Editing Mutual assured destruction (section)

==== Terrorism ====
*The threat of [[Nuclear terrorism|foreign and domestic nuclear terrorism]] has been a criticism of MAD as a defensive strategy. Deterrent strategies are ineffective against those who attack without regard for their life.<ref name=":1" /> Furthermore, the doctrine of MAD has been critiqued in regard to terrorism and asymmetrical warfare. Critics contend that a retaliatory strike would not be possible in this case because of the decentralization of terrorist organizations, which may be operating in several countries and dispersed among civilian populations. A misguided retaliatory strike made by the targeted nation could even advance terrorist goals in that a contentious retaliatory strike could drive support for the terrorist cause that instigated the nuclear exchange.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Fischhoff|first1=Baruch|last2=Atran|first2=Scott|last3=Sageman|first3=Marc|date=2008|title=Mutually Assured Support: A Security Doctrine for Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Threats|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/40375782|journal=The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science|volume=618|pages=160–167|doi=10.1177/0002716208317247|jstor=40375782|s2cid=146145387|issn=0002-7162|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

However [[Robert Gallucci]], the president of the [[John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation]], argues that although traditional deterrence is not an effective approach toward terrorist groups bent on causing a nuclear catastrophe, "the United States should instead consider a policy of expanded deterrence, which focuses not solely on the would-be nuclear terrorists but on those states that may deliberately transfer or inadvertently lead nuclear weapons and materials to them. By threatening retaliation against those states, the United States may be able to deter that which it cannot physically prevent."<ref>{{cite journal|last=Gallucci|first=Robert|title=Averting Nuclear Catastrophe: Contemplating Extreme Responses to U.S. Vulnerability|journal=Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science|date=September 2006|volume= 607|pages=51–58|doi=10.1177/0002716206290457|s2cid=68857650}}</ref>

[[Graham Allison]] makes a similar case and argues that the key to expanded deterrence is coming up with ways of tracing nuclear material to the country that forged the fissile material: "After a nuclear bomb detonates, [[nuclear forensics|nuclear forensic]] cops would collect debris samples and send them to a laboratory for radiological analysis. By identifying unique attributes of the fissile material, including its impurities and contaminants, one could trace the path back to its origin."<ref name=":0a">{{cite news|last=Allison|first=Graham|title=How to Keep the Bomb From Terrorists|url=http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/03/13/how-to-keep-the-bomb-from-terrorists.html|accessdate=28 January 2013|newspaper=Newsweek|date=13 March 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130513111324/http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/03/13/how-to-keep-the-bomb-from-terrorists.html|archive-date=13 May 2013|url-status=dead}}</ref> The process is analogous to identifying a criminal by fingerprints: "The goal would be twofold: first, to deter leaders of nuclear states from selling weapons to terrorists by holding them accountable for any use of their own weapons; second, to give leaders every incentive to tightly secure their nuclear weapons and materials."<ref name=":0a" />