Editing Autoethnography (section)

====From "validity" to "truth"====
As an idea that emerged from the tradition of [[social constructionism]] and interpretive paradigm, autoethnography challenges the traditional social scientific methodology that emphasizes the criteria for quality in social research developed in terms of validity. [[Carolyn Ellis]] writes, <blockquote>In autoethnographic work, I look at validity in terms of what happens to readers as well as to research participants and researchers. To me, validity means that our work seeks verisimilitude; it evokes in readers a feeling that the experience described is lifelike, believable, and possible. You also can judge validity by whether it helps readers communicate with others different from themselves or offers a way to improve the lives of participants and readers—or even your own.<ref name=":5" />{{Rp|page=124}} </blockquote>In this sense, [[Carolyn Ellis|Ellis]] emphasizes the "narrative truth" for autoethnographic writings.

<blockquote>
I believe you should try to construct the story as close to the experience as you can remember it, especially in the initial version. If you do, it will help you work through the meaning and purpose of the story. But it's not so important that narratives represent lives accurately—only, as Art([[Art Bochner|Arthur Bochner]]) argues, "that narrators believe they are doing so" (Bochner, 2002, p. 86). Art believes that we can judge one narrative interpretation of events against another, but we cannot measure a narrative against the events themselves because the meaning of the events comes clear only in their narrative expression.<ref name=":5" />{{Rp|page=126}}
</blockquote>

Instead, [[Carolyn Ellis|Ellis]] suggests to judge autoethnographic writings on the usefulness of the story, rather than only on accuracy. She quotes [[Art Bochner]],<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bochner |first=Arthur P. |date=April 2001 |title=Narrative's Virtues |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/107780040100700201 |journal=Qualitative Inquiry |language=en |volume=7 |issue=2 |pages=131–157 |doi=10.1177/107780040100700201 |s2cid=145498475 |issn=1077-8004|url-access=subscription }}</ref> who argues

<blockquote>that the real questions is what narratives do, what consequences they have, to what uses they can be put. Narrative is the way we remember the past, turn life into language, and disclose to ourselves and others the truth of our experiences. In moving from concern with the inner veridicality to outer pragmatics of evaluating stories, Plummer [2001, p.&nbsp;401] also looks at uses, functions, and roles of stories, and adds that they "need to have rhetorical power enhanced by aesthetic delight (Ellis, 2004, p.&nbsp;126-127).</blockquote>

Similarly,

<blockquote>Laurel Richardson [1997, p.&nbsp;92] uses the metaphor of a crystal to deconstruct traditional validity. A crystal has an infinite number of shapes, dimensions and angles. It acts as a prism and changes shape, but still has structure. Another writer, Patti Lather [1993, p. 674], proposes counter-practices of authority that rupture validity as a "regime of truth" and lead to a critical political agenda [Cf. Olesen, 2000, p.&nbsp;231]. She mentions the four subtypes [pp. 685-686]: "ironic validity, concerning the problems of representation; paralogical validity, which honors differences and uncertainties; rhizomatic validity, which seeks out multiplicity; and voluptuous validity, which seeks out ethics through practices of engagement and self-reflexivity (Ellis, 2004, pp.&nbsp;124~125).</blockquote>