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== Rocket engine development == === United States === The development of the US rocket engine industry has been shaped by a complex web of relationships between government agencies, private companies, research institutions, and other stakeholders. Since the establishment of the first [[liquid-propellant rocket]] engine company ([[Reaction Motors|Reaction Motors, Inc.]]) in 1941 and the first government laboratory ([[Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory|GALCIT]]) devoted to the subject, the US liquid-propellant rocket engine (LPRE) industry has undergone significant changes. At least 14 US companies have been involved in the design, development, manufacture, testing, and flight support operations of various types of rocket engines from 1940 to 2000. In contrast to other countries like Russia, China, or India, where only government or pseudogovernment organisations engage in this business, the US government relies heavily on private industry. These commercial companies are essential to the continued viability of the United States and its form of governance, as they compete with one another to provide cutting-edge rocket engines that meet the needs of the government, the military, and the private sector. In the United States the company that develops the LPRE usually is awarded the production contract. Generally, the need or demand for a new rocket engine comes from government agencies such as [[NASA]] or the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]]. Once the need is identified, government agencies may issue [[Request for proposal|requests for proposals]] (RFPs) to solicit proposals from private companies and research institutions. Private companies and research institutions, in turn, may invest in research and development (R&D) activities to develop new rocket engine technologies that meet the needs and specifications outlined in the RFPs. Alongside private companies, universities, independent research institutes and government laboratories also play a critical role in the research and development of rocket engines. Universities provide graduate and undergraduate education to train qualified technical personnel, and their research programs often contribute to the advancement of rocket engine technologies. More than 25 universities in the US have taught or are currently teaching courses related to Liquid Propellant Rocket Engines (LPREs), and their graduate and undergraduate education programs are considered one of their most important contributions. Universities such as Princeton University, Cornell University, Purdue University, Pennsylvania State University, University of Alabama, the Navy's Post-Graduate School, or the California Institute of Technology have conducted excellent R&D work on topics related to the rocket engine industry.<ref name=":0" /> One of the earliest examples of the contribution of universities to the rocket engine industry is the work of the GALCIT in 1941. They demonstrated the first jet-assisted takeoff (JATO) rockets to the Army, leading to the establishment of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. However the transfer of knowledge from research professors and their projects to the rocket engine industry has been a mixed experience. While some notable professors and relevant research projects have positively influenced industry practices and understanding of LPREs, the connection between university research and commercial companies has been inconsistent and weak.<ref name=":0" /> Universities were not always aware of the industry's specific needs, and engineers and designers in the industry had limited knowledge of university research. As a result, many university research programs remained relatively unknown to industry decision-makers. Furthermore, in the last few decades, certain university research projects, while interesting to professors, were not useful to the industry due to a lack of communication or relevance to industry needs.<ref name=":0" /> Government laboratories, including the Rocket Propulsion Laboratory (now part of Air Force Research Laboratory), Arnold Engineering Test Center, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Stennis Space Center, White Sands Proving Grounds, and NASA John H. Glenn Research Center, have played crucial roles in the development of liquid rocket propulsion engines (LPREs).<ref name=":0" /> They have conducted unbiased testing, guided work at US and some non-US contractors, performed research and development, and provided essential testing facilities including hover test facilities and simulated altitude test facilities and resources. Initially, private companies or foundations financed smaller test facilities, but since the 1950s, the U.S. government has funded larger test facilities at government laboratories. This approach reduced costs for the government by not building similar facilities at contractors' plants but increased complexity and expenses for contractors. Nonetheless, government laboratories have solidified their significance and contributed to LPRE advancements. LPRE programs have been subject to several cancellations in the United States, even after spending millions of dollars on their development. For example, the M-l LOX/LH2 LPRE, Titan I, and the RS-2200 aerospike, as well as several JATO units and large uncooled thrust chambers were cancelled. The cancellations of these programs were not related to the specific LPRE's performance or any issues with it. Instead, they were due to the cancellation of the vehicle programs the engine was intended for or budget cuts imposed by the government. === USSR === Russia and the former Soviet Union was and still is the world's foremost nation in developing and building rocket engines. From 1950 to 1998, their organisations developed, built, and put into operation a larger number and a larger variety of liquid propellant rocket engine (LPRE) designs than any other country. Approximately 500 different LPREs have been developed before 2003. For comparison the United States has developed slightly more than 300 (before 2003). The Soviets also had the most rocket-propelled flight vehicles. They had more liquid propellant [[ballistic missile]]s and more [[Launch vehicle|space launch vehicles]] derived or converted from these decommissioned ballistic missiles than any other nation. As of the end of 1998, the Russians (or earlier the Soviet Union) had successfully launched 2573 [[satellite]]s with LPREs or almost 65% of the world total of 3973. All of these vehicle flights were made possible by the timely development of suitable high-performance reliable LPREs.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last=Sutton |first=George |title=History of Liquid Propellant Rocket Engines |publisher=AIAA |year=2006 |isbn=978-1-56347-649-5}}</ref> ==== Institutions and actors ==== Unlike many other countries where the development and production of rocket engines were consolidated within a single organisation, the Soviet Union took a different approach, they established numerous specialised [[OKB|design bureaus]] (DB) which would compete for development contracts. These design bureaus, or "konstruktorskoye buro" (KB) in Russian were state run organisations which were primarily responsible for carrying out [[Research and development|research, development]] and [[Prototype|prototyping]] of advanced technologies usually related to [[Military technology|military hardware]], such as [[turbojet]] [[engine]]s, aircraft components, [[missile]]s, or [[Launch vehicle|space launch vehicles]]. [[OKB|Design Bureaus]] which specialised in rocket engines often possessed the necessary personnel, facilities, and equipment to conduct l[[Launch vehicle system tests|aboratory tests, flow tests, and ground testing of experimental rocket engines]]. Some even had specialised facilities for testing very large engines, conducting [[Launch vehicle system tests|static firings]] of engines installed in vehicle stages, or simulating altitude conditions during engine tests. In certain cases, engine testing, certification and [[quality control]] were outsourced to other organisations and locations with more suitable test facilities. Many DBs also had housing complexes, gymnasiums, and medical facilities intended to support the needs of their employees and their families. The Soviet Union's LPRE development effort saw significant growth during the 1960s and reached its peak in the 1970s. This era coincided with the [[Cold War]] between the Soviet Union and the United States, characterised by intense competition in spaceflight achievements. Between 14 and 17 Design Bureaus and research institutes were actively involved in developing LPREs during this period. These organisations received relatively steady support and funding due to high military and [[Soviet space program|spaceflight priorities]], which facilitated the continuous development of new engine concepts and manufacturing methods. Once a mission with a new vehicle (missile or spacecraft) was established it was passed on to a design bureau whose role was to oversee the development of the entire rocket. If none of the previously developed rocket engines met the needs of the mission, a new rocket engine with specific requirements would be contracted to another DB specialised in LPRE development (oftentimes each DB had expertise in specific types of LPREs with different applications, propellants, or engine sizes). This meant that the development or design study of a rocket engine was always aimed at a specific application which entailed set requirements. When it comes to which DBs were awarded contracts for the development of new rocket engines either a single design bureau would be chosen or several design bureaus would be given the same contract which sometimes led to fierce competition between DBs. When only one DB was picked for the development, it was often the result of the relationship between a vehicle or system's chief designer and the chief designer of a rocket engine specialised DB. If the vehicle's chief designer was happy with previous work done by a certain design bureau it was not unusual to see continued reliance on that LPRE bureau for that class of engines. For example, all but one of the LPREs for submarine-launched missiles were developed by the same design bureau for the same vehicle development prime contractor. However, when two parallel engine development programs were supported in order to select the superior one for a specific application, several qualified rocket engine models were never used. This luxury of choice was not commonly available in other nations. However, the use of design bureaus also led to certain issues, including program cancellations and duplication. Some major programs were cancelled, resulting in the disposal or storage of previously developed engines. One notable example of duplication and cancellation was the development of engines for the R-9A ballistic missile. Two sets of engines were supported, but ultimately only one set was selected, leaving several perfectly functional engines unused. Similarly, for the ambitious heavy N-l space launch vehicle intended for lunar and planetary missions, the Soviet Union developed and put into production at least two engines for each of the six stages. Additionally, they developed alternate engines for a more advanced N-l vehicle. However, the program faced multiple flight failures, and with the United States' successful [[Moon landing]], the program was ultimately cancelled, leaving the Soviet Union with a surplus of newly qualified engines without a clear purpose. These examples demonstrate the complex dynamics and challenges faced by the Soviet Union in managing the development and production of rocket engines through Design Bureaus. ==== Accidents ==== The development of rocket engines in the Soviet Union was marked by significant achievements, but it also carried ethical considerations due to numerous accidents and fatalities. From a [[Science and technology studies|Science and Technology Studies]] point of view, the ethical implications of these incidents shed light on the complex relationship between technology, human factors, and the prioritisation of scientific advancement over safety. The Soviet Union encountered a series of tragic accidents and mishaps in the development and operation of rocket engines. Notably, the USSR holds the unfortunate distinction of having experienced more injuries and deaths resulting from liquid propellant rocket engine (LPRE) accidents than any other country. These incidents brought into question the ethical considerations surrounding the development, testing, and operational use of rocket engines. One of the most notable disasters occurred in 1960 when the [[R-16 (missile)|R-16]] ballistic missile suffered a catastrophic accident on the launchpad at the [[Töretam|Tyuratam]] launch facility. This incident resulted in the deaths of 124 engineers and military personnel, including Marshal M.I. Nedelin, a former deputy [[Minister of Defence (Soviet Union)|minister of defence]]. The explosion occurred after the second-stage rocket engine suddenly ignited, causing the fully loaded missile to disintegrate. The explosion resulted from the ignition and explosion of the mixed [[hypergolic propellant]]s, consisting of [[nitric acid]] with additives and [[Unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine|UDMH]] (unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine). While the immediate cause of the 1960 accident was attributed to a lack of protective circuits in the missile control unit, the ethical considerations surrounding LPRE accidents in the USSR extend beyond specific technical failures. The secrecy surrounding these accidents, which remained undisclosed for approximately three decades, raises concerns about transparency, accountability, and the protection of human life. The decision to keep fatal LPRE accidents hidden from the public eye reflects a broader ethical dilemma. The Soviet government, driven by the pursuit of scientific and technological superiority during the Cold War, sought to maintain an image of invincibility and conceal the failures that accompanied their advancements. This prioritisation of national prestige over the well-being and safety of workers raises questions about the ethical responsibility of the state and the organisations involved.
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