Editing Causal theory of reference (section)

== Variations<!--'Causal-historical theory of reference', 'Causal-descriptive theory of reference', and 'Descriptive-causal theory of reference' redirect here--> ==
Variations of the causal theory include:
* The '''causal-historical theory of reference'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> is the original version of the causal theory. It was put forward by [[Keith Donnellan]] in 1972<ref>Donnellan, Keith. (1972). "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions." In Donald Davidson; Gilbert Harman (eds.). ''Semantics of Natural Language''. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. pp. 356–379.</ref> and [[Saul Kripke]] in 1980.<ref>Kripke, S. "A Puzzle about Belief", in A. Margalit (ed.), ''Meaning and Use'', Reidel, pp. 239–83 (1979).</ref><ref name=SEP>[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/names/ Names (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)]</ref> This view introduces the idea of reference-passing links in a causal-historical chain.<ref name=SEP/>
* The '''descriptive-causal theory of reference'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> (also '''causal-descriptive theory of reference'''),<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--><ref name=Psillos279>[[Stathis Psillos]], ''Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth'', Routledge, 1999, p. 279.</ref> a view put forward by [[David Lewis (philosopher)|David Lewis]]<ref name=Psillos279/><ref name=Gattei>Stefano Gattei, ''Thomas Kuhn's 'Linguistic Turn' and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism: Incommensurability, Rationality and the Search for Truth'', Ashgate Publishing, 2012, p. 122.</ref> in 1984,<ref>D. K. Lewis (1984), "Putnam's Paradox." ''Australasian Journal of Philosophy'', '''62'''(3), 221–36; reprinted in D. Lewis (1999), ''Papers on metaphysics and epistemology'', Cambridge University Press, pp. 56–77.</ref> introduces the idea that a minimal descriptive apparatus needs to be added to the causal relations between speaker and object.<ref name=Gattei/>{{efn|See also [[Structuralism (philosophy of science)#Further criticism|Criticism of structuralism]].}}