Open main menu
Home
Random
Recent changes
Special pages
Community portal
Preferences
About Wikipedia
Disclaimers
Incubator escapee wiki
Search
User menu
Talk
Dark mode
Contributions
Create account
Log in
Editing
Committee on Public Information
(section)
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
===Activities=== Wilson established the first modern propaganda office, the Committee on Public Information (CPI), headed by [[George Creel]].<ref>George Creel, [https://archive.org/details/howweadvertameri00creerich ''How We Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public Information That Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe.'' (1920)]</ref><ref>Stephen Vaughn, ''Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on Public Information'' (1980). [https://www.questia.com/library/1664084/holding-fast-the-inner-lines-democracy-nationalism online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190329234132/https://www.questia.com/library/1664084/holding-fast-the-inner-lines-democracy-nationalism |date=2019-03-29 }}</ref> Creel set out to systematically reach every person in the United States multiple times with patriotic information about how the individual could contribute to the war effort. It also worked with the post office to censor seditious [[Propaganda in World War I|counter-propaganda]]. Creel set up divisions in his new agency to produce and distribute innumerable copies of pamphlets, newspaper releases, magazine advertisements, films, school campaigns, and the speeches of the Four Minute Men. CPI created colorful posters that appeared in every store window, catching the attention of the passersby for a few seconds.<ref>Katherine H. Adams, ''Progressive Politics and the Training of America's Persuaders'' (1999)</ref> Movie theaters were widely attended, and the CPI trained thousands of volunteer speakers to make patriotic appeals during the four-minute breaks needed to change reels. They also spoke at churches, lodges, fraternal organizations, labor unions, and even logging camps. Speeches were mostly in English, but ethnic groups were reached in their own languages. Creel boasted that in 18 months his 75,000 volunteers delivered over 7.5 million four minute orations to over 300 million listeners, in a nation of 103 million people. The speakers attended training sessions through local universities, and were given pamphlets and speaking tips on a wide variety of topics, such as buying Liberty Bonds, registering for the draft, rationing food, recruiting unskilled workers for munitions jobs, and supporting Red Cross programs.<ref>Lisa Mastrangelo, "World War I, public intellectuals, and the Four Minute Men: Convergent ideals of public speaking and civic participation." ''Rhetoric & Public Affairs'' 12#4 (2009): 607-633.</ref> Historians were assigned to write pamphlets and in-depth histories of the causes of the European war.<ref>George T. Blakey, ''Historians on the Homefront: American Propagandists for the Great War'' (1970)</ref><ref>Committee on public information, ''Complete Report of the Committee on Public Information: 1917, 1918, 1919'' (1920) [https://archive.org/details/CompleteReportCommitteeOnPublicInformation191719181919 online free]</ref> [[File:4-Minute-Men 1917 CPI.jpg|thumb|left]] The CPI used material that was based on fact, but spun it to present an upbeat picture of the American war effort. In his memoirs, Creel claimed that the CPI routinely denied false or undocumented atrocity reports, fighting the crude propaganda efforts of "patriotic organizations" like the [[National Security League]] and the [[American Defense Society]] that preferred "general thundering" and wanted the CPI to "preach a gospel of hate."<ref>Creel, 195-6</ref> The committee used newsprint, posters, radio, telegraph, and movies to broadcast its message. It recruited about 75,000 "[[Four Minute Men]]," volunteers who spoke about the war at social events for an ideal length of four minutes. They covered the draft, rationing, war bond drives, victory gardens and why America was fighting. They were advised to keep their message positive, always use their own words and avoid "hymns of hate."<ref>Thomas Fleming, ''The Illusion of Victory: America in World War I.'' New York: Basic Books, 2003; pg. 117.</ref> For ten days in May 1917, the Four Minute Men were expected to promote "Universal Service by Selective Draft" in advance of national draft registration on June 5, 1917.<ref>Fleming, ''The Illusion of Victory,'' pp. 92-94.</ref> The CPI staged events designed for many different ethnic groups, in their language. For instance, Irish-American tenor [[John McCormack (tenor)|John McCormack]] sang at Mount Vernon before an audience representing Irish-American organizations.<ref>Fleming, ''The Illusion of Victory,'' pp. 117-118.</ref> The committee also targeted the American worker and, endorsed by [[Samuel Gompers]], filled factories and offices with posters designed to promote the critical role of American labor in the success of the war effort.<ref>Fleming, ''The Illusion of Victory,'' pg. 118.</ref> As the war progressed, the depiction of the enemy evolved in CPI publications. Initially in 1917, CPI pamphlets emphasized the importance of defending democracy and liberty from the German state. Over time the distinction between the German state and the German people was blurred. By 1918, following German military advances, pamphlets depicted individuals of German descent living in the United States as a threat.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Heuer |first=Vera |date=2018-04-03 |title=Pamphlets of the Committee on Public Information and the Construction of an American National Identity during World War One: An Event-Frame Analysis |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13537113.2018.1457821 |journal=Nationalism and Ethnic Politics |language=en |volume=24 |issue=2 |pages=222–243 |doi=10.1080/13537113.2018.1457821 |s2cid=149512029 |issn=1353-7113|url-access=subscription }}</ref> The CPI's activities were so thorough that historians later stated, using the example of a typical midwestern American farm family, that<ref name="sweeney2001">{{cite book | title=Secrets of Victory: The Office of Censorship and the American Press and Radio in World War II | publisher=University of North Carolina Press | pages=[https://archive.org/details/secretsofvictory00swee/page/15 15–16] | author=Sweeney, Michael S. | year=2001 | location=Chapel Hill | isbn=978-0-8078-2598-3 | url=https://archive.org/details/secretsofvictory00swee/page/15 }}</ref> {{blockquote|Every item of war news they saw—in the country weekly, in magazines, or in the city daily picked up occasionally in the general store—was not merely officially approved information but precisely the same kind that millions of their fellow citizens were getting at the same moment. Every war story had been censored somewhere along the line— at the source, in transit, or in the newspaper offices in accordance with 'voluntary' rules established by the CPI.}} Creel wrote about the committee's rejection of the word propaganda, saying: "We did not call it propaganda, for that word, in German hands, had come to be associated with deceit and corruption. Our effort was educational and informative throughout, for we had such confidence in our case as to feel that no other argument was needed than the simple, straightforward presentation of facts."<ref name = "War2" /> A report published in 1940 by the [[Council on Foreign Relations]] credits the committee with creating "the most efficient engine of war propaganda which the world had ever seen", producing a "revolutionary change" in public attitude toward US participation in WWI:<ref>pp. 75-76, Harold J. Tobin and Percy W. Bidwell, ''Mobilizing Civilian America'', New York: Council on Foreign Relations.</ref> {{blockquote|In November 1916, the slogan of Wilson's supporters, 'He Kept Us Out Of War,' played an important part in winning the election. At that time a large part of the country was apathetic.... Yet, within a very short period after America had joined the belligerents, the nation appeared to be enthusiastically and overwhelmingly convinced of the justice of the cause of the Allies, and unanimously determined to help them win. The revolutionary change is only partly explainable by a sudden explosion of latent anti-German sentiment detonated by the declaration of war. Far more significance is to be attributed to the work of the group of zealous amateur propagandists, organized under Mr. George Creel in the Committee on Public Information. With his associates he planned and carried out what was perhaps the most effective job of large-scale war propaganda which the world had ever witnessed.}}
Edit summary
(Briefly describe your changes)
By publishing changes, you agree to the
Terms of Use
, and you irrevocably agree to release your contribution under the
CC BY-SA 4.0 License
and the
GFDL
. You agree that a hyperlink or URL is sufficient attribution under the Creative Commons license.
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)