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Principal–agent problem
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==Further reading== * {{cite book |last=Azfar |first=Omar |year=2007 |chapter=Chapter 8: Disrupting Corruption |chapter-url=http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/DisruptingCorruption.pdf |editor1-first=Anwar |editor1-last=Shah |title=Performance Accountability and Combating Corruption |url=https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/6732 |publisher=World Bank |isbn=9780821369418 |doi=10.1596/978-0-8213-6941-8 |hdl=10986/6732}} * {{cite journal |jstor=258191 |last=Eisenhardt |first=K. |year=1989 |title=Agency theory: An assessment and review |journal=Academy of Management Review |volume=14 |issue=1 |pages=57–74 |doi= 10.5465/amr.1989.4279003}} * Fleckinger, Pierre, David Martimort, and Nicolas Roux. 2024. "[https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.20241678 Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory]." ''Journal of Economic Literature'', 62 (4): 1589–1646. * Gailmard, Sean (2014), "[[doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199641253.013.0016|Accountability and Principal–Agent Theory]]" in ''The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability.'' Oxford University Press. * {{cite journal |last1=Green |first1=J. R. |first2=N. L. |last2=Stokey |year=1983 |title=A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts |journal= [[Journal of Political Economy]] |volume=91 |issue= 3|pages=349–64 |doi= 10.1086/261153 |jstor=1837093 |s2cid=18043549 |url= http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3203644|url-access=subscription }} * {{Citation | url = http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/mind_the_gap.pdf | publisher = IEA | year = 2007 | title = Mind the Gap—Quantifying Principal–Agent Problems in Energy Efficiency | access-date = February 7, 2013 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20180930110225/https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/mind_the_gap.pdf | archive-date = September 30, 2018 | url-status = dead }}. * Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Martimort, David (2002). ''The Theory of Incentives: The Principal–Agent Model''. Princeton University Press. * Miller, Gary. 2005. “The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models” ''Annual Review of Political Science'' 8: 203–25.. * {{cite journal |last1=Nikkinen |first1=Jussi |last2=Sahlström |first2= Petri |year=2004 |title=Does agency theory provide a general framework for audit pricing? |journal=International Journal of Auditing |volume=8 |issue=3 |pages=253–262 |doi=10.1111/j.1099-1123.2004.00094.x }} * Rees, R., 1985. "The Theory of Principal and Agent—Part I". ''[[Bulletin of Economic Research]]'', 37(1), 3–26 * Rees, R., 1985. "The Theory of Principal and Agent—Part II". ''Bulletin of Economic Research'', 37(2), 75–97 * Rutherford, R. & Springer, T. & Yavas, A. (2005). Conflicts between Principals and Agents: Evidence from Residential Brokerage. Journal of Financial Economics (76), 627–65. * {{cite journal |last=Rosen |first=S. |year=1986 |title=Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments |journal=[[American Economic Review]] |volume=76 |issue=4 |pages=701–715 |jstor=1806068 }} * {{cite journal |last=Sappington |first=David E. M. |title= Incentives in Principal–Agent Relationships |journal=[[Journal of Economic Perspectives]] |volume= 5 |issue= 2 |year= 1991 |pages= 45–66 |jstor=1942685 |doi= 10.1257/jep.5.2.45|doi-access= free }} * [[Joseph E. Stiglitz|Stiglitz, Joseph E.]] (1987). "Principal and agent", ''The [[New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics]]'', v. 3, pp. 966–71.
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