Editing Commerce Clause (section)

===Early years (1800s–1830s)===
Chief Justice [[John Marshall]] ruled in ''[[Gibbons v. Ogden]]'' (1824) that the power to regulate interstate commerce also included the power to regulate interstate navigation: "Commerce, undoubtedly is traffic, but it is something more—it is intercourse.... [A] power to regulate navigation is as expressly granted, as if that term had been added to the word 'commerce'.... [T]he power of Congress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several [[U.S. state|states]]. It would be a very useless power if it could not pass those lines."<ref>[[s:Gibbons_v._Ogden_(22_U.S._1)|''Gibbons v. Ogden'' (22 U.S. 1)]]</ref> The Court's decision contains language supporting one important line of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the idea that the electoral process of representative government represents the primary limitation on the exercise of the Commerce Clause powers:

<blockquote>The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments....</blockquote>

In ''Gibbons'', the Court struck down [[New York State]]'s attempt to grant a steamboat monopoly to [[Robert Fulton]], which he had then ultimately franchised to Ogden, who claimed river traffic was not "commerce" under the Commerce Clause and that Congress could not interfere with New York State's grant of an exclusive monopoly within its own borders.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.annenbergclassroom.org/resource/the-pursuit-of-justice/pursuit-justice-chapter-3-steamboats-states-rights-power-congress/|title=Chapter 3: Steamboats, States’ Rights, and the Power of Congress}}</ref> Ogden's assertion was untenable: he contended that New York could control river traffic within New York all the way to the border with [[New Jersey]] and that New Jersey could control river traffic within New Jersey all the way to the border with New York, leaving Congress with the power to control the traffic as it crossed the [[U.S. state|state]] line.

Thus, Ogden contended, Congress could not invalidate his monopoly if transported passengers only within New York. The Supreme Court, however, found that Congress could invalidate his monopoly since it was operational on an interstate channel of navigation.

In its decision, the Court assumed interstate commerce required movement of the subject of regulation across state borders. The decision contains the following principles, some of which have since been altered by subsequent decisions:
* Commerce is "intercourse, all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse."
* Commerce among the states cannot stop at the external boundary of each state, but may be introduced into the interior.
* Congress can regulate, that is "to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed" that "may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution."

Additionally, the Marshall Court limited the extent of federal maritime and admiralty jurisdiction to tidewaters in [[s:The_Steam-Boat_Thomas_Jefferson_Johnson|''The Steam-Boat Thomas Jefferson Johnson'']].<ref>{{ussc|23|428|1825|Wheat.|10}}</ref>