Editing Pseudoscience (section)

===Philosophy===
{{Main|Demarcation problem}}

Karl Popper stated it is insufficient to distinguish science from pseudoscience, or from [[metaphysics]] (such as the philosophical question of what [[existence]] means), by the criterion of rigorous adherence to the [[Empiricism|empirical method]], which is essentially inductive, based on observation or experimentation.<ref name="Popper, Karl 1963">{{cite book|last=Popper|first=Karl|author-link=Karl Popper|year=1963|title=Conjectures and Refutations|url=http://www.paul-rosenfels.org/Popper.pdf|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171013124349/http://www.paul-rosenfels.org/Popper.pdf|archive-date=13 October 2017}}</ref> He proposed a method to distinguish between genuine empirical, nonempirical or even pseudoempirical methods. The latter case was exemplified by astrology, which appeals to observation and experimentation. While it had [[empirical research|empirical evidence]] based on observation, on [[horoscopes]] and [[biographies]], it crucially failed to use acceptable scientific standards.<ref name="Popper, Karl 1963"/> Popper proposed falsifiability as an important criterion in distinguishing science from pseudoscience.

To demonstrate this point, Popper<ref name="Popper, Karl 1963"/> gave two cases of human behavior and typical explanations from [[Sigmund Freud]] and [[Alfred Adler]]'s theories: "that of a man who pushes a child into the water with the intention of drowning it; and that of a man who sacrifices his life in an attempt to save the child."<ref name="Popper, Karl 1963"/> From Freud's perspective, the first man would have suffered from [[psychological repression]], probably originating from an [[Oedipus complex]], whereas the second man had attained [[Sublimation (psychology)|sublimation]]. From Adler's perspective, the first and second man suffered from feelings of [[inferiority]] and had to prove himself, which drove him to commit the crime or, in the second case, drove him to rescue the child. Popper was not able to find any counterexamples of human behavior in which the behavior could not be explained in the terms of Adler's or Freud's theory. Popper argued<ref name="Popper, Karl 1963"/> it was that the observation always fitted or confirmed the theory which, rather than being its strength, was actually its weakness. In contrast, Popper<ref name="Popper, Karl 1963"/> gave the example of Einstein's [[gravitational theory]], which predicted "light must be attracted by heavy bodies (such as the Sun), precisely as material bodies were attracted."<ref name="Popper, Karl 1963"/> Following from this, stars closer to the Sun would appear to have moved a small distance away from the Sun, and away from each other. This prediction was particularly striking to Popper because it involved considerable risk. The brightness of the Sun prevented this effect from being observed under normal circumstances, so photographs had to be taken during an eclipse and compared to photographs taken at night. Popper states, "If observation shows that the predicted effect is definitely absent, then the theory is simply refuted."<ref name="Popper, Karl 1963"/> Popper summed up his criterion for the scientific status of a theory as depending on its falsifiability, refutability, or [[testability]].

[[Paul R. Thagard]] used astrology as a case study to distinguish science from pseudoscience and proposed principles and criteria to delineate them.{{sfnp|Thagard|1978}} First, astrology has not progressed in that it has not been updated nor added any explanatory power since [[Ptolemy]]. Second, it has ignored outstanding problems such as the [[Axial precession (astronomy)|precession of equinoxes]] in astronomy. Third, alternative theories of [[Personality psychology|personality]] and behavior have grown progressively to encompass explanations of phenomena which astrology statically attributes to heavenly forces. Fourth, astrologers have remained uninterested in furthering the theory to deal with outstanding problems or in critically evaluating the theory in relation to other theories. Thagard intended this criterion to be extended to areas other than astrology. He believed it would delineate as pseudoscientific such practices as [[witchcraft]] and [[pyramidology]], while leaving [[physics]], [[chemistry]], [[astronomy]], [[geoscience]], [[biology]], and [[archaeology]] in the realm of science.{{sfnp|Thagard|1978}}

In the [[Philosophy of science|philosophy]] and history of science, [[Imre Lakatos]] stresses the social and political importance of the demarcation problem, the normative methodological problem of distinguishing between science and pseudoscience. His distinctive historical analysis of scientific methodology based on research programmes suggests: "scientists regard the successful theoretical prediction of stunning novel facts&nbsp;– such as the return of Halley's comet or the gravitational bending of light rays&nbsp;– as what demarcates good scientific theories from pseudo-scientific and degenerate theories, and in spite of all scientific theories being forever confronted by 'an ocean of counterexamples'".<ref name="Imre-Lakatos"/> Lakatos offers a "novel [[fallibilist]] analysis of the development of Newton's celestial dynamics, [his] favourite historical example of his methodology" and argues in light of this historical turn, that his account answers for certain inadequacies in those of [[Karl Popper]] and Thomas Kuhn.<ref name="Imre-Lakatos"/> "Nonetheless, Lakatos did recognize the force of Kuhn's historical criticism of Popper&nbsp;– all important theories have been surrounded by an 'ocean of anomalies', which on a falsificationist view would require the rejection of the theory outright...Lakatos sought to reconcile the [[rationalism]] of Popperian falsificationism with what seemed to be its own refutation by history".<ref name="Bird2008">{{cite book|first=Alexander|last=Bird|chapter=The Historical Turn in the Philosophy of Science |title=Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science|editor1-first=Stathis|editor1-last=Psillos|editor2-first=Martin|editor2-last=Curd|location=Abingdon|publisher=Routledge|year=2008 |pages=9, 14|chapter-url=http://eis.bris.ac.uk/~plajb/research/papers/The-Historical-Turn.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130601030150/http://eis.bris.ac.uk/~plajb/research/papers/The-Historical-Turn.pdf|archive-date=1 June 2013|url-status=live}}</ref>

{{blockquote|Many philosophers have tried to solve the problem of demarcation in the following terms: a statement constitutes knowledge if sufficiently many people believe it sufficiently strongly. But the history of thought shows us that many people were totally committed to absurd beliefs. If the strengths of beliefs were a hallmark of knowledge, we should have to rank some tales about demons, angels, devils, and of heaven and hell as knowledge. Scientists, on the other hand, are very sceptical even of their best theories. Newton's is the most powerful theory science has yet produced, but Newton himself never believed that bodies attract each other at a distance. So no degree of commitment to beliefs makes them knowledge. Indeed, the hallmark of scientific behaviour is a certain scepticism even towards one's most cherished theories. Blind commitment to a theory is not an intellectual virtue: it is an intellectual crime.<br/><br/>
Thus a statement may be pseudoscientific even if it is eminently 'plausible' and everybody believes in it, and it may be scientifically valuable even if it is unbelievable and nobody believes in it. A theory may even be of supreme scientific value even if no one understands it, let alone believes in it.<ref name="Imre-Lakatos"/>|Imre Lakatos|Science and Pseudoscience}}

The boundary between science and pseudoscience is disputed and difficult to determine analytically, even after more than a century of study by philosophers of science and [[scientist]]s, and despite some basic agreements on the fundamentals of the scientific method.<ref name="Cover_Curd_1998"/>{{sfnp|Gauch|2003|pp=3–7}}<ref>{{cite book|last=Gordin|first=Michael D.|article=That a clear line of demarcation has separated science from pseudoscience|editor-last1=Numbers|editor-first1=Ronald L.|editor-last2=Kampourakis|editor-first2=Kostas|title=Newton's Apple and Other Myths about Science|pages=219–25|publisher=Harvard University Press|year=2015|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=pWouCwAAQBAJ&q=newton's+apple+and+other+myths+about+science|isbn=978-0-674-91547-3|access-date=11 January 2022|archive-date=11 October 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211011230629/https://books.google.com/books?id=pWouCwAAQBAJ&q=newton%27s+apple+and+other+myths+about+science|url-status=live}}</ref> The concept of pseudoscience rests on an understanding that the scientific method has been misrepresented or misapplied with respect to a given theory, but many philosophers of science maintain that different kinds of methods are held as appropriate across different fields and different eras of human history. According to Lakatos, the typical descriptive unit of great scientific achievements is not an isolated hypothesis but "a powerful problem-solving machinery, which, with the help of sophisticated mathematical techniques, digests anomalies and even turns them into positive evidence".<ref name="Imre-Lakatos"/>

{{blockquote|To Popper, pseudoscience uses induction to generate theories, and only performs experiments to seek to verify them. To Popper, falsifiability is what determines the scientific status of a theory. Taking a historical approach, Kuhn observed that scientists did not follow Popper's rule, and might ignore falsifying data, unless overwhelming. To Kuhn, puzzle-solving within a paradigm is science. Lakatos attempted to resolve this debate, by suggesting history shows that science occurs in research programmes, competing according to how progressive they are. The leading idea of a programme could evolve, driven by its heuristic to make predictions that can be supported by evidence. Feyerabend claimed that Lakatos was selective in his examples, and the whole history of science shows there is no universal rule of scientific method, and imposing one on the scientific community impedes progress.<ref name="Newbold">{{cite journal|vauthors=Newbold D, Roberts J|title=An analysis of the demarcation problem in science and its application to therapeutic touch theory|journal=International Journal of Nursing Practice|volume=13 |issue=6|pages=324–30|year=2007|pmid=18021160|doi=10.1111/j.1440-172X.2007.00646.x}}</ref>|David Newbold and Julia Roberts|"An analysis of the demarcation problem in science and its application to therapeutic touch theory" in ''International Journal of Nursing Practice'', Vol. 13}} Laudan maintained that the demarcation between science and non-science was a pseudo-problem, preferring to focus on the more general distinction between reliable and unreliable knowledge.<ref>{{cite book|vauthors=Laudan L|author-link=Larry Laudan|veditors=Cohen RS, Laudan L|title=Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: Essays in Honor of Adolf Grünbaum|series=Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science|volume=76|year=1983|publisher=D. Reidel|location=Dordrecht|isbn=978-90-277-1533-3|pages=111–127|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AEvprSJzv2MC|chapter=The Demise of the Demarcation Problem|access-date=25 October 2015|archive-date=25 September 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200925144320/https://books.google.com/books?id=AEvprSJzv2MC|url-status=live}}</ref>

{{blockquote|[Feyerabend] regards Lakatos's view as being closet anarchism disguised as methodological rationalism. Feyerabend's claim was not that standard methodological rules should never be obeyed, but rather that sometimes progress is made by abandoning them. In the absence of a generally accepted rule, there is a need for alternative methods of persuasion. According to Feyerabend, Galileo employed stylistic and rhetorical techniques to convince his reader, while he also wrote in Italian rather than Latin and directed his arguments to those already temperamentally inclined to accept them.<ref name="Bird2008"/>|Alexander Bird|"The Historical Turn in the Philosophy of Science" in ''Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science''}}