Editing Union army (section)

===Quartermaster's Department===
{{main|Quartermaster Corps (United States Army)}}
The Quartermaster's Department (QMD) was the most important and extensive department of the Union army, not least because it provided transportation services to the entire army, including the other supply departments.  The QMD was responsible for the procurement, storage and distribution of supplies not already covered by another supply department, including various [[equipage]] (clothing, tents, stoves, etc.), horses and mules ([[United States Army Remount Service#Early history|Cavalry Bureau]]), [[forage]] and [[fuel]], and non-Ordnance vehicles including wagons, ambulances and [[traveling forge]]s.  Other assumed responsibilities included the acquisition, construction and maintenance of various military structures such as barracks, hospitals, wharves, storehouses, etc.; the charter, purchase and maintenance of all [[riverine]] and [[ocean-going vessel]]s used by the army and the [[Western Gunboat Flotilla]]; the construction, maintenance and management of all military railroad transportation ([[United States Military Railroad]]); the construction, maintenance and management of military telegraph lines ([[U.S. Military Telegraph Corps]]); management of all [[Train (military)|wagon trains]] in the field; the collection and burial of the dead and maintenance of [[United States National Cemetery System|national cemeteries]]; and any expenses associated with army movement and operations that did not fall under another department's purview.<ref name="Newell139">Newell & Shrader, page 139</ref><ref name="Eicher61">Eicher, pages 60–61</ref>

The QMD at the start of the war consisted of just thirty-seven officers, seven military storekeepers, and thirteen civilian clerks at the office of the Quartermaster-General (QMG), a situation which was considered understaffed even for peacetime requirements. Within a month of the conflict's start, Congress passed an act to raise the number of officers to forty-nine, and again several months later it was raised to seventy-six, adding an assistant quartermaster-general (colonel) and additional numbers of deputy quartermaster-generals (lieutenant colonel), quartermasters (major) and assistant quartermasters (captain) to support the QMG (brigadier-general). Although a substantial increase, this was not enough to meet the needs of the QMD, and so more than nine hundred assistant quartermasters of volunteers were commissioned and a large number of regular and volunteer officers were detailed to serve as acting quartermasters during the war. Congress also authorized the number of storekeepers increased to twelve and the hiring of additional clerks and other civilian workers for the office (including women), which would grow to over 200 by 1863 and close to 600 by the war's end. To this were added the many civilians working at the quartermaster depots or with quartermasters in the field. Many of these workers were rowdy and difficult to manage, especially before Congress made QMD employees subject to military law and discipline. One exception were Black workers who proved more reliable and whom Quartermaster-General Meigs considered a great aid; by 1864 the QMD was largely reliant on them to fulfill various unskilled positions.<ref name="Newell142">Newell & Shrader, pages 142–151</ref>

Officers of the QMD were assigned as commanders of the various quartermaster depots or to the staff of various field units (with the exception of regiments, whose quartermaster personnel were selected from among its own officers and NCOs).  Depot commanders were responsible for the acquisition, storage and distribution of supplies and the disbursement of funds for transportation and other services. Supplies could be manufactured within the depot or purchased from commercial interests, usually as part of a low-bid contract but in an emergency on the open market. In the first three years of the war depot commanders themselves were responsible for managing these contracts, but by July 1864 a more centralized system requiring approval from the QMG's office had been implemented to improve accountability. Based on unit quartermasters' requests, supplies would be shipped to advanced depots or railheads, where the unit quartermasters arraigned to have them picked up and issued to the unit.<ref name="Newell142"/><ref name="USAL202">United States Army Logistics, pages 202–204</ref>

The principal depots of the QMD were located in [[Cincinnati]], [[Milwaukee]], [[New York City|New York]], [[Philadelphia]], [[Quincy, Illinois]], [[Steubenville, Ohio]], [[St. Louis]], and [[Washington, D.C.]],<ref name="Eicher61"/> with other major depots located in [[Baltimore]], [[Chicago]], [[Louisville, Kentucky|Louisville]], [[New Orleans]], and [[San Francisco]].<ref name="USAL202"/> New York, Philadelphia, and Washington were the primary depots supporting Union armies in the eastern theater, with Cincinnati, St. Louis, and Louisville the primary support depots in the western theater. Many advanced and temporary depots were established as needed, including at [[Alexandria, Virginia]], Fort Monroe, [[City Point, Virginia]], and Nashville, which could become as large and busy as any general depot.  However, despite these depots being responsible for thousands of soldiers and millions of dollars in supplies, many of their commanders were only captains.  Congress approved in July 1864 the appointment of ten depot commanders to the rank of colonel, while other commanders either received a volunteer commission or brevet rank of brigadier general for as long as they remained at their depot.<ref name="Newell142"/>

In the early months of the conflict, the QMD struggled to clothe, equip and transport the rapidly-growing Union army, especially as fraud, war profiteering and political interference was rampant.  Under the able leadership of Quartermaster-General Meigs and legislation passed by Congress, this corruption was quickly brought under control and most quartermasters (with notable exceptions such as [[Justus McKinstry]]) proved to be able and law-abiding.<ref name="Newell151">Newell & Shrader, pages 151–161</ref> Undoubtedly this was due in part to the requirement that quartermasters file a [[Bond (finance)|bond]] worth $10,000 that made them personally liable for their supplies. The exception to this was when the supplies were destroyed due to natural causes or to prevent them falling into enemy hands, a situation which perversely caused celebration among some quartermasters.<ref>Hess, E. J. (2017). Civil War Logistics: A Study of Military Transportation. United States: LSU Press. page 22</ref>  While there were inevitably mistakes and other mishaps, the Union army was rarely deprived of the supplies and services provided by the QMD. Although the scope and scale of the Civil War was beyond any prewar planning, the professional competence of the department allowed it to quickly meet every challenge.  It also exploited emerging technologies like railroads and steamboats with expertise to support the Union army like never before at a strategic and operational level.<ref name="Newell151"/>

Of the $1.8 billion spent by the Federal government during the war, over a billion of that was distributed by the Quartermaster Department.<ref>Hess (2017), page 30</ref>  Among the staggering number of supplies and services acquired by the QMD include approximately a million horses and half a million mules; the movement by rail of over 1.2 million troops; 590 ocean-going vessels under charter or owned outright providing over 190,000 tons of shipping, with another 599 riverine vessels; over 1.6 million tons of coal and 500,000 [[Cord (unit)|cords]] of wood; over 22 million [[bushel]]s of corn, 78 million of oat, 1.5 million tons of hay and 21,000 tons of straw and other fodder; more than $23 million for the rental, construction and maintenance of army property; and over 51,000 standard army wagons and 5,300 ambulances.<ref name="Newell151"/>

;Leadership
The Quartermaster General at the start of the war was [[Joseph E. Johnston]], who resigned shortly after on April 22, 1861, to join the Confederate army. Major Ebenezer S. Sibly served as acting QMG until [[Montgomery C. Meigs]] was appointed and took up his new duties on June 13, 1861. Considered one of the most effective leaders to serve in the Union army, Meigs oversaw the expansion of the QMD to meet the demands of the war and continued to lead it well after its end. Meigs was also a [[hands-on management|hands-on manager]] and from August 1863 to January 1864 he was busy handling logistical matters in the western theatre. During his absence, Colonel [[Charles Thomas (1797–1878)|Charles Thomas]] served as acting QMG in Washington.<ref>Newell & Shrader, page 140</ref>