Editing Actor–network theory (section)

===Human agency===

Actor–network theory insists on the capacity of [[Non human|nonhumans]] to be actors or participants in networks and systems. Critics including figures such as [[Langdon Winner]] maintain that such properties as [[intentionality]] fundamentally distinguish humans from animals or from "things" (see [[Activity Theory]]). ANT scholars  [<nowiki/>[[wikipedia:Manual of Style/Words to watch#Unsupported attributions|who?]]] respond with the following arguments:

* They do not attribute intentionality and similar properties to [[Non human|nonhumans]].
* Their conception of [[Human agency|agency]] does not presuppose intentionality.
* They locate agency neither in human "subjects" nor in nonhuman "objects", but in [[heterogeneous]] associations of humans and nonhumans.

ANT has been criticized as amoral. [[Wiebe Bijker]] has responded to this criticism by stating that the amorality of ANT is not a necessity. Moral and political positions are possible, but one must first describe the network before taking up such positions. This position has been further explored by Stuart Shapiro who contrasts ANT with the history of ecology, and argues that research decisions are moral rather than methodological, but this moral dimension has been sidelined.<ref>Shapiro, S. (1997). Caught in a web: The implications of ecology for radical symmetry in STS. Social Epistemology, 11(1), 97-110. [[doi:10.1080/02691729708578832]]</ref>