Editing Hard problem of consciousness (section)

===New mysterianism===
{{Main|New mysterianism}}
[[New mysterianism]], most significantly associated with the philosopher [[Colin McGinn]], proposes that the human mind, in its current form, will not be able to explain consciousness.<ref name="mcginn-1989">{{cite journal|last1=McGinn|first1=Colin|title=Can We Solve the Mind–Body Problem?|journal=Mind|date=1989|volume=98|issue=391|pages=349–366|doi=10.1093/mind/XCVIII.391.349|jstor=2254848}}</ref><ref name="mcginn-2012"/> McGinn draws on [[Noam Chomsky]]'s distinction between problems, which are in principle solvable, and mysteries, which human cognitive faculties are unequipped to ever understand, and places the [[mind–body problem]] in the latter category.<ref name="mcginn-1989"/> His position is that a [[Metaphysical naturalism|naturalistic]] explanation does exist but that the human mind is [[Cognitive closure (philosophy)|cognitively closed]] to it due to its limited range of intellectual abilities.<ref name="mcginn-1989"/> He cites [[Jerry Fodor]]'s concept of the [[modularity of mind]] in support of cognitive closure.<ref name="mcginn-1989"/>

While in McGinn's strong form, new mysterianism states that the relationship between consciousness and the material world can ''never'' be understood by the human mind, there are also weaker forms that argue it cannot be understood within existing paradigms but that advances in science or philosophy may open the way to other solutions (see above).<ref name="jw-iep"/> The ideas of [[Thomas Nagel]] and [[Joseph Levine (philosopher)|Joseph Levine]] fall into the second category.<ref name="jw-iep"/> Steven Pinker has also endorsed this weaker version of the view, summarising it as follows:<ref name="pinker-time"/>

<blockquote>And then there is the theory put forward by philosopher Colin McGinn that our vertigo when pondering the Hard Problem is itself a quirk of our brains. The brain is a product of evolution, and just as animal brains have their limitations, we have ours. Our brains can't hold a hundred numbers in memory, can't visualize seven-dimensional space and perhaps can't intuitively grasp why neural information processing observed from the outside should give rise to subjective experience on the inside. This is where I place my bet, though I admit that the theory could be demolished when an unborn genius—a Darwin or Einstein of consciousness—comes up with a flabbergasting new idea that suddenly makes it all clear to us.</blockquote>