Editing Confirmation bias (section)

=== Biased search for information ===
[[File:Fred Barnard07.jpg|thumb|right|200px|alt=A drawing of a man sitting on a stool at a writing desk|Confirmation bias has been described as an internal "[[Wikt:yes man|yes man]]", echoing back a person's beliefs like [[Charles Dickens]]'s character [[Uriah Heep (character)|Uriah Heep]].<ref name="WSJ">{{Citation |title=How to ignore the yes-man in your head |first=Jason |last=Zweig |newspaper=[[Wall Street Journal]] |date=19 November 2009 |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703811604574533680037778184 |access-date=13 June 2010 |archive-date=14 February 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150214052645/http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703811604574533680037778184 |url-status=live }}</ref>]]
Experiments have found repeatedly that people tend to test hypotheses in a one-sided way, by searching for evidence consistent with their current [[hypothesis]].<ref name ="nickerson"/>{{rp|177–178}}<ref name="kunda112" /> Rather than searching through all the relevant evidence, they phrase questions to receive an affirmative answer that supports their theory.<ref name="baron162" /> They look for the consequences that they would expect if their hypothesis was true, rather than what would happen if it was false.<ref name="baron162">{{Harvnb|Baron|2000 |pp=162–64}}</ref> For example, someone using yes/no questions to find a number they suspect to be the number 3 might ask, "Is it an [[odd number]]?" People prefer this type of question, called a "positive test", even when a negative test such as "Is it an even number?" would yield exactly the same information.<ref>{{Harvnb|Kida|2006|pp=162–65}}</ref> However, this does not mean that people seek tests that guarantee a positive answer. In studies where subjects could select either such pseudo-tests or genuinely diagnostic ones, they favored the genuinely diagnostic.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Devine |first1=Patricia G. |first2=Edward R. |last2=Hirt |first3=Elizabeth M. |last3=Gehrke |year=1990 |title=Diagnostic and confirmation strategies in trait hypothesis testing |journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology |volume=58 |issue=6 |pages=952–963 |issn=1939-1315 |doi=10.1037/0022-3514.58.6.952}}</ref><ref>{{Citation |last1=Trope |first1=Yaacov |first2=Miriam |last2=Bassok |year=1982 |title=Confirmatory and diagnosing strategies in social information gathering |journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology |volume=43 |issue=1 |pages=22–34 |issn=1939-1315 |doi=10.1037/0022-3514.43.1.22}}</ref>

The preference for positive tests in itself is not a bias, since positive tests can be highly informative.<ref name="klaymanha" /> However, in combination with other effects, this strategy can confirm existing beliefs or assumptions, independently of whether they are true.<ref name="oswald82">{{Harvnb|Oswald|Grosjean|2004|pp=82–83}}</ref> In real-world situations, evidence is often complex and mixed. For example, various contradictory ideas about someone could each be supported by concentrating on one aspect of his or her behavior.<ref name="kunda112" /> Thus any search for evidence in favor of a hypothesis is likely to succeed.<ref name=oswald82 /> One illustration of this is the way the phrasing of a question can significantly change the answer.<ref name="kunda112">{{Harvnb|Kunda|1999|pp=112–115}}</ref> For example, people who are asked, "Are you happy with your social life?" report greater satisfaction than those asked, "Are you ''un''happy with your social life?"<ref>{{Citation |last1=Kunda |first1=Ziva |first2=G.T. |last2 =Fong |first3=R. |last3=Sanitoso |first4=E. |last4=Reber |year=1993 |title=Directional questions direct self-conceptions |journal=[[Journal of Experimental Social Psychology]] |volume=29 |pages=62–63 |issn=0022-1031|doi=10.1006/jesp.1993.1004 }} via {{Harvnb|Fine|2006|pp=63–65}}</ref>

Even a small change in a question's wording can affect how people search through available information, and hence the conclusions they reach. This was shown using a fictional child custody case.<ref name="shafir" /> Participants read that Parent A was moderately suitable to be the guardian in multiple ways. Parent B had a mix of salient positive and negative qualities: a close relationship with the child but a job that would take them away for long periods of time. When asked, "Which parent should have custody of the child?" the majority of participants chose Parent B, looking mainly for positive attributes. However, when asked, "Which parent should be denied custody of the child?" they looked for negative attributes and the majority answered that Parent B should be denied custody, implying that Parent A should have custody.<ref name="shafir">{{Citation |last=Shafir |first=E. |year=1993 |title=Choosing versus rejecting: why some options are both better and worse than others |journal=Memory and Cognition |volume=21 |pages=546–556 |pmid= 8350746 |issue=4 |doi=10.3758/bf03197186|doi-access=free }} via {{Harvnb|Fine|2006|pp=63–65}}</ref>

Similar studies have demonstrated how people engage in a biased search for information, but also that this phenomenon may be limited by a preference for genuine diagnostic tests. In an initial experiment, participants rated another person on the [[extroversion and introversion|introversion–extroversion]] personality dimension on the basis of an interview. They chose the interview questions from a given list. When the interviewee was introduced as an introvert, the participants chose questions that presumed introversion, such as, "What do you find unpleasant about noisy parties?" When the interviewee was described as extroverted, almost all the questions presumed extroversion, such as, "What would you do to liven up a dull party?" These [[loaded question]]s gave the interviewees little or no opportunity to falsify the hypothesis about them.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Snyder |first1=Mark | first2=William B. Jr. | last2=Swann |year=1978 |title=Hypothesis-testing processes in social interaction |journal=[[Journal of Personality and Social Psychology]] |volume=36 |issue=11 |pages=1202–1212 |doi=10.1037/0022-3514.36.11.1202}} via {{Harvnb|Poletiek|2001|p=131}}</ref> A later version of the experiment gave the participants less presumptive questions to choose from, such as, "Do you shy away from social interactions?"<ref name="kunda117" /> Participants preferred to ask these more diagnostic questions, showing only a weak bias towards positive tests. This pattern, of a main preference for diagnostic tests and a weaker preference for positive tests, has been replicated in other studies.<ref name="kunda117">{{Harvnb|Kunda|1999|pp=117–18}}</ref>

Goedert, Ellefson, and Rehder (2014) examined the influence of prior distributions of the strength of causal relations on how people collect and evaluate evidence. The findings suggest that people's sense of plausibility will influence their search for evidence in a way that bolsters their prior views. In this experiment, participants read stories about a range of causes to other kinds of effect, for example, skin diseases to car accidents, and collected evidence of the probativeness of particular causes. They found that, on average, participants were more likely to search for confirming evidence for causes they concluded were plausible and disconfirming evidence for causes they considered implausible — a strategy the researchers dubbed the positive test strategy. This result implies that plausibility does not just change how people interpret evidence, but also what evidence they seek. Furthermore, the research indicated that in cases when participants perceived the cause as unlikely, one of their major concerns is to give disconfirming evidence preference, and because the explanation they modified is a source of evidence that contradicts their newly acquired explanation, it may be difficult for people to update their beliefs when faced with disconfirming evidence.<ref>Goedert, K. M., Ellefson, M. R., & Rehder, B. (2014). "Causal inference and evidence gathering: The influence of prior beliefs on causal reasoning." ''Psychological Science'', 25(4), 783-791.</ref>

Personality traits influence and interact with biased search processes.<ref name=albarracin>{{Citation|last=Albarracin|first=D.|author2=Mitchell, A.L.|title=The role of defensive confidence in preference for proattitudinal information: How believing that one is strong can sometimes be a defensive weakness|journal=Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin|year=2004|volume=30|issue=12|pages=1565–1584|doi=10.1177/0146167204271180|pmid=15536240|pmc=4803283}}</ref> Individuals vary in their abilities to defend their attitudes from external attacks in relation to [[selective exposure theory|selective exposure]]. Selective exposure occurs when individuals search for information that is consistent, rather than inconsistent, with their personal beliefs.<ref>{{Citation|last=Fischer|first=P.|author2=Fischer, Julia K. |author3=Aydin, Nilüfer |author4= Frey, Dieter |title=Physically attractive social information sources lead to increased selective exposure to information|journal=Basic and Applied Social Psychology|year=2010|volume=32|issue=4|pages=340–347|doi=10.1080/01973533.2010.519208|s2cid=143133082}}</ref> An experiment examined the extent to which individuals could refute arguments that contradicted their personal beliefs.<ref name=albarracin /> People with high [[confidence]] levels more readily seek out contradictory information to their personal position to form an argument. This can take the form of an ''oppositional news consumption'', where individuals seek opposing partisan news in order to counterargue.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Dahlgren |first1=Peter M. |title=Media Echo Chambers: Selective Exposure and Confirmation Bias in Media Use, and its Consequences for Political Polarization |date=2020 |publisher=University of Gothenburg |location=Gothenburg |isbn=978-91-88212-95-5 |url=https://gupea.ub.gu.se/handle/2077/67023?locale=en |mode=cs2 |access-date=16 October 2021 |archive-date=6 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230406025447/https://gupea.ub.gu.se/handle/2077/67023?locale=en |url-status=live }}</ref> Individuals with low confidence levels do not seek out contradictory information and prefer information that supports their personal position. People generate and evaluate evidence in arguments that are biased towards their own beliefs and opinions.<ref name="stanovich"/> Heightened confidence levels decrease preference for information that supports individuals' personal beliefs.

Another experiment gave participants a complex rule-discovery task that involved moving objects simulated by a computer.<ref name="mynatt1978">{{Citation |last1=Mynatt |first1=Clifford R. |first2=Michael E. |last2=Doherty |first3=Ryan D. |last3=Tweney |year=1978 |title=Consequences of confirmation and disconfirmation in a simulated research environment |journal=Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology |volume=30 |issue=3 |pages=395–406 
|url=https://www.academia.edu/442226 |doi =10.1080/00335557843000007 |s2cid=145419628 }}</ref> Objects on the computer screen followed specific laws, which the participants had to figure out. So, participants could "fire" objects across the screen to test their hypotheses. Despite making many attempts over a ten-hour session, none of the participants figured out the rules of the system. They typically attempted to confirm rather than falsify their hypotheses, and were reluctant to consider alternatives. Even after seeing objective evidence that refuted their working hypotheses, they frequently continued doing the same tests. Some of the participants were taught proper hypothesis-testing, but these instructions had almost no effect.<ref name="mynatt1978" />