Editing First Opium War (section)

===Revisionist views===
The impact of the opium habit on the Chinese people, and the manner in which the British imposed their power to guarantee the profitable trade, have been staples of Chinese historiography ever since.<ref>Arthur Waley, ''The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes'' (London: Allen and Unwin, 1958)</ref>{{page needed|date=September 2021}}
The British historian [[Jasper Ridley (historian)|Jasper Ridley]] concluded:
{{blockquote|Conflict between China and Britain was inevitable. On the one side was a corrupt, decadent and caste-ridden despotism, with no desire or ability to wage war, which relied on custom much more than force for the enforcement of extreme privilege and discrimination, and which was blinded by a deep-rooted superiority complex into believing that they could assert their supremacy over Europeans without possessing military power. On the other side was the most economically advanced nation in the world, a nation of pushing, bustling traders, of self-help, free trade, and the pugnacious qualities of John Bull.<ref>Jasper Ridley, ''Lord Palmerston'' (1970) p. 249.</ref>}}
However, Ridley adds, opposition in Britain was intense:

{{blockquote|An entirely opposite British viewpoint was promoted by humanitarians and reformers such as the Chartists and religious nonconformists led by a young Gladstone. They argued that Palmerston (the foreign secretary) was only interested in the huge profits it would bring Britain, and was totally oblivious to the horrible moral evils of opium which the Chinese government was valiantly trying to stamp out.<ref>Ridley, 254–256.</ref><ref>May Caroline Chan, “Canton, 1857” ''Victorian Review'' (2010), 36#1 pp 31–35.</ref>}}

The American historian [[John K. Fairbank]] wrote:
{{blockquote|In demanding diplomatic equality and commercial opportunity, Britain represented all the Western states, which would sooner or later have demanded the same things if Britain had not. It was an accident of history that the dynamic British commercial interests in the China trade was centered not only on tea but also on opium. If the main Chinese demand had continued to be for Indian raw cotton, or at any rate if there had been no market for opium in late-Ch'ing China, as there had been none earlier, then there would have been no "opium war". Yet probably some kind of Sino-foreign war would have come, given the irresistible vigor of Western expansion and immovable inertia of Chinese institutions.<ref>John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, ''A History of East Asian Civilization: Volume Two: East Asia the Modern transformation'' (1965) p. 136.</ref>}}

Some historians claim that Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary, initiated the Opium War to maintain the principle of free trade.<ref>Jasper Ridley, ''Lord Palmerston,'' (1970) p. 248</ref>
Professor Glenn Melancon, for example, argues that the issue in going to war was not opium but Britain's need to uphold its reputation, its honour and its commitment to global free trade. China was pressing Britain just when the British faced serious pressures in the Near East, on the Indian frontier and in Latin America. In the end, says Melancon, the government's need to maintain its honour in Britain and prestige abroad forced the decision to go to war.<ref name="Glenn Melancon 1840, pp 854-874">Glenn Melancon, "Honor in Opium? The British Declaration of War on China, 1839–1840," ''International History Review'' (1999) 21#4 pp. 854–874.</ref>{{page range too broad|date=September 2021}} Former American president [[John Quincy Adams]] commented that opium was "a mere incident to the dispute&nbsp;... the cause of the war is the [[kowtow]]—the arrogant and insupportable pretensions of China that she will hold commercial intercourse with the rest of mankind not upon terms of equal reciprocity, but upon the insulting and degrading forms of the relations between lord and vassal."<ref>{{Cite book |first=Julia |last=Lovell |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=CxOEDwAAQBAJ&pg=PP67 |title=The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams, and the Making of Modern China |publisher=Abrams |year=2015 |isbn=978-1468313239 |page=67}}</ref>

Ray Huang, in ''China: A Macro History'', provides a broader context for understanding the Opium War. He argues that the causes of the conflict cannot be solely reduced to economic factors or immediate diplomatic tensions. Huang emphasizes the deep structural issues within the Qing dynasty, including economic strain, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and social unrest. These issues weakened the Qing state's ability to respond effectively to both internal and external pressures. The mounting frustrations of Chinese officials and the social dislocations they faced played a significant role in pushing the government towards harsher policies against the opium trade[4].

The Australian historian Harry G. Gelber argues that opium played a role similar to the tea dumped into the harbour in the [[Boston Tea Party]] of 1773 leading to the [[American Revolutionary War]]. Gelber argues instead:
{{blockquote|The British went to war because of Chinese military threats to defenceless British civilians, including women and children; because China refused to negotiate on terms of diplomatic equality and because China refused to open more ports than Guangzhou to trade, not just with Britain but with everybody. The belief about British "guilt" came later, as part of China's long catalogue of alleged Western "exploitation and aggression".<ref>Harry G. Gelber, "China as 'Victim'? The Opium War That Wasn't" in ''Harvard University Center for European Studies, Working Paper Series #136'' (2019)  [https://ces.fas.harvard.edu/uploads/files/Working-Papers-Archives/CES_WP136.pdf online]</ref>}}

Western women were actually not legally permitted to enter Guangzhou although they were permitted to live in Macau.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Waley-Cohen |first=Joanna |title=The Sextants of Beijing: Global Currents in Chinese History |publisher=W. W. Norton |year=2000 |isbn=039324251X |page=99}}</ref>

The Qing government hampered foreign trade and through the Canton System concentrated trade in Guangzhou. That being said, the policy of concentrating trade to a single port was also used in Western countries such as Spain and Portugal. Western merchants could also trade freely and legally with Chinese merchants in Xiamen and Macao or when the trade was conducted through ports outside China such as Manila and Batavia.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Vries |first=Peer |title=State, Economy and the Great Divergence: Great Britain and China, 1680s–1850s |year=2015 |publisher=Bloomsbury |isbn=978-1472526403 |pages=353–354}}</ref> Furthermore, Macao was restricted to Portuguese traders, and Xiamen the Spanish, who rarely made use of this privilege.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Greenberg |first=Michael |title=British Trade and the Opening of China 1800-1842 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=1969 |page=47}}</ref>

The public in Western countries had earlier condemned the British government for supporting the opium trade.<ref name="Melancon-2003b" /> Opium was the most profitable single commodity trade of the 19th century. As Timothy Brook and Bob Wakabayashi write of opium, "The British Empire could not survive were it deprived of its most important source of capital, the substance that could turn any other commodity into silver."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Brook |first=Timothy |title=Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839–1952 |last2=Wakabayashi |first2=Bob Tadashi |year=2000 |publisher=University of California Press |location=Berkeley |isbn=9780520220096 |page=6 |doi=10.1525/california/9780520220096.001.0001}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Wakeman |first=Frederic Jr. |chapter=The Canton Trade in the Opium War |series=The Cambridge History of China |volume=10 |title=Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911 |last2=Fairbank |first2=John K. |year=1978 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |location=New York |page=172}}</ref> although this thesis is controversial<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Klimburg |first=Alexander |year=2001 |title=Some Research Notes on Carl A. Trocki's Publication "Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy" |journal=Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies |volume=64 |issue=2 |pages=260–267 |doi=10.1017/S0041977X01000155 |jstor=3657672 |pmid=18546608 |s2cid=34708108}}</ref> Opium was the most common and the most profitable trade good and comprised 33–54% of all goods shipped from Bengal to the East between 1815 and 1818. Carl Trocki described "the British Empire east of Suez as of 1800 as essentially a drug cartel."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Trocki |first=Carl |title=Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore, 1800–1910 |year=2019 |publisher=Cornell University Press |isbn=978-1501746352 |pages=50–58}}</ref> James Bradley states that "between 1814 and 1850, the opium trade sucked out 11 percent of China's money supply".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Bradley |first=James |title=The Imperial Cruise, a Secret History of Empire and War |year=2009 |publisher=Little & Brown |isbn=978-0316049665 |chapter=Chapter 10 |pages=274–275 |url-access=registration |url=https://archive.org/details/imperialcruisese0000brad/page/274}}</ref>

Although shipping was regulated, the Qianlong emperor's administration was diligent in accommodating the requisites of Western merchants. It hired a growing body of Western assistants for the Customs Office to help manage its fellow countrymen. The order to stay in Macao during the winter was lifted; tax was exempted on food, drink, and basic supplies for Western merchants; and protections were granted to Westerners and their property.<ref>{{Cite thesis |last=Po |first=Chung-yam |title=Conceptualizing the Blue Frontier: The Great Qing and the Maritime World in the Long Eighteenth Century |date=28 June 2013 |publisher=Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg |url=http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/18877/1/PhD_Dissertation_CyPO.pdf |pages=203–204}}</ref> Qing laws prevented Chinese from pursuing foreigners through the courts. The prohibition mainly dated from the Qianlong Emperor's strong conviction that mistreatment of foreigners had been a major cause of the overthrow of several earlier dynasties.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Waley-Cohen |first=Joanna |title=The Sextants of Beijing: Global Currents in Chinese History |year=2000 |publisher=W. W. Norton |isbn=039324251X |location=New York; London |chapter=Chapter 4}}</ref>{{page needed|date=September 2021}}

The Qianlong Emperor granted Lord Macartney a golden sceptre, an important symbol of peace and wealth, but that was dismissed by the British, who were unaware of its symbolism. The Qianlong Emperor also dismissed the "lavish" presents that the British gave to facilitate diplomatic relations and concluded that they were no better than other European products. In 1806, Chinese officials compromised with the British on the murder of a Chinese man by British seamen, as Westerners refused to be punished under Chinese law, and local citizens vigorously protested for xenophobic reasons and because of perceived injustice. In 1816, the Jiaqing Emperor dismissed a British embassy for its refusal to kowtow, but he sent them an apologetic letter with gifts, which were later found in the Foreign Office, unread. The British ignored Chinese laws and warnings not to deploy military forces in Chinese waters. The British landed troops in Macao despite a Chinese and Portuguese agreement to bar foreign forces from Macao and then in the [[War of 1812]] attacked American ships deep in the inner harbour of Guangzhou (the Americans had previously robbed British ships in Chinese waters as well). Those, in combination with the British support to Nepal during [[Sino-Nepalese War|their invasion of Tibet]] and later [[Anglo-Nepalese War|British invasion of Nepal]] after it became a Chinese tributary state, led the Chinese authorities to become highly suspicious of British intentions.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Waley-Cohen |first=Joanna |title=The Sextants of Beijing: Global Currents in Chinese History |year=2000 |publisher=W. W. Norton |isbn=039324251X |pages=104, 126, 129–131, 136–137}}</ref> In 1834, when British naval vessels intruded into Chinese waters again, the Daoguang Emperor commented: "How laughable and deplorable is it that we cannot even repel two barbarian ships. Our military had decayed so much. No wonder the barbarians are looking down on us."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Sng |first=Tuan-Hwee |url=http://apebhconference.files.wordpress.com/2009/08/sng.pdf |title=Size and dynastic decline. The principal-agent problem in late imperial China, 1700–1850}}</ref>{{page needed|date=September 2021}}