Editing Barker v. Wingo (section)

==The Supreme Court decision==

===Opinion of the court===
The Supreme Court first noted that "[t]he right to a speedy trial is generically different from any of the other rights enshrined in the Constitution for the protection of the accused" for three reasons:
*First, the Court noted that "there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused".  The Court commented on the backlog of cases, mainly in urban courts, that often enable defendants to negotiate a plea for a lesser offense.  The Court also noted that persons released on bond had the opportunity to commit further crimes,<ref>The Court specifically commented that "[i]t must be of little comfort to the residents of Christian County, Kentucky, to know that Barker was at large on bail for over four years while accused of a vicious and brutal murder of which he was ultimately convicted."</ref> "the longer an accused is free awaiting trial, the more tempting becomes his opportunity to jump bail and escape", and that "delay between arrest and punishment may have a detrimental effect on rehabilitation."  The Court also noted that if the accused cannot make bail, that too can make rehabilitation difficult, that a lengthy pre-trial detention can be costly, and that "society loses wages which might have been earned, and it must often support families of incarcerated breadwinners."<ref>''Barker'', 407 U.S. at 520-21.</ref>
*Second, the Court noted that "deprivation of the right may work to the accused's advantage."  As the time between arrest and trial lengthens, witnesses may become unavailable and/or their memories fade; if the witnesses were for the prosecution the case may be seriously weakened (as the prosecution has the burden to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt).<ref name=Barker521>''Barker'', 407 U.S. at 521.</ref>
*Finally, the Court noted that the concept is more vague than with other rights, in that the Court "cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate."<ref name=Barker521/>

The Court then noted that there were two competing approaches as to how to handle the uncertainty regarding "how long is too long"; neither of which it accepted:<ref name=Barker521/>
*One approach (supported by the [[American Bar Association]]) was to "hold that the Constitution requires a criminal defendant to be offered a trial within a specified time period."  The Court rejected this approach, stating that there was "no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number of days or months."<ref name=Barker523>''Barker'', 407 U.S. at 523.</ref>
*The other approach was to "restrict consideration of the right to those cases in which the accused has demanded a speedy trial."  In other words, if the defendant did not specifically demand a trial, the defendant waived his/her right to appeal the matter.  The Court also rejected this approach, as it considered a speedy trial to be a fundamental right, and quoting ''Carnley v. Cochran'' the Court ruled that "[p]resuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandably rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver."<ref name=Barker526>''Barker'', 407 U.S. at 526.</ref>

As a balancing test, the Court adopted four factors to be considered in determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether a defendant has been prejudiced by the lack of a speedy trial:<ref name=Barker530>''Barker'', 407 U.S. at 530.</ref>
#the length of delay,
#the reason for the delay,
#the time and manner in which the defendant has asserted his right, and
#the degree of prejudice to the defendant which the delay has caused.

Taking these factors into consideration, though, Barker's conviction was upheld.  The court agreed that the period of time between initial arrest and trial &ndash; over five years &ndash; was "extraordinary" and that only seven months of the delay was justifiable (the period of the ex-sheriff's illness).<ref>The Court also stated that some delay to secure Manning's testimony against Barker would have been permissible, "but more than four years was too long a period, particularly since a good part of that period was attributable to the Commonwealth's failure or inability to try Manning under circumstances that comported with due process."</ref>

However, the Court also ruled that Barker was not prejudiced by the delay, since none of Barker's witnesses were harmed by the delay.  More importantly, the Court determined that Barker did not want a speedy trial (a fact that Barker's counsel conceded at oral argument).  The Court speculated that Barker's reason was his gambling on Manning's acquittal (the evidence against Manning not being strong as evidenced by two hung juries and two appellate court reversals), believing that if Manning was acquitted, he would never be tried (which Barker's counsel also conceded at oral argument).  The Court further noted that, after Barker's counsel objected to the February 1962 continuance, he did not object to the June or September 1962 continuances; only in March 1963, after Manning's convictions became final, were objections raised to further continuances (this time brought about by the ex-sheriff's illness, which Barker conceded was a justifiable reason).

===Concurring opinion===
Justice White, joined by Justice Brennan, concurred in the verdict, and specifically commented that an overcrowded docket would not be a reasonable basis for a delay.