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Perception management
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==Censorship in China== The Propaganda and Information Leading Group is generally responsible for [[censorship]] and control of information. The unit is also one of the largest in the CCP leadership organ.<ref>{{cite journal|url=http://derekreveron.com/Documents/perception_mgt.pdf |access-date=November 8, 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110709013759/http://derekreveron.com/Documents/perception_mgt.pdf |archive-date=July 9, 2011 |title=China's Use of Perception Management|doi= 10.1080/713830380|journal=International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence|volume=16|year=2003|author1=Peter Callamari|author2=Derek Reveron |pages=1β15 |s2cid=154923202 }}</ref> Chinese military scholars{{who|date=October 2013}} argue that their nation has a long history of conducting "psychological operations", a phrase that connotes important aspects of strategic deception and, to a certain degree, what the US Department of Defense portrays as perception management. For example, several articles published by the [[People's Liberation Army|PLA]]'s [[Academy of Military Science (China)|Academy of Military Science]] (AMS) journal ''Zhongguo Junshi Kexue'', examine psychological warfare and psychological operations mainly as a deception-oriented function of military strategy.<ref>{{cite web|author=Anderson, Eric|author2=Engstrom, Jeffrey|year=2009|title=China's use of perception management and strategic deception|publisher=U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission|url=http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/ApprovedFINALSAICStrategicDeceptionPaperRevisedDraft06Nov2009_0.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161228142352/http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/ApprovedFINALSAICStrategicDeceptionPaperRevisedDraft06Nov2009_0.pdf|archive-date=2016-12-28}}</ref> The Chinese government has also used strategies to manage the perception of their country to the rest of the world. Facing criticisms about its questionable domestic [[human rights]] policies, the Chinese government successfully deflected international media's attention during the [[2008 Beijing Summer Olympics]] to the apolitical Olympic ideals by creating intensive coverage of the positive feedback for the Olympics on paper, TV, and online, despite governmental officers' promises to improve their poor history of protecting human rights when Beijing was still competing for the right to host the game in 2001.<ref name=htworld>{{cite journal|url=http://www.uky.edu/Centers/Asia/SECAAS/Seras/2009/21_Lord_2009.pdf |title=Hosting the World: Perception Management and the Beijing Olympics |journal=Southeast Review of Asian Studies |volume=31|year=2009|pages= 272β81|author=Jim Lord|publisher=[[Bob Jones University]]}}</ref> The images and video captured that night by Chinese media would display only the packed, patriotic crowds and nothing of the rest of the celebrants, who were largely occupied with taking photos of themselves with friends, family, and even security personnel.<ref name=htworld/> The Beijing games were also an opportunity for China to show its rapid development. The presence of a large contingent of foreign businessmen, media, and politicians necessitated a strict system of perception management before and during the [[Olympic Games]].<ref name=htworld/> The government wanted to ensure that it could use this opportunity to portray China as positively as possible by showcasing its development and modernity rather than some of its more internationally disliked features such as its domestic human rights policies and frequent government protests. China looked at its opportunity to host the Olympic Games as "a definitive demonstration of its status as a world partner comparable to any power in the Western world".<ref name=htworld/> They made certain that those who would be directly talking to the media had the "right" talking points; mostly these focused on promoting the stability and dominance of [[China's economy]]. The government restructured the landscape of [[Beijing]] to portray a sense of modernity to foreigners. Three new buildings called the "bird buildings" were constructed at a high cost, forcing a large number of residents to relocate. A couple of new subway lines are also built to increase the convenience for foreigners to reach the [[Olympic village]]. The government also did whatever it could to make the opening ceremonies of the Beijing Olympics more impressive and extravagant than any before. An example of how they managed perceptions in this realm was the intentional substitution of a more attractive girl, [[Lin Miaoke]], to [[lip-sync]] "[[Ode to the Motherland]]" instead of using the original singer. In their opinion of the officials in charge, the original singer wasn't attractive enough to favorably represent China.<ref>{{cite web|last=Magnay |first=Jacquelin |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/othersports/olympics/2545387/Beijing-Olympics-Faking-scandal-over-girl-who-sang-in-opening-ceremony.html |title=Beijing Olympics: Faking scandal over girl who 'sang' in opening ceremony |publisher=Telegraph.co.uk |access-date=2012-10-19}}</ref> Beijing's security forces were also greatly increased before and during the Olympic Games to ensure that no large protests could be started and possibly caught on camera by the media. [[Re-education through labor|Re-education camp]]s and [[imprisonment]] were possible punishments for Chinese citizens who made known a desire to protest around the Games. The government also announced a few days prior to the opening ceremonies that three "demonstration parks" would be opened for protests, requiring a written request form five days in advance, although none of the requests were granted. Promotional materials are also made as ideal as possible, for example the slogan "[[One World, One Dream]]" referring to a unifying ideal of "love for all mankind". There was even the creation of a slogan ("[[Beijing Welcomes You]]"), and [[Fuwa|five stuffed animal mascots]] used to portray Beijing and China as harmonious and cordial.<ref name=htworld/>
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