Editing Accountability (section)

=== Electoral accountability===
Electoral accountability refers to citizens using their vote to sanction or reward politicians.<ref name=":1" />

Some researchers have considered accountability using [[Formal theory (political science)|formal theory]], which makes assumptions about the state of the world to draw larger conclusions. Voters can hold representatives accountable through the process of sanctioning—voting the [[incumbent]] out of office in response to poor performance.{{r|:1}} While politicians face a decrease in vote share as a result of poor performance, they are less likely to see an increase in vote share for good performance.<ref name=":4">{{cite journal |last1=Martin|first1=Lucy|last2=Raffler|first2=Pia |date=4 August 2019 |title=Fault Lines: The Effects of Bureaucratic Power on Electoral Accountability |url=https://columbiapeseminar.files.wordpress.com/2019/09/martin_raffler_fault-lines.pdf |journal=American Journal of Political Science |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191206135401/https://columbiapeseminar.files.wordpress.com/2019/09/martin_raffler_fault-lines.pdf |archive-date=6 December 2019 |access-date=6 December 2019}}</ref> Selection—voters choosing candidates based on who will best represent their interests—is another method by which voters hold their representatives accountable.{{r|:1}} These methods of accountability can occur simultaneously, with voters holding representatives accountable using both sanctioning and selection.{{r|:1}} These conclusions rely on the assumption that voters do not observe the policy implemented by the incumbent, but do know their own welfare.{{clarify|how can you vote the incumbent out "in response to poor performance" if you "do not observe the policy implemented by the incumbent"?|date=July 2023}}{{r|:1}}

Some factors make it harder for voters to sanction incumbents. When politicians do not have control over outcomes, it becomes harder{{How|date=July 2023}} to hold them accountable.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, when organizations are unable to monitor elections and provide information to voters, then voters struggle to sanction the incumbent.<ref name=":5">{{citation | last1=Grossman | first1=Guy | last2=Michelitch | first2=Kristin Grace | last3=Prato | first3=Carlo | title=The Effect of Sustained Transparency on Electoral Accountability | publisher=Center for Open Science | date=2 March 2022 | doi=10.31219/osf.io/qwcek }}</ref> When voters are better informed about the incumbent's performance, the incumbent is more vulnerable to voter sanctioning.<ref name=":5" /> Furthermore, when incumbents face sanctioning, challengers are more likely to enter the race.<ref name=":5" />

While elections provide a mechanism which can theoretically increase government accountability to citizens, they may instead lead to less egalitarian policy outcomes, because those who hold the government accountable tend to be from wealthier segments of society.<ref name=":29">{{Cite journal|last=Sances|first=Michael W.|date=January 2016|title=The Distributional Impact of Greater Responsiveness: Evidence from New York Towns|url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/683026|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=78|issue=1|pages=105–119|doi=10.1086/683026|s2cid=155437616|issn=0022-3816|url-access=subscription}}</ref> For example, a study of elected versus appointed property assessors in the state of New York shows that the election of property assessors leads to policies that severely undertax wealthier homes relative to poorer homes.<ref name=":29" />

Studies on political accountability have emphasized the key role of elections in promoting accountability in democratic settings. It is through elections that citizens hold governments accountable for past performance.{{r|:1}}<ref>{{cite SSRN |last1=Besley|first1=Timothy J.|last2=Kudamatsu|first2=Masayuki|date=1 May 2007|title=Making Autocracy Work|language=en|ssrn=1127017}}</ref> 

==== Electoral manipulation ====
{{Further|Political corruption|Electoral fraud}}
The role of elections in fostering accountability is often undermined by electoral manipulation and fraud.<ref name=":02">{{cite book |title=Why governments and parties manipulate elections: theory, practice, and implications |author1=Simpser, Alberto |date=2013|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-107-30688-2|location=Cambridge|oclc=826857655}}</ref> By preventing citizens from removing leaders through elections based on their performance in office, electoral manipulation breaks down accountability and may undercut the consolidation of democratic institutions.<ref>{{cite thesis|url=https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2bs339cm|title=Voting, Fraud, and Violence: Political Accountability in African Elections|last=Long|first=James Dunway|publisher=University of California San Diego|year=2014}}</ref>

Electoral manipulation is not rare; some estimates are that in the 1990s and 2000s, up to one fourth of elections suffered some form of substantial manipulation.<ref name=":02" /> This includes a large array of pre-election and election-day tactics, such as outlawing rival parties and candidates, employing violence and [[intimidation]], and manipulating voter registration and vote count.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Schedler|first=Andreas|date=2002|title=The Menu of Manipulation|journal=Journal of Democracy|language=en|volume=13|issue=2|pages=36–50|doi=10.1353/jod.2002.0031|s2cid=154830665|issn=1086-3214}}</ref> Some efforts to improve accountability by preventing electoral manipulation and fraud have obtained a certain measure of success, such as using cell phone applications for monitoring and disseminating polling station results<ref name=":12b">{{cite journal|last1=Callen|first1=Michael|last2=Long|first2=James D.|date=2015|title=Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan|journal=American Economic Review|language=en|volume=105|issue=1|pages=354–381|doi=10.1257/aer.20120427|s2cid=7016902 |issn=0002-8282|url=http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102931/1/In.pdf}}</ref> and employing domestic or international election observers.<ref name=":22">{{cite journal|last1=Ichino|first1=Nahomi|last2=Schündeln|first2=Matthias|date=2012|title=Deterring or Displacing Electoral Irregularities? Spillover Effects of Observers in a Randomized Field Experiment in Ghana|journal=The Journal of Politics|language=en|volume=74|issue=1|pages=292–307|doi=10.1017/S0022381611001368|s2cid=10426326|issn=0022-3816|url=http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9282597|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref name=":32">{{cite journal|last1=Beaulieu|first1=Emily|last2=Hyde|first2=Susan D.|date=2009|title=In the Shadow of Democracy Promotion: Strategic Manipulation, International Observers, and Election Boycotts|journal=Comparative Political Studies|language=en|volume=42|issue=3|pages=392–415|doi=10.1177/0010414008325571|s2cid=155078768|issn=0010-4140}}</ref> However, governments may simply alter the type of manipulation or where it occurs in order to deceive observers and monitoring agencies.<ref name=":22" /><ref name=":32" />

Governments, politicians, and political parties are more likely to resort to electoral manipulation and fraud when they believe they might be removed from office and when they face few institutional constraints to their power.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Hafner-Burton|first1=Emilie Marie|last2=Hyde|first2=Susan D.|last3=Jablonski|first3=Ryan S.|date=6 September 2012 |title=When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence? |journal=British Journal of Political Science |language=en|location=Rochester, N.Y. |ssrn=1667063}}</ref> Low political competition has also been linked to some forms of manipulation, such as abolishing presidential term limits.<ref>{{cite journal|last=McKie|first=Kristin|date=2019|title=Presidential Term Limit Contravention: Abolish, Extend, Fail, or Respect?|journal=Comparative Political Studies|language=en|volume=52|issue=10|pages=1500–1534|doi=10.1177/0010414019830737|s2cid=159155380|issn=0010-4140|doi-access=free}}</ref> Well-connected{{How|date=July 2023}} candidates are more likely to resort to vote count fraud.<ref name=":12b" /> Governments may engage in electoral manipulation not only to obtain victory at a given election or to remain in office longer, but also for post-election reasons, such as reducing the strength of the opposition or increasing their own bargaining power in the subsequent period.<ref name=":02" />