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Albert Coady Wedemeyer
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==World War II== At the outbreak of [[World War II]], Wedemeyer was a [[lieutenant colonel (United States)|lieutenant colonel]] assigned as a staff officer to the War Plans Division.<ref name="sp1">[http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-42624625.html Der Spiegel 9/1959]</ref> Notably, in 1941 he was the chief author of the "[[Victory Program]]", which advocated the defeat of Germany's [[Wehrmacht]] in Europe as the prime war objective for the United States. This plan was adopted and expanded as the war progressed. Additionally, Wedemeyer helped to plan the [[Normandy Invasion]].{{citation needed|date=October 2019}} ===China-Burma-India Command=== [[File:GeneralWedemeyer.JPG|250px|thumb|General Wedemeyer arriving in Chungking, 1944]] In 1943, Wedemeyer was reassigned to the [[South-East Asian Theatre of World War II|South-East Asia Theatre]] to be Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander of the [[South East Asia Command]] (SEAC), [[Louis Mountbatten, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma|Lord Louis Mountbatten]]. On 27 October 1944, Wedemeyer received a telegram from General [[George C. Marshall]] directing him to proceed to [[Republic of China|China]] to assume command of United States forces in China, replacing General [[Joseph Stilwell]]. In his new command, Wedemeyer was also named Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo [[Chiang Kai-shek]]. The telegram contained a host of special instructions and limitations on Wedemeyer's command when dealing with the [[Nationalist government]]. Wedemeyer later recalled his initial dread over the assignment, as service in the China theater was considered a graveyard for American officials, both military and diplomatic.<ref>Wedemeyer, Albert C. (Gen.), ''Wedemeyer Reports!'', Henry Holt Co. (1958) {{ISBN|0-89275-011-1|0-8159-7216-4}}, p. 269</ref> When Wedemeyer arrived at Stilwell's headquarters after Stilwell's dismissal, he was dismayed to discover that Stilwell had intentionally departed without seeing him, and did not leave a single briefing paper for his guidance, though departing United States military commanders habitually greeted their replacement in order to thoroughly brief them on the strengths and weaknesses of headquarters staff, the issues confronting the command, and planned operations.<ref name="Wedemeyer, Albert C. 1958 pp. 303-304">Wedemeyer, Albert C. (Gen), ''Wedemeyer Reports!'', Henry Holt Co. (1958) {{ISBN|0-89275-011-1|0-8159-7216-4}}, pp. 303β304</ref> Searching the offices, Wedemeyer could find no documentary record of Stilwell's plans or records of his former or future operations.<ref name="Wedemeyer, Albert C. 1958 pp. 303-304"/> Wedemeyer then spoke with Stilwell's staff officers but learned little from them because Stilwell, according to the staff, kept everything in his "hip pocket".<ref>Wedemeyer, Albert C. (Gen), ''Wedemeyer Reports!'', Henry Holt Co. (1958) {{ISBN|0-89275-011-1|0-8159-7216-4}}, p. 294</ref> During his time in the CBI, Wedemeyer attempted to motivate the Nationalist Chinese government to take a more aggressive role against the [[Imperial Japanese Armed Forces]] in the war. He was instrumental in expanding [[the Hump]] airlift operation with additional, more capable transport aircraft, and continued Stilwell's programs to train, equip, and modernize the [[National Revolutionary Army]]. His efforts were not wholly successful, in part because of the ill will engendered by his predecessor, as well as continuing friction over the role of the [[Chinese Communist Party]]'s [[People's Liberation Army]]. Wedemyer was credited for his advice in helping the NRA to defeat the Japanese forces in the [[Battle of West Hunan]], as well as retaking Guilin and Liuzhou. Wedemeyer also supervised logistical support for the [[United States Army Air Forces]] in China. These forces included the United States [[Twentieth Air Force]] partaking in [[Operation Matterhorn]] and the [[Fourteenth Air Force]] operated by General [[Claire Chennault]]. On 7 December 1945, Wedemeyer with General [[Douglas MacArthur]], and navy Admiral [[Raymond A. Spruance]], the three top military officers in the Far East, recommended to the Pentagon that it transport six more Chinese Nationalist armies into North China and Manchuria. However they also suggested that "the U.S. assistance to China, as outlined above, be made available as basis for negotiation by the American Ambassador to bring together and effect a compromise between the major opposing groups in order to promote a united and democratic China."<ref>Feis, ''The China Tangle'' p. 417</ref> The issue of forcing the Nationalists into a coalition government with the Communists would later become a central issue in the fierce "[[Loss of China|Who lost China]]" political debates in the United States during 1949β51. On 10 July 1945, Wedemeyer had informed General Marshall: {{blockquote|If [[Uncle Sam|Uncle Sugar]], Russia, and Britain united strongly in their endeavor to bring about a coalition of these two political parties [the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party] in China by coercing both sides to make realistic concessions, serious post-war disturbance may be averted and timely effective military employment of all Chinese may be obtained against the Japanese. I use the term coercion advisedly because it is my conviction that continued appeals to both sides couched in polite diplomatic terms will not accomplish unification. There must be teeth in Big Three.<ref>Romanus and Sunderland, ''Time Runs Out in CBI'' p. 383</ref>}} Wedemeyer later said as a military commander, his statement was intended as a call to force the long-heralded, but never implemented, military alliance between the Nationalist government and Chinese Communists in order to rout undefeated Japanese forces in China. He later told others that he had opposed a political coalition. (Tsou, 1962). After Japan's capitulation, Wedemeyer became alarmed that some Japanese troops were surrendering to Communist Chinese forces. He wanted seven American divisions to be sent to China, but General Marshall replied that it should not be given priority over Japan and Korea.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Spector |first1=Ronald H. |title=In the ruins of empire : the Japanese surrender and the battle for postwar Asia |date=2007 |location=New York |isbn=9780375509155 |edition=1st |pages=38β39}}</ref> Wedemeyer served in China into 1946.
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