Editing Submarine communications cable (section)

==== Cyber vulnerabilities ====
Increasingly, sophisticated [[Cyberattack|cyber-attacks]] threaten the data traffic on the cables, with incentives ranging from financial gain, espionage, or [[extortion]] by either state actors or non-state actors.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":11" /><ref name=":8" /> Further, [[hybrid warfare]] tactics can interfere with or even weaponize the data transferred by the cables.<ref name=":8" /> For example, low-intensity cyber-attacks can be employed for [[ransomware]], data manipulation and theft,<ref>Grabosky, P. (2007). The internet, technology, and organized crime. ''Asian Journal of Criminology'', ''2''(2), 145–161. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11417-007-9034-z</ref><ref name=":8" /> opening up new a new opportunity for the use of [[cybercrime]] and [[Grey-zone (international relations)|grey-zone tactics]] in interstate disputes.<ref>Bueger, C., & Edmunds, T. (2024). ''Understanding maritime security''. Oxford University Press. https://10.1093/oso/9780197767146.001.0001{{Dead link|date=March 2025 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref><ref>Heller, K. J. (2022). ''Low-Intensity Cyber Operation and State Sovereignty in Cyberspace'' (1st ed.). Djøf Publishing and The Centre for Military Studies.</ref>

The lack of binding international [[Information security standards|cybersecurity standards]] may create a gap in dealing with cyber-enabled sabotage, that can be used by organized crime.<ref name=":8" /> However, attributing an incident to a specific actor or motivation of such actor can be challenging, specifically in cyberspace.<ref>Jaggard, A. D., Johnson, A., Cortes, S., Syverson, P., & Feigenbaum, J. (2015). 20,000 in league under the sea: Anonymous communication, trust, MLATs, and undersea cables. ''Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies'', ''2015''(1), 4–24. https://doi.org/10.1515/popets-2015-0002</ref>