Editing Problem of evil (section)

===Free will defense===
{{Main|Free will}}

The problem of evil is sometimes explained as a consequence of [[free will]].<ref name=boydp69/><ref name="Lacewing2014p239"/> Free will is a source of both good and of evil, since with free will comes the potential for abuse. People with free will make their own decisions to do wrong, states [[Greg Boyd (theologian)|Gregory Boyd]], and it is they who make that choice, not God.<ref name=boydp69/> Further, the free will argument asserts that it would be logically inconsistent for God to prevent evil by coercion because then human will would no longer be free.<ref name=boydp69>Gregory A. Boyd, ''Is God to Blame?'' (InterVarsity Press, 2003) {{ISBN|978-0830823949}}, pp. 55–58, 69–70, 76, 96.</ref><ref name="Lacewing2014p239"/>

The key assumption underlying the free-will defense is that a world containing creatures who are significantly free is innately more valuable than one containing none. The sort of virtues and values that freedom makes possible – such as trust, love, charity, sympathy, tolerance, loyalty, kindness, forgiveness and friendship – are virtues that cannot exist as they are currently known and experienced without the freedom to choose them or not choose them.<ref name="GF&E">{{cite book |last1=Plantinga |first1=Alvin |title=God, freedom, and evil |date=1977 |publisher=Eerdmans Publishing Company |isbn=9780802817310}}</ref>{{rp|30}} [[Augustine]] offered a theodicy of freewill in the fourth century, but the contemporary version is best represented by Alvin Plantinga.

Plantinga offers a free will defense, instead of a theodicy, that began as a response to three assertions raised by [[J. L. Mackie]].<ref name="Self profile"/> First, Mackie asserts "there is no possible world" in which the "essential" theistic beliefs Mackie describes can all be true. Either believers retain a set of inconsistent beliefs, or believers can give up "at least one of the 'essential propositions' of their faith".<ref name="J. L. Mackie evil">{{cite journal |last1=J. L. Mackie |first1=J. L. Mackie |title=Evil and Omnipotence |journal=Mind |date=1955 |volume=64 |issue=254 |pages=200–212 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2251467 |publisher=Oxford University Press|doi=10.1093/mind/LXIV.254.200 |jstor=2251467 |url-access=subscription }}</ref>{{rp|90, 97–98}} Second, there is Mackie's statement that an all powerful God, in creating the world, could have made "beings who would act freely, but always go right", and third is the question of what choices would have been logically available to such a God at creation.<ref name="J. L. Mackie evil"/>{{rp|98}}
[[File:Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Bernhard Christoph Francke.jpg|thumb|right|upright|Gottfried Leibniz]]
Plantinga built his response beginning with [[Gottfried Leibniz]]' assertion that there were innumerable possible worlds available to God before creation.<ref name="Self profile"/>{{rp|38}} Leibniz introduced the term theodicy in his 1710 work {{lang|fr|[[Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal]]}} ("Theodicic Essays on the Benevolence of God, the Free will of man, and the Origin of Evil") where he argued that this is the [[best of all possible worlds]] that God could have created.

Plantinga says mankind lives in the actual world (the world God actualized), but that God could have chosen to create (actualize) any of the possibilities including those with moral good but no moral evil. The catch, Plantinga says, is that it is possible that factors within the possible worlds themselves prevented God from actualizing any of the worlds containing moral goodness and no moral evil. Plantinga refers to these factors as the nature of "human essences" and "transworld depravity".<ref name="GF&E"/>{{rp|51–53}}

Across the various possible worlds (transworld) are all the variations of possible humans, each with their own "human essence" (identity): core properties essential to each person that makes them who they are and distinguishes them from others. Every person is the instantiation of such an essence. This "transworld identity" varies in details but not in essence from world to world.<ref name="GF&E"/>{{rp|50–51}} This might include variations of a person (X) who always chooses right in some worlds. If somewhere, in some world, (X) ever freely chooses wrong, then the other possible worlds of only goodness could not be actualized and still leave (X) fully free.<ref name="Plantinga Nature">{{cite book |last1=Plantinga |first1=Alvin |title=The Nature of Necessity |date=1978 |publisher=Clarendon Press |isbn=9780191037177}}</ref>{{rp|184}} There might be numerous possible worlds which contained (X) doing only morally good things, but these would not be worlds that God could bring into being, because (X) would not be free in those worlds to make the wrong choice.<ref name="Plantinga Nature"/>{{rp|187–188}}

An all knowing God would know "in advance" that there are times when "no matter what circumstances" God places (X) in, as long as God leaves (X) free, (X) will make at least one bad choice. Plantinga terms this "transworld depravity".<ref name="Plantinga Nature"/>{{rp|186}} Therefore, if God wants (X) to be a part of creation, and free, then it could mean that the only option such a God would have would be to have an (X) who goes wrong at least once in a world where such wrong is possible. (X)'s free choice determined the world available for God to create.<ref name="Plantinga Nature"/>{{rp|187–188}}

"What is important about transworld depravity is that if a person suffers from it, then it wasn't within God's power to actualize any world in which that person is significantly free but does no wrong".<ref name="GF&E"/>{{rp|48}} Plantinga extends this to all human agents noting, "clearly it is possible that everybody suffers from transworld depravity".<ref name="Plantinga Nature"/>{{rp|186}} This means creating a world with moral good, no moral evil, and truly free persons was not an option available to God. The only way to have a world free of moral evil would be "by creating one without significantly free persons".<ref name="Plantinga Nature"/>{{rp|189}}

====Discussion====
Most philosophers accept Plantinga's free-will defense and see the logical problem of evil as having been rebutted, according to Chad Meister, [[Robert Merrihew Adams|Robert Adams]], and [[William Alston]].<ref name="2009Meister"/><ref name="auto"/><ref name="auto1"/>  [[William L. Rowe]], in referring to Plantinga's argument, has written that "granted [[incompatibilism]], there is a fairly compelling argument for the view that the existence of evil is logically consistent with the existence of the theistic God".<ref>Rowe, William (1979). "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism". American Philosophical Quarterly. 16 (4): 335–341. {{ISSN|0003-0481}}. {{JSTOR|20009775}}p. 335</ref> In ''Arguing About Gods'', [[Graham Oppy]] offers a dissent; while he acknowledges that "[m]any philosophers seem to suppose that [Plantinga's free-will defense] utterly demolishes the kinds of 'logical' arguments from evil developed by Mackie", he also says "I am not sure this is a correct assessment of the current state of play".<ref>Oppy, Graham (2006). Arguing About Gods. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-521-86386-5}}. pp. 262–263</ref> Among contemporary philosophers, most discussion on the problem of evil currently revolves around the ''evidential'' problem of evil, namely that the existence of God is unlikely, rather than logically impossible.<ref>Beebe, James R. (2005). "Logical Problem of Evil". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. {{ISSN|2161-0002}}.</ref>

Critics of the free will response have questioned whether it accounts for the degree of evil seen in this world. One point in this regard is that while the value of free will may be thought sufficient to counterbalance minor evils, it is less obvious that it outweighs the negative attributes of evils such as rape and murder. Another point is that those actions of free beings which bring about evil very often diminish the freedom of those who suffer the evil; for example the murder of a young child prevents the child from ever exercising their free will. In such a case the freedom of an innocent child is pitted against the freedom of the evil-doer, it is not clear why God would remain unresponsive and passive.<ref>[[Marilyn McCord Adams]], ''Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God'' (Melbourne University Press, 1999), 26.</ref> Christopher Southgate asserts that a freewill defense cannot stand alone as sufficient to explain the abundance of situations where humans are deprived of freewill. It requires a secondary theory.<ref name="Christopher Southgate"/>{{rp|42}}

Another criticism is that the potential for evil inherent in free will may be limited by means which do not impinge on that free will. God could accomplish this by making moral actions especially pleasurable, or evil action and suffering impossible by allowing free will but not allowing the ability to enact evil or impose suffering.<ref>C. S. Lewis writes: "We can, perhaps, conceive of a world in which God corrected the results of this abuse of free will by His creatures at every moment: so that a wooden beam became soft as grass when it was used as a weapon, and the air refused to obey me if I attempted to set up in it the sound waves that carry lies or insults. But such a world would be one in which wrong actions were impossible, and in which, therefore, freedom of the will would be void; nay, if the principle were carried out to its logical conclusion, evil thoughts would be impossible, for the cerebral matter which we use in thinking would refuse its task when we attempted to frame them." C.S. Lewis ''[[The Problem of Pain]]'' (HarperCollins, 1996) pp. 24–25</ref> Supporters of the free will explanation state that would then no longer be free will.<ref name=boydp69/><ref name="Lacewing2014p239"/> Critics respond that this view seems to imply it would be similarly wrong to try to reduce suffering and evil in these ways, a position which few would advocate.<ref>Michael Tooley, [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/ "The Problem of Evil"], ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''.</ref>

=====Natural evil=====
A third challenge to the free will defence is natural evil, evil which is the result of natural causes (e.g. a child suffering from a disease, mass casualties from a volcano).<ref>[http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/rs/god/chgoodandevilrev1.shtml "The Two Types of Evil"]. Accessed 10 July 2014.</ref> Criticism of natural evil posits that even if for some reason an all-powerful and all-benevolent God tolerated evil human actions in order to allow free will, such a God would not be expected to also tolerate natural evils because they have no apparent connection to free will.<ref name=boydp69/><ref name="Lacewing2014p239">{{cite book|first=Michael|last=Lacewing|title=Philosophy for AS: Epistemology and Philosophy of Religion|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=EoA9BAAAQBAJ |year=2014|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-317-63583-3 |pages=239–242 }}</ref> [[Patricia A. Williams]] says differentiating between moral and natural evil is common but, in her view, unjustified. "Because human beings and their choices are part of nature, all evils are natural".<ref name="Patricia A. Williams">{{cite book |last1=Williams |first1=Patricia A. |title=Doing Without Adam and Eve Sociobiology and Original Sin |date=2001 |publisher=Fortress Press |isbn=9781451415438}}</ref>{{rp|169}}

Advocates of the free will response propose various explanations of natural evils. [[Alvin Plantinga]]<ref name="Stanford"/><ref name="Good and evil">{{cite book |title=God, Freedom, and Evil |last=Plantinga |first=Alvin |year=1974 |publisher=Harper & Row |isbn=978-0-8028-1731-0 |page=[https://archive.org/details/godfreedomevil00plan/page/58 58] |url=https://archive.org/details/godfreedomevil00plan/page/58 }}</ref> references [[Augustine of Hippo]],<ref>Alvin Plantinga, ''God, Freedom, and Evil'' (Eerdmans, 1989), 58.</ref> writing of the possibility that natural evils could be caused by supernatural beings such as [[Satan]].<ref>Bradley Hanson, ''Introduction to Christian Theology'' (Fortress, 1997), 99.</ref> Plantinga emphasizes that it is not necessary that this be true, it is only necessary that this possibility be compatible with the argument from freewill.<ref name="Good and evil"/>{{rp|58}} There are those who respond that Plantinga's freewill response might address moral evil but not natural evil.<ref name="David Kyle Johnson">{{cite journal |last1=Johnson |first1=David Kyle |title=The Failure of Plantinga's Solution to the Logical Problem of Natural Evil |journal=Philo |date=2012 |volume=15 |issue=2 |pages=145–157 |doi=10.5840/Philo20121528 |url=https://www.pdcnet.org/philo/content/Philo_2012_0015_0002_0145_0157|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Some scholars, such as [[David Ray Griffin|David Griffin]], state that free will, or the assumption of greater good through free will, does not apply to animals.<ref>{{cite book|author=David Ray Griffin|title=Evil Revisited: Responses and Reconsiderations|url=https://archive.org/details/evilrevisitedres0000grif |url-access=registration|year=1991|publisher=State University of New York Press|isbn=978-0-7914-0612-0 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/evilrevisitedres0000grif/page/94 94]–95 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book|first=John S. |last=Feinberg |title=The Many Faces of Evil (Revised and Expanded Edition): Theological Systems and the Problems of Evil |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9w_vM7DgWN4C |year=2004|publisher=Crossway|isbn=978-1-4335-1727-3 |pages=94–95 }}</ref> In contrast, a few scholars, while accepting that "free will" applies in a human context, have posited an alternative "free creatures" defense, stating that animals too benefit from their physical freedom though that comes with the cost of dangers they continuously face.<ref name="Nicola Hoggard Creegan 2013 48">{{cite book|author=Nicola Hoggard Creegan|title=Animal Suffering and the Problem of Evil|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xB1pAgAAQBAJ |year=2013|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-993185-9|page=48}}</ref>

The "free creatures" defense has also been criticized, in the case of caged, domesticated and farmed animals who are not free and many of whom have historically experienced evil and suffering from abuse by their owners. Further, even animals and living creatures in the wild face horrendous evils and suffering{{snd}}such as burns and slow death after natural fires or other natural disasters or from predatory injuries{{snd}}and it is unclear, state Bishop and Perszyk, why an all-loving God would create such free creatures prone to intense suffering.<ref name="Nicola Hoggard Creegan 2013 48"/>