Editing Deterrence theory (section)

===Misprediction of behavior===
Scholars have also argued that leaders do not behave in ways that are consistent with the predictions of nuclear deterrence theory.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Green|first=Brendan Rittenhouse|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wFTMDwAAQBAJ|title=The Revolution that Failed: Nuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War|date=2020|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-108-48986-7|language=en|access-date=2021-11-20|archive-date=2024-02-24|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240224052405/https://books.google.com/books?id=wFTMDwAAQBAJ|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Citation|last=Jervis|first=Robert|title=The Nuclear Age|date=2021|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/before-and-after-the-fall/nuclear-age/3F9C601E9D5B0283487BEFCE73913C60|work=Before and After the Fall: World Politics and the End of the Cold War|pages=115–131|editor-last=Bartel|editor-first=Fritz|publisher=Cambridge University Press|doi=10.1017/9781108910194.008|isbn=978-1-108-90677-7|s2cid=244858515|editor2-last=Monteiro|editor2-first=Nuno P.|access-date=2021-12-17|archive-date=2024-02-24|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240224052405/https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/before-and-after-the-fall/nuclear-age/3F9C601E9D5B0283487BEFCE73913C60|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Sagan|first=Scott D.|date=1994|title=The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539178|journal=International Security|volume=18|issue=4|pages=66–107|doi=10.2307/2539178|jstor=2539178|s2cid=153925234|issn=0162-2889|access-date=2022-02-14|archive-date=2022-02-14|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220214233129/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539178|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref> Scholars have also argued that rational deterrence theory does not grapple sufficiently with emotions and psychological biases that make accidents, loss of self-control, and loss of control over others likely.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2023-02-26 |title=Don't Be So Confident in Nuclear Decision-Making |url=https://www.lawfaremedia.org/topics/armed-conflict |access-date=2023-03-04 |website=Lawfare |language=en |archive-date=2023-07-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230707162609/https://www.lawfaremedia.org/topics/armed-conflict |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |date=2023 |title=The Psychology of Nuclear Brinkmanship |url=https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/47/3/9/114669/The-Psychology-of-Nuclear-Brinkmanship |journal=International Security |access-date=2023-03-04 |archive-date=2023-03-04 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230304134035/https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/47/3/9/114669/The-Psychology-of-Nuclear-Brinkmanship |url-status=live }}</ref> Frank C. Zagare has argued that deterrence theory is logically inconsistent and empirically inaccurate. In place of classical deterrence, rational choice scholars have argued for ''perfect deterrence'', which assumes that states may vary in their internal characteristics and especially in the credibility of their threats of retaliation.<ref name="Zagare_2004">
{{Citation
|last=Zagare
|first=Frank C.
|year=2004
|title=Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence: A Re-examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory
|journal=Journal of Theoretical Politics
|volume=16
|issue=2
|pages=107–141
|doi=10.1177/0951629804041117
|citeseerx=10.1.1.335.7353
|s2cid=13900591
}}</ref>