Editing Beeching cuts (section)

=== ''The Reshaping of British Railways'' (Beeching I) ===
[[File:Beeching axe 1 and NUR response.jpg|thumb|A copy of ''The Reshaping of British Railways'' report, displayed beside the [[National Union of Railwaymen]]'s response pamphlet]]
The first Beeching report, titled ''The Reshaping of British Railways'', was published on 27 March 1963.<ref>{{cite web |author=Garry Keenor |url=http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docSummary.php?docID=13 |title=The Reshaping of British Railways – Part 1: Report |publisher=The Railways Archive |access-date=25 July 2010}}</ref>

The report starts by quoting the brief provided by the [[Prime Minister of the United Kingdom|Prime Minister]], [[Harold Macmillan]], from 1960: "First, the industry must be of a size and pattern suited to modern conditions and prospects. In particular, the railway system must be modelled to meet current needs, and the modernisation plan must be adapted to this new shape"{{sfn|Beeching|1963a|p=1}} and with the premise that the railways should be run as a profitable business.{{sfn|Beeching|1963a|p=2|loc="It is, of course the responsibility of the British Railways Board so to shape and operate the railways as to make them pay"}}

Beeching first studied traffic flows on all lines to identify "the good, the bad, and the indifferent".{{sfn|Beeching|1963a|p=3|loc="Ever since major amalgamations started, the business of railways has been, from a financial point of view, a mixture of good, bad, and indifferent"}} His analysis showed that the least-used 1,762 stations had annual passenger receipts of less than £2,500 each (£{{Formatprice|{{Inflation|UK|2500|1960|r=-3}}|0}} as of {{CURRENTISOYEAR}}{{Inflation-fn|UK|df=y}}), that over half of the 4,300 stations open to passengers in 1960 had receipts of less than £10,000,{{sfn|Beeching|1963a|p=65}} that the least-used 50% of stations contributed only 2% of passenger revenue,{{sfn|Beeching|1963a|p=66}} and that one third of route miles carried just 1% of passengers.{{sfn|Beeching|1963a|p=64}}

By way of example, he noted that the line from [[Thetford railway station|Thetford]] to [[Swaffham railway station|Swaffham]] carried five trains each weekday in each direction, carrying an average of nine passengers with only 10% of the costs of operating the line covered by fares; another example was the [[Crieff and Comrie Railway|Gleneagles-Crieff-Comrie line]] which had ten trains a day and five passengers on average, earning only 25% of costs. Finally there was the service from Hull to York via Beverley (using part of the [[Yorkshire Coast Line]], which was not closed, and the [[York to Beverley Line]], which was). The line covered 80% of its operating costs, but he calculated that it could be closed because there was an alternative, albeit less direct, route.{{sfn|Beeching|1963a|pp=96–99|loc=Appendix 2}}

Out of {{convert|18000|mi}} of railway, Beeching recommended that {{convert|6000|mi}}—mostly rural and industrial lines—should be closed entirely, and that some of the remaining lines should be kept open only for freight. A total of 2,363 stations were to close, including 435 already under threat, both on lines that were to close and on lines that were to remain open.{{sfn|Beeching|1963a|p=97}}

He recommended that freight services should mainly be for bulk commodities such as minerals and coal, and that the freight system make use of new [[containerised]] handling systems rather than less efficient and slower wagon-load traffic. The latter recommendation would prove prescient with the rise of [[intermodal freight transport]] in the following decades.{{sfn|Beeching|1963a|pp=141–148|loc=Appendix 4 – The Liner Train}}