Editing Hard problem of consciousness (section)

==Relationship to scientific frameworks==
Most neuroscientists and cognitive scientists believe that Chalmers' alleged "hard problem" will be solved, or be shown to not be a real problem, in the course of the solution of the so-called "easy problems", although a significant minority disagrees.<ref name="pinker-time"/><ref name="dennett-edge">{{cite web|last1=Dennett|first1=Daniel|title=The Hard Problem|url=https://www.edge.org/response-detail/25289|website=Edge.org|access-date=11 April 2019|date=2014}}</ref>{{Better source needed|date=May 2022|reason=These are not surveys.}}

===Neural correlates of consciousness===
{{further|Neural correlates of consciousness}}
Since 1990, researchers including the molecular biologist [[Francis Crick]] and the neuroscientist [[Christof Koch]] have made significant progress toward identifying which neurobiological events occur concurrently to the experience of subjective consciousness.<ref name="KochEtAl">{{cite journal|last1=Koch|first1=Christof|last2=Massimini|first2=Marcello|last3=Boly|first3=Melanie|last4=Tononi|first4=Giulio|title=Neural correlates of consciousness: Progress and problems|journal=Nature Reviews Neuroscience|date=April 2016|volume=17|issue=5|pages=307–321|doi=10.1038/nrn.2016.22|pmid=27094080|s2cid=5395332|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301567963|access-date=14 April 2018}}</ref> These postulated events are referred to as ''neural correlates of consciousness'' or NCCs. However, this research arguably addresses the question of ''which'' neurobiological mechanisms are linked to consciousness but not the question of ''why'' they should give rise to consciousness at all, the latter being the hard problem of consciousness as Chalmers formulated it. In "On the Search for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness", Chalmers said he is confident that, granting the principle that something such as what he terms "global availability" can be used as an indicator of consciousness, the neural correlates will be discovered "in a century or two".<ref name="chalmers-ncc">{{cite encyclopedia|last=Chalmers|first=David|editor1-last=Hameroff|editor1-first=Stuart|editor1-link=Stuart Hameroff|editor2-last=Kaszniak|editor2-first=Alfred|editor3-first=Alwyn|editor3-last=Scott|encyclopedia=Toward a Science of Consciousness II|title=On the Search for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness|year=1998|publisher=MIT Press|location=Cambridge, MA|isbn=9780262082624|url=http://consc.net/papers/ncc.pdf|access-date=17 April 2018}}</ref> Nevertheless, he stated regarding their relationship to the hard problem of consciousness:

<blockquote>One can always ask why these processes of availability should give rise to consciousness in the first place. As yet we cannot explain why they do so, and it may well be that full details about the processes of availability will still fail to answer this question. Certainly, nothing in the standard methodology I have outlined answers the question; that methodology assumes a relation between availability and consciousness, and therefore does nothing to explain it. [...] So the hard problem remains. But who knows: Somewhere along the line we may be led to the relevant insights that show why the link is there, and the hard problem may then be solved.<ref name="chalmers-ncc"/></blockquote>

The neuroscientist and Nobel laureate [[Eric Kandel]] wrote that locating the NCCs would not solve the hard problem, but rather one of the so-called easy problems to which the hard problem is contrasted.<ref name="Kandel">{{cite book|author=Kandel Eric R.|year=2007|title=In search of memory: The emergence of a new science of mind|publisher=W. W. Norton & Company|isbn=978-0393329377|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=PFnRwWXzypgC|pages=380–382}}</ref> Kandel went on to note Crick and Koch's suggestion that once the [[binding problem]]—understanding what accounts for the unity of experience—is solved, it will be possible to solve the hard problem empirically.<ref name="Kandel"/> However, neuroscientist [[Anil Seth]] argued that emphasis on the so-called hard problem is a distraction from what he calls the "real problem": understanding the neurobiology underlying consciousness, namely the neural correlates of various conscious processes.<ref name="seth-aeon">{{cite web|last1=Seth|first1=Anil|author-link=Anil Seth| title=The real problem|url=https://aeon.co/essays/the-hard-problem-of-consciousness-is-a-distraction-from-the-real-one|website=Aeon|access-date=22 April 2018|date=November 2016}}</ref> This more modest goal is the focus of most scientists working on consciousness.<ref name="Kandel"/> Psychologist [[Susan Blackmore]] believes, by contrast, that the search for the neural correlates of consciousness is futile and itself predicated on an erroneous belief in the hard problem of consciousness.<ref name="blackmore">{{cite web|last1=Blackmore|first1=Susan|title=The Neural Correlates of Consciousness|url=https://www.edge.org/response-detail/25457|website=Edge.org|access-date=22 April 2018|date=2014}}</ref>

===Computational cognition===
{{further|Computational theory of mind}}

A [[Functionalism (philosophy of mind)|functionalist]] view in [[cognitive science]] holds that the mind is an information processing system, and that cognition and consciousness together are a form of [[computation]]. Cognition, distinct from consciousness, is explained by neural computation in the [[computational cognition|computational theory of cognition]]. The computational theory of mind asserts that not only cognition, but also phenomenal consciousness or [[qualia]], are computational. While the computation system is realised by neurons rather than electronics, in theory it would be possible for artificial intelligence to be conscious.

===Integrated information theory===
{{further|Integrated information theory}}
Integrated information theory (IIT), developed by the neuroscientist and psychiatrist [[Giulio Tononi]] in 2004 and more recently also advocated by Koch, is one of the most discussed models of consciousness in neuroscience and elsewhere.<ref name="comp-iit">{{cite journal|last1=Krohn|first1=Stephan|last2=Ostwald|first2=Dirk|title=Computing integrated information|journal=Neuroscience of Consciousness|date=2017|volume=2017|issue=1|pages=nix017|doi=10.1093/nc/nix017|pmid=30042849|pmc=6007153}}</ref><ref name="critique-iit">{{cite journal|last1=Cerullo|first1=Michael A.|editor1-last=Kording|editor1-first=Konrad P.|title=The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory|journal=PLOS Computational Biology|date=September 2015|volume=11|issue=9|pages=e1004286|pmid=26378789|pmc=4574706|doi=10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004286|bibcode=2015PLSCB..11E4286C|doi-access=free}}</ref> The theory proposes an [[Identity (philosophy)|identity]] between consciousness and integrated information, with the latter item (denoted as Φ) defined mathematically and thus in principle measurable.<ref name="critique-iit"/><ref name="morch-iit">{{cite web|last1=Mørch|first1=Hedda Hassel|title=The Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness|url=https://philosophynow.org/issues/121/The_Integrated_Information_Theory_of_Consciousness|website=Philosophy Now|access-date=22 April 2018|date=2017}}</ref> The hard problem of consciousness, write Tononi and Koch, may indeed be intractable when working from matter to consciousness.<ref name="tononi+koch"/> However, because IIT inverts this relationship and works from phenomenological axioms to matter, they say it could be able to solve the hard problem.<ref name="tononi+koch"/> In this vein, proponents have said the theory goes beyond identifying human neural correlates and can be extrapolated to all physical systems. Tononi wrote (along with two colleagues):

<blockquote>While identifying the "neural correlates of consciousness" is undoubtedly important, it is hard to see how it could ever lead to a satisfactory explanation of what consciousness is and how it comes about. As will be illustrated below, IIT offers a way to analyse systems of mechanisms to determine if they are properly structured to give rise to consciousness, how much of it, and of which kind.<ref name="iit-3.0">{{cite journal|last1=Oizumi|first1=Masafumi|last2=Albantakis|first2=Larissa|last3=Tononi|first3=Giulio|title=From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0|journal=PLOS Computational Biology|date=May 2014|volume=10|issue=5|pages=e1003588|doi=10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588|pmid=24811198|pmc=4014402|bibcode=2014PLSCB..10E3588O|doi-access=free}}</ref></blockquote>

As part of a broader critique of IIT, Michael Cerullo suggested that the theory's proposed explanation is in fact for what he dubs (following [[Scott Aaronson]]) the "Pretty Hard Problem" of methodically inferring which physical systems are conscious—but would not solve Chalmers' hard problem.<ref name="critique-iit"/> "Even if IIT is correct," he argues, "it does not explain why integrated information generates (or is) consciousness."<ref name="critique-iit"/> Chalmers agrees that IIT, if correct, would solve the "Pretty Hard Problem" rather than the hard problem.<ref name="mindt-2017">{{cite journal|last1=Mindt|first1=Garrett|title=The Problem with the 'Information' in Integrated Information Theory|journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies|date=2017|volume=24|issue=7–8|pages=130–154|url=http://newdualism.org/papers/G.Mindt/Mindt-JCS2017.pdf|access-date=22 February 2022}}</ref>

===Global workspace theory===
{{further|Global workspace theory}}

[[Global workspace theory]] (GWT) is a [[cognitive architecture]] and theory of consciousness proposed by the cognitive psychologist [[Bernard Baars]] in 1988.<ref name="baars-2005">{{cite book|doi=10.1016/S0079-6123(05)50004-9|citeseerx=10.1.1.456.2829|chapter=Global workspace theory of consciousness: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of human experience|title=The Boundaries of Consciousness: Neurobiology and Neuropathology|series=Progress in Brain Research|year=2005|last1=Baars|first1=Bernard J.|volume=150|pages=45–53|pmid=16186014|isbn=9780444518514}}</ref> Baars explains the theory with the metaphor of a theatre, with conscious processes represented by an illuminated stage.<ref name="baars-2005"/> This theatre integrates inputs from a variety of unconscious and otherwise autonomous networks in the brain and then broadcasts them to unconscious networks (represented in the metaphor by a broad, unlit "audience").<ref name="baars-2005"/> The theory has since been expanded upon by other scientists including cognitive neuroscientist [[Stanislas Dehaene]].<ref name="dehaene-naccache">{{cite journal|last1=Dehaene|first1=Stanislas|last2=Naccache|first2=Lionel|title=Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework|journal=Cognition|date=2001|volume=79|issue=1–2|pages=1–37|url=http://zoo.cs.yale.edu/classes/cs671/12f/12f-papers/dehaene-consciousness.pdf|access-date=5 April 2019|doi=10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00123-2|pmid=11164022|s2cid=1762431}}</ref>

In his original paper outlining the hard problem of consciousness, Chalmers discussed GWT as a theory that only targets one of the "easy problems" of consciousness.<ref name="Chalmers"/> In particular, he said GWT provided a promising account of how information in the brain could become globally accessible, but argued that "now the question arises in a different form: why should global accessibility give rise to conscious experience? As always, this bridging question is unanswered."<ref name="Chalmers"/> J. W. Dalton similarly criticised GWT on the grounds that it provides, at best, an account of the cognitive ''function'' of consciousness, and fails to explain its experiential aspect.<ref name="dalton-1997">{{cite journal|last1=Dalton|first1=J. W.|title=The unfinished theatre|journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies|date=1997|volume=4|issue=4|pages=316–318}}</ref> By contrast, A. C. Elitzur argued: "While [GWT] does not address the 'hard problem', namely, the very nature of consciousness, it constrains any theory that attempts to do so and provides important insights into the relation between consciousness and cognition."<ref name="elitzur-1997">{{cite journal|last1=Elitzur|first1=Avshalom C.|title=Why don't we know what Mary knows? Baars' reversing the problem of qualia|journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies|date=1997|volume=4|issue=4|pages=319–324}}</ref>

For his part, Baars writes (along with two colleagues) that there is no hard problem of explaining [[qualia]] over and above the problem of explaining causal functions, because qualia are entailed by neural activity and themselves causal.<ref name="dc-gw"/> Dehaene, in his 2014 book ''[[Consciousness and the Brain]]'', rejected the concept of qualia and argued that Chalmers' "easy problems" of consciousness are actually the hard problems.<ref name="Dehaene"/> He further stated that the "hard problem" is based only upon ill-defined intuitions that are continually shifting as understanding evolves:<ref name=Dehaene/>

<blockquote>Once our intuitions are educated by cognitive neuroscience and computer simulations, Chalmers' hard problem will evaporate. The hypothetical concept of qualia, pure mental experience, detached from any information-processing role, will be viewed as a peculiar idea of the prescientific era, much like [[vitalism]]... [Just as science dispatched vitalism] the science of consciousness will keep eating away at the hard problem of consciousness until it vanishes.</blockquote>