Editing Predatory pricing (section)

==Support==
An article written by [[Heterodox economics|heterodox economist]] [[Thomas DiLorenzo]] and published by the libertarian [[Cato Institute]] suggests that while a company might be able to successfully price other firms out of the market, there is no evidence to support the theory that the virtual monopoly could then raise prices. This would be due to other emerging firms rapidly entering the market to compete.<ref name="DiLorenzo">{{cite web|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/19970223150158/http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-169.html|url=http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-169.html|title=The Myth of Predatory Pricing|archive-date=February 23, 1997|author=Thomas DiLorenzo|publisher=Cato Institute}}</ref> Such entrances demand substantial capital investments, which would not be repaid for a substantial period of time due to sharp price decreases, provoked by resumption of competition.<ref>{{cite book|author=Harold Demsetz|title=The Economics of the Business Firm: Seven Critical Commentaries|page=147|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vWZDJbZq4SUC&pg=PA14|date=October 14, 1997|publisher=Cambridge University Press|via=Google Books|isbn=9780521588652|access-date=December 25, 2021|archive-date=June 29, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220629062058/https://books.google.com/books?id=vWZDJbZq4SUC&pg=PA14|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Perman">{{cite book|author=R. Perman|title=MBM Business economic notes|chapter=Chapter 7. Monopoly and barriers to entry|url=http://personal.strath.ac.uk/r.perman/tmba6.doc}}{{Dead link|date=April 2014}}</ref> According to the Chicago School of Thought advocated by Robert Bork, predatory pricing is not always anti-competitive even if it ends a successful strategy.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Bork|first=Robert|title=The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy At War With Itself|publisher=Simon & Schuster|year=1993|isbn=0029044561|pages=148}}</ref> The Court in ''Post Danmark'' agreed predatory pricing does not always harm competition because competing "on the merits" to exclude less-efficient competitors can benefit consumers by providing lower prices, improved quality and choice of products and services.<ref>[https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62010CJ0209&from=en Case 209/10] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308175109/https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62010CJ0209&from=en |date=2021-03-08 }}, ''Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet'' [2012] EU:C:2012:172, para 22</ref>

The DG Competition's 'Discussion Paper' states predatory pricing can sometimes be justified as a rational strategy.<ref>{{Cite web|title=DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses|url=https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf|date=2005|publisher=European Commission|location=Brussels|at=Paragraph 130|access-date=April 22, 2020|archive-date=June 23, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200623052831/https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> This is why dominant firms can rebut presumptions of predatory pricing, despite prices falling below the "relevant cost benchmark". For example, dominant undertaking could argue that changing market conditions have caused reduced demand but increased capacity, and therefore   below-cost pricing was necessary in the short-term to sell off fresh produce.<ref>{{Cite web|title=DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses|url=https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf|date=2005|publisher=European Commission|location=Brussels|at=Paragraph 131|access-date=April 22, 2020|archive-date=June 23, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200623052831/https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> Although this defense is not commonly accepted due to predatory pricing rarely being the most efficient option, it is still possible for predatory pricing to be considered a rational strategy.<ref>{{Cite web|title=DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses|url=https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf|date=2005|publisher=European Commission|location=Brussels|at=Paragraph 133|access-date=April 22, 2020|archive-date=June 23, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200623052831/https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>