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Arms control
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== Theory of arms control == {{More citations needed section|date=April 2023}} Scholars and practitioners such as [[John D. Steinbruner]], [[Thomas Schelling]], [[Morton Halperin]], [[Jonathan Dean]] or [[Stuart Croft (political scientist)|Stuart Croft]] worked extensively on the theoretical backing of arms control. Arms control is meant to break the [[security dilemma]]. It aims at mutual security between partners and overall stability (be it in a crisis situation, a [[grand strategy]], or stability to put an end to an [[arms race]]). Other than stability, arms control comes with cost reduction and damage limitation. It is different from [[disarmament]] since the maintenance of stability might allow for mutually controlled armament and does not take a peace-without-weapons-stance.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Schelling |first1=Thomas |last2=Halperin |first2=Morton |title=Strategy and Arms Control |date=1961 |publisher=Twentieth Century Fund}}</ref> Nevertheless, arms control is a defensive strategy in principle, since [[transparency (social)|transparency]], equality, and stability do not fit into an offensive strategy.{{citation needed|date=November 2022}} According to a 2020 study in the ''American Political Science Review'', arms control is rare because successful arms control agreements involve a difficult trade-off between transparency and security. For arms control agreements to be effective, there needs to be a way to thoroughly verify that a state is following the agreement, such as through intrusive inspections. However, states are often reluctant to submit to such inspections when they have reasons to fear that the inspectors will use the inspections to gather information about the capabilities of the state, which could be used in a future conflict.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Coe|first1=Andrew J.|last2=Vaynman|first2=Jane|date=2020|title=Why Arms Control Is So Rare|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/why-arms-control-is-so-rare/BAC79354627F72CDDDB102FE82889B8A|journal=American Political Science Review|language=en|volume=114|issue=2|pages=342β355|doi=10.1017/S000305541900073X|s2cid=201700936|issn=0003-0554|url-access=subscription}}</ref>
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