Editing Deterrence theory (section)

==Criticism==
===Deterrence failures===
{{see also|Salami slicing tactics}}
Deterrence theory has been criticized by numerous scholars for various reasons, the most basic being skepticism that decision makers are rational. A prominent strain of criticism argues that rational deterrence theory is contradicted by frequent deterrence failures, which may be attributed to misperceptions.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Jervis|first=Robert|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3QlsDQAAQBAJ|title=Perception and Misperception in International Politics: New Edition|date=1976|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-1-4008-8511-4|language=en|access-date=2021-11-20|archive-date=2024-02-24|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240224052359/https://books.google.com/books?id=3QlsDQAAQBAJ|url-status=live}}</ref> Here it's argued that misestimations of perceived costs and benefits by analysts contribute to deterrence failures,<ref>{{cite journal | doi=10.1080/13523260.2023.2259153 | title=Utility-based predictions of military escalation: Why experts forecasted Russia would not invade Ukraine | date=2023 | last1=Driedger | first1=Jonas J. | last2=Polianskii | first2=Mikhail | journal=Contemporary Security Policy | volume=44 | issue=4 | pages=544–560 | doi-access=free }}</ref> as exemplified in case of [[Russian invasion of Ukraine]]. [[Frozen conflict]]s can be seen as rewarding [[aggression]].<ref>{{cite journal | url=https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2023.2192137 | doi=10.1080/0163660X.2023.2192137 | title=A New Concert for Europe: Security and Order After the War | date=2023 | last1=Jung | first1=Karsten | journal=The Washington Quarterly | volume=46 | pages=25–43 | url-access=subscription }}</ref>

===Misprediction of behavior===
Scholars have also argued that leaders do not behave in ways that are consistent with the predictions of nuclear deterrence theory.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Green|first=Brendan Rittenhouse|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wFTMDwAAQBAJ|title=The Revolution that Failed: Nuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War|date=2020|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-108-48986-7|language=en|access-date=2021-11-20|archive-date=2024-02-24|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240224052405/https://books.google.com/books?id=wFTMDwAAQBAJ|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Citation|last=Jervis|first=Robert|title=The Nuclear Age|date=2021|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/before-and-after-the-fall/nuclear-age/3F9C601E9D5B0283487BEFCE73913C60|work=Before and After the Fall: World Politics and the End of the Cold War|pages=115–131|editor-last=Bartel|editor-first=Fritz|publisher=Cambridge University Press|doi=10.1017/9781108910194.008|isbn=978-1-108-90677-7|s2cid=244858515|editor2-last=Monteiro|editor2-first=Nuno P.|access-date=2021-12-17|archive-date=2024-02-24|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240224052405/https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/before-and-after-the-fall/nuclear-age/3F9C601E9D5B0283487BEFCE73913C60|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Sagan|first=Scott D.|date=1994|title=The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539178|journal=International Security|volume=18|issue=4|pages=66–107|doi=10.2307/2539178|jstor=2539178|s2cid=153925234|issn=0162-2889|access-date=2022-02-14|archive-date=2022-02-14|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220214233129/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539178|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref> Scholars have also argued that rational deterrence theory does not grapple sufficiently with emotions and psychological biases that make accidents, loss of self-control, and loss of control over others likely.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2023-02-26 |title=Don't Be So Confident in Nuclear Decision-Making |url=https://www.lawfaremedia.org/topics/armed-conflict |access-date=2023-03-04 |website=Lawfare |language=en |archive-date=2023-07-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230707162609/https://www.lawfaremedia.org/topics/armed-conflict |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |date=2023 |title=The Psychology of Nuclear Brinkmanship |url=https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/47/3/9/114669/The-Psychology-of-Nuclear-Brinkmanship |journal=International Security |access-date=2023-03-04 |archive-date=2023-03-04 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230304134035/https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/47/3/9/114669/The-Psychology-of-Nuclear-Brinkmanship |url-status=live }}</ref> Frank C. Zagare has argued that deterrence theory is logically inconsistent and empirically inaccurate. In place of classical deterrence, rational choice scholars have argued for ''perfect deterrence'', which assumes that states may vary in their internal characteristics and especially in the credibility of their threats of retaliation.<ref name="Zagare_2004">
{{Citation
|last=Zagare
|first=Frank C.
|year=2004
|title=Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence: A Re-examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory
|journal=Journal of Theoretical Politics
|volume=16
|issue=2
|pages=107–141
|doi=10.1177/0951629804041117
|citeseerx=10.1.1.335.7353
|s2cid=13900591
}}</ref>

===Suicide attacks===
Advocates for [[nuclear disarmament]], such as [[Global Zero (campaign)|Global Zero]], have criticized nuclear deterrence theory. [[Sam Nunn]], [[William J. Perry|William Perry]], [[Henry Kissinger]], and [[George Shultz]] have all called upon governments to embrace the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and created the Nuclear Security Project to advance that agenda.<ref name="globalzero">{{cite news |date=June 16, 2011 |title=Nuclear endgame: The growing appeal of zero |newspaper=The Economist |url=http://www.economist.com/node/18836134 |access-date=January 17, 2012 |archive-date=December 3, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111203114636/http://www.economist.com/node/18836134 |url-status=live }}</ref> In 2010, the four were featured in a documentary film entitled ''[[Nuclear Tipping Point]]'' where proposed steps to achieve nuclear disarmament.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.economist.com/node/18836134 |title=The Growing Appeal of Zero |date=June 18, 2011 |newspaper=The Economist |page=66 |access-date=January 17, 2012 |archive-date=December 3, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111203114636/http://www.economist.com/node/18836134 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |access-date=2010-06-10 |url=https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=123012569&sc=emaf |title=Documentary Advances Nuclear Free Movement |newspaper=NPR.org |publisher=NPR |archive-date=2023-04-05 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230405161533/https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=123012569&sc=emaf |url-status=live }}</ref> Kissinger has argued, "The classical notion of deterrence was that there was some consequences before which aggressors and evildoers would recoil. In a world of suicide bombers, that calculation doesn't operate in any comparable way."<ref>{{cite web |url=https://thehill.com/opinion/columnists/ben-goddard/59952-cold-warriors-say-no-nukes/ |title=Cold Warriors say no nukes |author=Ben Goddard |date=2010-01-27 |work=The Hill |access-date=2013-11-15 |archive-date=2014-02-13 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140213100710/http://thehill.com/opinion/columnists/ben-goddard/78391-cold-warriors-say-no-nukes |url-status=live }}</ref> Shultz said, "If you think of the people who are doing suicide attacks, and people like that get a nuclear weapon, they are almost by definition not deterrable."<ref>{{cite web |url=http://thebulletin.org/new-abolitionists |title=The new abolitionists |author=Hugh Gusterson |date=30 March 2012 |work=[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]] |author-link=Hugh Gusterson |access-date=15 November 2013 |archive-date=17 February 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140217074609/http://thebulletin.org/new-abolitionists |url-status=dead }}</ref>

===Stronger deterrent===
[[Paul Nitze]] argued in 1994 that nuclear weapons were obsolete in the "new world disorder" after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and he advocated reliance on precision guided munitions to secure a permanent military advantage over future adversaries.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Nitze |first1=Paul |title=IS IT TIME TO JUNK OUR NUKES? THE NEW WORLD DISORDER MAKES THEM OBSOLETE |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1994/01/16/is-it-time-to-junk-our-nukes-the-new-world-disorder-makes-them-obsolete/e3580886-a891-462f-98bc-b3deaf07fdbd/ |access-date=July 2, 2019 |website=washingtonpost dot com |publisher=WP Company LLC |archive-date=July 2, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190702175008/https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1994/01/16/is-it-time-to-junk-our-nukes-the-new-world-disorder-makes-them-obsolete/e3580886-a891-462f-98bc-b3deaf07fdbd/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Minimum deterrence===
As opposed to the extreme [[mutually assured destruction]] form of deterrence, the concept of [[minimum deterrence]] in which a state possesses no more nuclear weapons than is necessary to deter an adversary from attacking is presently the most common form of deterrence practiced by [[nuclear weapon states]], such as China, India, Pakistan, Britain, and France.<ref>Kristensen, Hans M, Robert S Norris, and Ivan Oelrich. "[https://fas.org/pubs/_pages/occ_pap7.html From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150620163400/https://fas.org/pubs/_pages/occ_pap7.html |date=2015-06-20 }}." [https://fas.org/ ''Federation of American Scientists''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170921014729/https://fas.org/ |date=2017-09-21 }}. April 2009. Accessed July 31, 2010.</ref> Pursuing [[minimal deterrence]] during arms negotiations between the United States and Russia allows each state to make [[nuclear stockpile]] reductions without the state becoming vulnerable, but it has been noted that there comes a point that further reductions may be undesirable, once minimal deterrence is reached, as further reductions beyond that point increase a state's vulnerability and provide an incentive for an adversary to expand its nuclear arsenal secretly.<ref>[[Barry Nalebuff|Nalebuff, Barry]]. "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence." ''[[Journal of Conflict Resolution]]'' 32, no. 3 (September 1988): p. 424.</ref>

France has developed and maintained its own [[Force de frappe|nuclear deterrent]] under the belief that the United States will refuse to risk its own cities by assisting Western Europe in a nuclear war.<ref name="ullman1989">{{cite journal | jstor=1148862 | title=The Covert French Connection | author=Ullman, Richard H. | journal=Foreign Policy |date=Summer 1989 | volume=75 | issue=75 | pages=3–33| doi=10.2307/1148862 }}</ref>

===Ethical objections===
In the post [[cold war]] era, philosophical objections to the reliance upon deterrence theories in general have also been raised on purely [[ethical]] grounds. Scholars such as [[Robert L. Holmes]] have noted that the implementation of such theories is inconsistent with a fundamental [[deontological]] presumption which prohibits the killing of innocent life. Consequently, such theories are [[prima facie]] immoral in nature. In addition, he observes that deterrence theories serve to perpetuate a state of mutual assured destruction between nations over time. Holmes further argues that it is therefore both irrational and immoral to utilize a methodology for perpetuating international peace which relies exclusively upon the continuous development of new iterations of the very weapons which it is designed to prohibit.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Meyers |first=Diana T. |date=1992 |title=Reviewed work: On War and Morality, Robert L. Holmes |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2185583.pdf |journal=The Philosophical Review |volume=101 |issue=2 |pages=481–484 |doi=10.2307/2185583 |jstor=2185583}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Rock |first=Stephen R. |date=1989 |title=Reviewed work: On War and Morality, Robert L. Holmes; Paths to Peace: Exploring the Feasibility of Sustainable Peace, Richard Smoke, Willis Harman |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1961738.pdf |journal=The American Political Science Review |volume=83 |issue=4 |pages=1447–1448 |doi=10.2307/1961738 |jstor=1961738}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Lee |first=Steven |date=1992 |title=Reviewed work: On War and Morality., Robert L. Holmes |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2216042.pdf |journal=Noûs |volume=26 |issue=4 |pages=559–562 |doi=10.2307/2216042 |jstor=2216042}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Holmes |first=Robert L. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TBoABAAAQBAJ&q=Robert+L.+Holms |title=On War and Morality |date=14 July 2014 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-1-4008-6014-2}}</ref>