Editing Cheap talk (section)

===Biological applications===
It has been commonly argued that cheap talk will have no effect on the underlying structure of the game.  In [[biology]] authors have often argued that costly signalling best explains signalling between animals (see [[Handicap principle]], [[Signalling theory]]).  This general belief has been receiving some challenges (see work by Carl Bergstrom<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://octavia.zoology.washington.edu/information_overview.html |title=''The Biology of Information''. |access-date=2005-03-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050304030024/http://octavia.zoology.washington.edu/information_overview.html |archive-date=2005-03-04 |url-status=dead }}</ref> and [[Brian Skyrms]] 2002, 2004).  In particular, several models using [[evolutionary game theory]] indicate that cheap talk can have effects on the evolutionary dynamics of particular games.