Editing Agreed Framework (section)

==Implementation of the agreement==
[[File:KEDO funding.gif|346px|right|KEDO funding per year 1995 to 2005]]
Soon after the agreement was signed, [[U.S. Congress]] control changed to the [[Republican Party (United States)|Republican Party]], who did not support the agreement.<ref name=sigal>{{citation|url=http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&ord582=grp2&id=31958|title=North Korea: Negotiations Work|author=Leon V Sigal|date=February 2007|publisher=MIT Center for International Studies|access-date=2009-03-05|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090909051426/http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&ord582=grp2&id=31958|archive-date=2009-09-09}}</ref><ref>[http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c104:H.J.RES.83.EH: Joint resolution relating to the United States-North Korea Agreed Framework and the obligations of North Korea under that and previous agreements with respect to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and dialog with the Republic of Korea] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150904103407/http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c104:H.J.RES.83.EH: |date=2015-09-04 }}, [[United States House of Representatives|House of Representatives]], [[104th Congress]], 1st Session, H.J. Res. 83, September 18, 1995</ref> Some Republican [[U.S. Senator|Senator]]s were strongly against the agreement, regarding it as [[appeasement]].<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/gallucci.html |title=frontline: kim's nuclear gamble: interviews: robert gallucci |date=10 April 2003 |publisher=PBS |access-date=2009-06-09| archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20090528211359/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/gallucci.html| archive-date= 28 May 2009 | url-status= live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/perle.html |title=frontline: kim's nuclear gamble: interviews: perle |publisher=PBS |date=2003-03-27 |access-date=2009-06-09 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090328120918/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/perle.html |archive-date=2009-03-28 }}</ref>  Initially, [[U.S. Department of Defense]] emergency funds not under Congress' control were used to fund the transitional oil supplies under the agreement,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/perry.html |title=frontline: kim's nuclear gamble: interviews: william perry |publisher=PBS |date=2003-02-26 |access-date=2009-06-09| archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20090528211409/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/perry.html| archive-date= 28 May 2009 | url-status= live}}</ref>  together with international funding.  From 1996 Congress provided funding, though not always sufficient amounts.<ref name=bridge-hecker-2010 /><ref name=CRS-20030317>{{cite report |url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/nk24.pdf |title=North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program |author =Larry A. Niksch |publisher=Congressional Research Service |id=IB91141 |date=March 17, 2003 |access-date=2009-09-24| archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20090904061135/http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/nk24.pdf| archive-date= 4 September 2009 | url-status= live}}</ref> Consequently, some of the agreed transitional oil supplies were delivered late.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/gao/rc00020t.pdf#page=5 |title=Nuclear Nonproliferation / Heavy Fuel Oil Delivered to North Korea Under the Agreed Framework |website=www.globalsecurity.org |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100415032427/http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/gao/rc00020t.pdf |archive-date=2010-04-15}}</ref> KEDO's first director, [[Stephen Bosworth]], later commented "The Agreed Framework was a political orphan within two weeks after its signature".<ref name=cnnmoney-20030512>{{cite news |url=http://money.cnn.com:80/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2003/05/12/342316/ |title=Rummy's North Korea Connection What did Donald Rumsfeld know about ABB's deal to build nuclear reactors there? And why won't he talk about it? |last=Behar |first=Richard |newspaper=CNN Money |date=12 May 2003 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071122140941/http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2003/05/12/342316/ |archive-date=22 November 2007 |url-status=dead }}</ref>

Some analysts believe North Korea agreed to the freeze primarily because of the U.S. agreement to phase out economic sanctions that had been in place since the [[Korean War]]. But because of congressional opposition, the U.S. failed to deliver on this part of the agreement.<ref>{{citation|url=http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20010301faessay4263/selig-s-harrison/time-to-leave-korea.html|title=Time To Leave Korea?|author=Selig S. Harrison|publisher=Foreign Affairs|date=March–April 2001|access-date=2009-06-09|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090301161804/http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20010301faessay4263/selig-s-harrison/time-to-leave-korea.html|archive-date=March 1, 2009|url-status=dead}}</ref>

International funding for the LWR replacement power plants had to be sought. Formal invitations to bid were not issued until 1998, by which time the delays were infuriating North Korea.<ref name=cnnmoney-20030512/>  In May 1998, North Korea warned it would restart nuclear research if the U.S. could not install the LWR.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/1998/9803/news03/06.htm#8 |title=LWR Provision is U.S. Obligation: DPRK FM Spokesman |publisher=[[Korean Central News Agency]] |date=1998-03-06 |access-date=2010-11-13 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120401221837/http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/1998/9803/news03/06.htm |archive-date=2012-04-01 }}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/042nd_issue/98051302.htm |title=Stalemated LWR Project to Prompt Pyongyang to Restart N-Program |publisher=The People's Korea |date=1998-05-13 |access-date=2009-06-09 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090824204704/http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/042nd_issue/98051302.htm |archive-date=2009-08-24 }}</ref> Formal ground breaking on the site was on 21 August 1997,<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/005th_issue/97082102.htm |title=KEDO Breaks Ground on US Led Nuclear Project That will Undermine Client Status of S Korea |newspaper=The People's Korea |date=21 August 1997 |access-date=2009-06-09 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090824204606/http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/005th_issue/97082102.htm |archive-date=24 August 2009 }}</ref> but significant spending on the LWR project did not commence until 2000.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/KEDO_AR_2004.pdf |title=Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization Annual Report 2004 |date=December 31, 2004 |publisher=Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization |access-date=2010-04-14 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090923120054/http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/KEDO_AR_2004.pdf |archive-date=September 23, 2009 }}</ref>

U.S. officials in 1998 testified to Congress that there were no fundamental violations of any aspect of the Framework Agreement by North Koreans.<ref name=conversation>{{cite web |url=https://theconversation.com/why-the-uss-1994-deal-with-north-korea-failed-and-what-trump-can-learn-from-it-80578 |title=Why the US's 1994 deal with North Korea failed – and what Trump can learn from it  |last=Ryan |first=Maria |website=The Conversation |date=19 July 2017 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171024034157/https://theconversation.com/why-the-uss-1994-deal-with-north-korea-failed-and-what-trump-can-learn-from-it-80578 |archive-date=24 October 2017}}</ref>

Joel S. Wit, State Department Coordinator for implementation of the Agreed Framework (1995–2000)<ref>{{cite web|title=Joel S. Wit – Senior Research Scholar|url=http://weai.columbia.edu/joel-wit/|website=Columbia University Weatherhead East Asian Institute|publisher=Columbia University|access-date=11 November 2016|quote=an important player in reaching the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework. From 1995–2000, Mr. Wit was the State Department Coordinator for implementation of that agreement|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161112081119/http://weai.columbia.edu/joel-wit/|archive-date=12 November 2016}}</ref> during the Clinton administration, stated that "we did know about the DPRK cheating on the highly-enriched uranium front starting in 1998."<ref name=wp-20150313>{{cite news|last1=Glenn Kessler|title=Cotton's misguided history lesson on the North Korean nuclear deal|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/03/13/cottons-misguided-history-lesson-on-the-north-korean-nuclear-deal/|access-date=11 November 2016|newspaper=The Washington Post|date=March 13, 2015|quote=In the Clinton administration,"we did know about the DPRK cheating on the highly-enriched uranium front starting in 1998"|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161112081807/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/03/13/cottons-misguided-history-lesson-on-the-north-korean-nuclear-deal/|archive-date=12 November 2016}}</ref>

The U.S. diplomat who negotiated the framework, [[Robert Gallucci]] has warned that it could collapse if United States did not fulfill obligations that it agreed to.<ref name=conversation/>

There was increasing disagreement between North Korea and the United States on the scope and implementation of the agreement. The United States did little to meet its commitment to normalize political and economic relations.<ref name=38north-20180518>{{cite news |url=https://www.38north.org/2018/05/lsigal051818/ |title=Pyongyang's Brushback Pitch |author=Leon V. Sigal |publisher=U.S.-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies |work=[[38 North]] |date=18 May 2018 |access-date=23 May 2018}}</ref> When by 1999 economic sanctions had not been lifted and full diplomatic relations between the United States and North Korea had not been established, North Korea warned that they would resume nuclear research unless the United States kept up its end of the bargain.{{citation needed|date=October 2017}}<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Pollack |first=Jonathan D. |year=2003 |title=The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework |url=https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2242&context=nwc-review |format=PDF |journal=Naval War College Review |volume=56 |issue=3 |access-date=June 16, 2022}}</ref>

Construction of the first LWR reactor began in August 2002.<ref>{{cite web |author=Tim Carter |url=http://www.kedo.org/news_detail.asp?NewsID=22 |title=Promoting Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula and Beyond |publisher=KEDO |access-date=2009-06-09 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090908031931/http://www.kedo.org/news_detail.asp?NewsID=22 |archive-date=2009-09-08 }}</ref>  Construction of both reactors was well behind schedule.  The initial plan was for both reactors to be operational by 2003, but the construction had been halted indefinitely in late 2002.  Senators accused President Clinton of understating the cost of the project.<ref name=conversation/>

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State [[Rust Deming]] told Congress "to be frank, we have in past years not always met the fuel year deadline".<ref name=conversation/>