Editing Peacekeeping (section)

=== Limitations on contemporary intervention and conflict resolution ===
Throughout the duration of the Cold War external intervention and mediation in civil conflicts took on a state-centric mechanism in which sovereignty was inviolable. Rarely did the international community intervene in internal conflicts involving a state's government and domestic belligerents that opposed it. Since the end of the Cold War, however, that has changed. Today, mediation by international actors in civil conflict rest on a standardised resolution mechanism that accords broadly equal standing to all factions within a conflict, and attempts to reach a settlement accepted by all.<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal|last=Clapham|first=Christopher|date=1998|title=Rwanda: The Perils of Peace|journal=Journal of Peace Research|volume=35|issue=2|pages=193–210|doi=10.1177/0022343398035002003|s2cid=110533606}}</ref>

The end of the Cold War presented an opportunity to reshape the international system. This opportunity was afforded to the Cold War's victors—that is to say, the [[United States]] and other western capitalist states governed by liberal-democratic values that put a premium on [[Human rights|basic human rights]] and [[democratization]].<ref name=":3" /> In the preceding decades the state was the only entity to receive special status. While there were exceptions, such as groups struggling against colonial powers, the state possessed the ultimate degree of legitimacy. As a result, the international community rarely meddled with the internal machinations of a given country. Sovereignty was not to be violated and this was a system which benefited both superpowers, their allies, as well as [[Third World|third world]] governments.<ref name=":3" />

Now, however, with legitimacy being extended to non-state actors, as well as the opportunity for a minority to secede from a given state and form a new country there has been a dramatic shift in the international status quo. Moreover, the international community's model for conflict resolution is heavily influenced by academic thought developed in western countries. This model encourages intervening in civil wars in order to stop political violence and come to a negotiated settlement which often involves democratising efforts.<ref name=":3" /> Critics such as Christopher Clapham and [[David Shearer]], argue that this intervention can provide mechanisms for continued conflict to the detriment of the civilian population. Clapham's argument is principally in relation to the situation in [[Rwanda]] leading up to the [[Rwandan genocide|genocide]],<ref name=":3" /> whereas Shearer focuses on the negative aspects of intervention, primarily regarding [[Sierra Leone]], which prevents total victory by one side and results in the creation of asymmetries between belligerents which opens the door for continued bloodshed.<ref name=":4">{{Cite journal|last=Shearer|first=David|date=1997|title=Exploring the Limits of Consent: Conflict Resolution in Sierra Leone|journal=Millennium- Journal of International Studies|volume=26|issue=3|pages=845–860|doi=10.1177/03058298970260030601|s2cid=144940982}}</ref>

In Rwanda, third-party attempts at a negotiated settlement between the [[Hutu]] and [[Tutsi]] afforded an opportunity for Hutu extremists to prepare for the killing of Hutu moderates and the genocide of the Tutsi. The international community, led by regional states from the [[Organisation of African Unity]], sought to negotiate a settlement and find a solution for the ongoing ethnic violence between Hutu and Tutsi via the Arusha Peace Process. This process lasted just over a year, included substantial international involvement, and incorporated many regional actors such as [[Tanzania]] (host of the process), [[Burundi]], [[Uganda]] and [[Zaire]].<ref name=":3" />

While the [[Rwandan Patriotic Front]] (RPF) was a major beneficiary of the [[Arusha Accords (Rwanda)|Arusha accords]] and was able to redress many of its grievances, many of the gains that it made could have been achieved through military action. Arusha, according to Clapham, affected the relative power of the participants in the two following ways: a ceasefire which froze the distribution of territorial control at a particular point and secondly the importance it ascribed to the participants of the negotiations.<ref name=":3" /> Meaning that it froze the conflict and prevented continued territorial gains being made by the RPF, in addition to designating the degree of importance with regard to the factions within the negotiations. A faction's importance was weighted not on their relative popularity or military strength, but on artificial weight assigned by the mediators. Thus, the entire process served to undermine the RPF's position while stalling their hitherto successful military campaign, while allowing Hutu extremists to prepare for a genocide.

Shearer argues that modern strategies that rely solely on consent-based negotiations are severely limited and that victory by military means should not be ignored. He states that a shift in battlefield fortunes can often bring one belligerent to the negotiation table and will likewise moderate their demands.<ref name=":4" />

Consent is of great importance when it comes to negotiation and mediation. The current international system and the conflict resolution model which the international community has utilised most since the end of the Cold War puts a premium on consent. But Shearer asks that if a belligerent uses negotiations and cease-fires as a method of delay in order to allow them to reposition military forces and continue fighting, then should consent-based strategies still be pursued, regardless of the potential for lengthening a conflict and the associated human cost?<ref name=":4" />

According to the empirical analysis cited by Shearer, past civil wars with negotiated settlements have had little success. He cites a study from John Stedman that notes between 1900 and 1980 85% of civil wars were solved by one side winning outright (this excludes colonial wars). 15% percent ended as a result of negotiation.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, Roy Licklider's study supports these conclusions by noting the following:<blockquote>From 1945 to 1989, 58 out of a total of 93 civil conflicts, as he categorised them, were settled in some form, while the remainder continued. However, only 14 (or 24 percent) of those settled were solved by negotiation. The others (76 percent) ended with military victories. Additionally, fighting resumed in seven of the 14 conflict which were initially ended by negotiation. The overall success rate of negotiated settlements, therefore, was around 12 percent out of the internal wars that ended.<ref name=":4" /></blockquote>In Sierra Leone the [[Revolutionary United Front]], led by [[Foday Sankoh]], fought an ongoing and bloody civil war with the government from 1991 to 1996. The conflict attracted little international attention, but managed to devastate the country and destroy its economy. Neither belligerent was willing to concede or compromise on their demands, despite multiple attempts at a negotiated settlement. Sankoh would come to the table after the intervention of the [[Private military company|private military corporation]] [[Executive Outcomes]] and a reversal in the RUF's battlefield fortunes.<ref name=":4" />

In the aftermath the RUF was a depleted threat, civilians were able to return from refugee camps and begin rebuilding their lives. But the peace was fragile and negotiations were ongoing. The RUF was reluctant to put down their arms, concerned over potential retribution at the hands of army units and civilian militias alike. There was a planned deployment of UN peacekeepers meant to ease these concerns and help with the transition to peace, but things began to unravel. International contributors began to shy away from further peacekeeping initiatives; such as an expensive and open-ended mission in a strategically unimportant country. As a result, the UN's intervention force was slow to come to fruition and then came to a halt completely when Sankoh argued the size of the contingent of 740 UN peacekeepers was too large.<ref name=":4" />

The UN refused to engage without total consent from both parties, thus preventing the deployment of a peacekeeping force. This consent-based approach, Shearer argues, illustrates the limits the UN can play in the volatile and fragile state of affairs that exist during and after civil wars. "In Sierra Leone, it meant that an important component needed to shore up the peace-building process was absent. It also meant that Sankoh was dictating terms."<ref name=":4" /> This consent-based approach effectively allowed the leadership of a brutal rebel group to hinder the potential for peace.

The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the newly elected [[Ahmad Tejan Kabbah|President]] of Sierra Leone terminated the Executive Outcomes contract undermining his [[hard power]] advantage. Things were further inflamed when disaffected officers of the [[Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces|army]] overthrew the government in 1997.<ref name=":4" /> The war quickly renewed. A small UN force of monitors was deployed to observe the security situation. [[United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone|UNOMSIL]], as it was called, was deployed between July 1998 and October 1999, but was forced to withdraw from the country when the RUF took the country's [[Freetown|capitol]].<ref name=":5">{{Cite book|title=Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' choices after Civil War|last=Fortna|first=Virginia|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=2008|pages=123–124}}</ref>

[[United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone|UNAMSIL]] was eventually formed and deployed in 1999, authorised under a Chapter VII mandate, it was meant to enforce the Lome agreements. However, violence would continue. From the outset the RUF was beyond uncooperative and once the [[Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group|ECOMOG]] contingent withdrew, the RUF attacked UN forces, eventually taking hundreds hostage.<ref name=":5" /> This led to an unexpected backlash from the international community that the RUF did not anticipate. Its leadership had expected the international community to cut and run, as it had done in Somalia and earlier when UNOMSIL fled Freetown. Instead, with British support, an aggressive [[British military intervention in the Sierra Leone Civil War|campaign]] was waged against the RUF. UNAMSIL's mandate was expanded and its manpower enlarged. By late 2000 and early 2001 the RUF's military strength had been severely depleted. Thus the [[Abuja Agreement (disambiguation)|Abuja agreements]]<!--intentional link to DAB page--> were signed and UNAMSIL fulfilled its mandate in December 2005.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/|title=UNAMSIL: United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone|website=www.un.org|access-date=May 5, 2016}}</ref> While Sierra Leone is at peace today and the UN's mission can be deemed a success, the way in which the situation developed illustrates Shearer's point: that a consent-based approach focused on negotiation that encompasses all belligerents' interest may not necessarily lead to success. As we see, fighting continued despite the presence of UNOMSIL. Indeed, even after UNOMSIL was replaced by a more robust force under a Chapter VII mandate in the form of UNAMSIL the violence continued. When the British intervened militarily and substantially degraded the RUF's capability to sustain the conflict, as Executive Outcomes had done years prior, the RUF finally come to the negotiating table and allowed for the establishment of peace.

Some authors question the idea of international interventions at all. In a 2005 working paper for the Center for Global Development, [[Jeremy Weinstein]] of [[Stanford University]] provides a theory of "autonomous recovery", in which states can achieve sustainable peace without international intervention. Using case studies of [[Uganda]], [[Eritrea]], and [[Somalia]], Weinstein demonstrates how states can develop effective institutions out of warfare. This method has cost and benefits that must be weighed against the potential outcome of international intervention. External intervention can stop mass atrocities, but also stop institutional change. Autonomous recovery elevates the strongest leader, but also rewards the strongest fighters who may be less inclined to share power. Furthermore, intervention depends on external influence while autonomous recovery is based on internal factors. The conclusions of his argument could suggest intervention is not ideal policy, but Weinstein argues the international community's "[[responsibility to protect]]" doctrine has moral importance for intervention and the conditions for "autonomous recovery" are very rare. Weinstein argues the fundamental challenge is how to incentivise good governance and assistance to rebel groups without disrupting the connection of citizens to rulers in terms of revenue collection that enables accountability.<ref>Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2005. "Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention in Comparative Perspective." Center for Global Development Working Paper 57.https://www.cgdev.org/files/2731_file_WP57.pdf</ref>