Editing Research and Analysis Wing (section)

====Myanmar====
During the 1990s, R&AW cultivated Burmese rebel groups and pro-democracy coalitions, especially the [[Kachin Independence Army]] (KIA). India allowed the KIA to carry a limited trade in [[jade]] and precious stones using Indian territory and even supplied them weapons. It is further alleged that KIA chief [[Maran Brang Seng]] met the Secretary(R) in Delhi twice. However, when the KIA became the main source of training and weapons for militant groups in Northeast India, R&AW initiated an operation, code named ''Operation Leech'', to assassinate the leaders of the Burmese rebels as an example to other groups. in 1998, six top rebel leaders, including military wing chief of National Unity Party of Arakans (NUPA), Khaing Raza, were shot dead and 34 Arakanese guerrillas were arrested and charged with gunrunning.<ref name="Federation of American Scientists"/><ref>[http://www.india-seminar.com/2005/550/550%20subir%20bhaumik.htm Guns, drugs and rebels] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090923193152/http://www.india-seminar.com/2005/550/550%20subir%20bhaumik.htm |date=23 September 2009
 }}. B.B. Nandi, former R&AW additional secretary, interview to author, 6 March 2002.</ref>

In 1995, in [[Mizoram]] along the [[India–Myanmar barrier|India–Myanmar border]], the [[III Corps (India)|57th Mountain Division]] of the [[Indian Army]] carried out the [[Operation Golden Bird]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/mar/23/20070323-103215-4113r/?page=all|title=India seen arming Burma to counter Chinese|work=The Washington Times|access-date=27 July 2020|archive-date=8 March 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160308063221/http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/mar/23/20070323-103215-4113r/?page=all|url-status=live}}</ref> The operation was launched because R&AW had provided information that a huge consignment of arms for northern eastern had reached to [[Cox's Bazar]] (Bangladesh) and was to be sent to insurgents in [[Manipur]]. The arms, as per intelligence were meant for groups in [[Nagaland]] and [[Isak Chishi Swu|Isak-Muivah]] group in Manipur. Forces were deployed for counterinsurgency in the states of Manipur and Nagaland. Radio sets and other technological instruments were used to intercepts insurgents messages. On 5 April 1995, the Indian troops captured an insurgent named Hathi Bsrvah, trained by Pakistani ISI near Karachi. By 21 May 1995, the operation was finally called off.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=h9KGAwAAQBAJ&q=Wyakaung+beach&pg=PA185|title=Troubled Periphery: The Crisis of India's North East By Subir Bhaumik|isbn=9788132104797|last1=Bhaumik|first1=Subir|date=10 December 2009|publisher=SAGE Publications India }}</ref>

In 2015, R&AW and [[Directorate of Military Intelligence (India)|Military Intelligence of Indian Army]] provided the intelligence support to [[Para (Special Forces)|21 Para (SF)]], for their [[2015 Indian counter-insurgency operation in Myanmar|counter-insurgency operation in Myanmar]].<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.scroll.in/article/733855/why-the-modi-government-decided-to-deliberately-leak-information-about-the-myanmar-strikes|title=Why the Modi government decided to deliberately leak information about the Myanmar strikes|date=12 June 2015|access-date=12 June 2015|publisher=Scroll|archive-date=13 June 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150613213913/http://scroll.in/article/733855/why-the-modi-government-decided-to-deliberately-leak-information-about-the-myanmar-strikes|url-status=live}}</ref>