Editing Deterrence theory (section)

===Deterrence failures===
{{see also|Salami slicing tactics}}
Deterrence theory has been criticized by numerous scholars for various reasons, the most basic being skepticism that decision makers are rational. A prominent strain of criticism argues that rational deterrence theory is contradicted by frequent deterrence failures, which may be attributed to misperceptions.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Jervis|first=Robert|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3QlsDQAAQBAJ|title=Perception and Misperception in International Politics: New Edition|date=1976|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-1-4008-8511-4|language=en|access-date=2021-11-20|archive-date=2024-02-24|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240224052359/https://books.google.com/books?id=3QlsDQAAQBAJ|url-status=live}}</ref> Here it's argued that misestimations of perceived costs and benefits by analysts contribute to deterrence failures,<ref>{{cite journal | doi=10.1080/13523260.2023.2259153 | title=Utility-based predictions of military escalation: Why experts forecasted Russia would not invade Ukraine | date=2023 | last1=Driedger | first1=Jonas J. | last2=Polianskii | first2=Mikhail | journal=Contemporary Security Policy | volume=44 | issue=4 | pages=544–560 | doi-access=free }}</ref> as exemplified in case of [[Russian invasion of Ukraine]]. [[Frozen conflict]]s can be seen as rewarding [[aggression]].<ref>{{cite journal | url=https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2023.2192137 | doi=10.1080/0163660X.2023.2192137 | title=A New Concert for Europe: Security and Order After the War | date=2023 | last1=Jung | first1=Karsten | journal=The Washington Quarterly | volume=46 | pages=25–43 | url-access=subscription }}</ref>