Editing Concurrence (section)

==Single transaction principle==
Not all acts forming the basis of an ''actus reus'' are single, unconnected events. If a sequence of events is inevitably linked, it may be viewed as a single transaction. So long as the requisite ''mens rea'' is formed before the sequence begins, or during the sequence (before it ends), the accused will be liable.

In the previous example, the victim would not have died if the first driver had not abandoned him at a dangerous point on the road. The law will treat the ''actus reus'' as having started with the accidental injury and ended with the death. In ''[[Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner]]'' (1969) 1 QB 439, a police officer ordered the defendant to park his car and he reluctantly complied. In doing so, he accidentally drove the car on to the policeman's foot and, when the policeman said "Get off my foot", said "Fuck you, you can wait" and turned off the ignition.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.a-level-law.com/caselibrary/FAGAN%20v%20METROPOLITAN%20POLICE%20COMMISSIONER%20%5B1969%5D%201%20QB%20439%20-%20DC.doc |title=FAGAN v METROPOLITAN POLICE COMMISSIONER (1969) 1 QB 439 – DC |access-date=2008-09-09 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120118065059/http://www.a-level-law.com/caselibrary/FAGAN%20v%20METROPOLITAN%20POLICE%20COMMISSIONER%20&#91;1969&#93;%201%20QB%20439%20-%20DC.doc |archive-date=2012-01-18 |url-status=dead }}</ref> Because of the steel toe cap in his boot, the policeman's foot was not in actual danger, but the Divisional Court held that this could constitute a [[common assault]]. Albeit accidentally, the driver had caused the car to rest on the foot. This ''actus reus'' was a continuing state of affairs for so long as the car rested on the officer's foot and the ''mens rea'' was formed before the car was removed. Whether realistically or not, the officer apprehended the possibility of injury so the offence of common assault was complete.

A different way of justifying liability in this type of situation would be to consider an [[omission (criminal law)|omission]] at the point in time that the ''mens rea'' is formed. In the first example, liability arises from the [[recklessness (law)|reckless]] omission to move the man, or willful blindness that he was in danger. In ''[[Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner|Fagan]]'', liability arises from omitting to remove the car.

But not every factual sequence can be so conveniently recast as an omission. Suppose, for example, that A sees his enemy, B, and decides to attack him. A picks up a stick and begins to chase B who runs into a hotel, up the stairs and into a room, locking the door behind him. A hammers at the door, shouting threats. A then sees a fire axe in a glass case nearby. He tells B that he is going for the axe and will break down the door. When A walks away, B is so terrified that he jumps out of the window and breaks his legs. Even though A might not have had an immediate intention to injure B at the critical moment when B jumped, the fear was inspired with an appropriate intention and B would not have been desperate enough to jump had it not been for that fear. [It is fair to exclude liability when B's fear is entirely unreasonable given A's behaviour because B's self-induced injury will break the chain of causation].

This latter example raises a separate issue which is that it is sufficient to base a conviction on the presence of ''mens rea'' at some time during the occurrence of the events comprising the single transaction. The fact that the accused might mistakenly believe they have succeeded in the crime does not prevent a conviction. For example, suppose that A begins to strangle B and, believing B to be dead, abandons the "body" in nearby woods where B dies of exposure. A will still be convicted of the homicide even though the relevant behaviour of abandoning the body was not accompanied by a ''mens rea''.

And for the sake of completeness, if A commits an offence with an ''actus reus'' and a ''mens rea'', it will not affect liability that A subsequently repents the crime and effects restitution. Thus, if A steals goods from B but then returns them together with some money to make good the damage caused during the forced entry, this cannot change the fact that there was an ''actus reus'' accompanied by an appropriate ''mens rea''. A crime was committed although the subsequent conscience-based behaviour would be a relevant consideration during the [[sentence (law)|sentencing]] stage of the trial.