Editing Consequentialism (section)

==Forms of consequentialism==
===Utilitarianism===
{{Main|Utilitarianism}}
[[File:Jeremy Bentham by Henry William Pickersgill detail.jpg|thumb|[[Jeremy Bentham]], best known for his advocacy of [[utilitarianism]]]]

{{blockquote|Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think...| Jeremy Bentham, ''The Principles of Morals and Legislation'' (1789) Ch I, p 1
}}

In summary, [[Jeremy Bentham]] states that people are driven by their interests and their fears, but their interests take precedence over their fears; their interests are carried out in accordance with how people view the consequences that might be involved with their interests. ''[[Happiness]]'', in this account, is defined as the [[Maximization (psychology)|maximization]] of pleasure and the [[Minimisation (psychology)|minimization]] of pain. It can be argued that the existence of [[phenomenal consciousness]] and "[[qualia]]" is required for the experience of pleasure or pain to have an ethical significance.<ref>{{Cite journal |pmc=4001209 |pmid=24791144|year=2014 |last1=Levy |first1=N. |title=The Value of Consciousness |journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies |volume=21 |issue=1–2 |pages=127–138 }}</ref><ref>Shepherd, Joshua. 2018. [https://library.oapen.org/viewer/web/viewer.html?file=/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/30007/650113.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y ''Consciousness and Moral Status'']. Routledge. {{ISBN|9781315396347}}. {{Hdl|20.500.12657/30007}}.</ref>

Historically, ''[[hedonistic utilitarianism]]'' is the paradigmatic example of a consequentialist moral theory. This form of utilitarianism holds that what matters is to aggregate happiness; the happiness of everyone, and not the happiness of any particular person. [[John Stuart Mill]], in his exposition of hedonistic utilitarianism, proposed a hierarchy of pleasures, meaning that the pursuit of certain kinds of pleasure is more highly valued than the pursuit of other pleasures.<ref name="Mill">{{Cite book| title = Utilitarianism | year = 1998 | last = Mill | first = John Stuart | author-link = John Stuart Mill | publisher = Oxford University Press | location = Oxford | isbn = 978-0-19-875163-2 | url = http://www.utilitarianism.com/mill1.htm}}</ref> However, some contemporary utilitarians, such as [[Peter Singer]], are concerned with maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, hence ''[[preference utilitarianism]]''. Other contemporary forms of utilitarianism mirror the forms of consequentialism outlined below.

===Rule consequentialism===
{{See also|Rule utilitarianism}}
In general, consequentialist theories focus on actions. However, this need not be the case. Rule consequentialism is a theory that is sometimes seen as an attempt to reconcile consequentialism with [[deontology]], or rules-based ethics<ref>{{cite news|last=D'Souza|first=Jeevan|title=On Measuring the Moral Value of Action|publisher=Philos, China|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301688068}}</ref>—and in some cases, this is stated as a criticism of rule consequentialism.<ref>[[Bernard Williams|Williams, Bernard]]. 1993. "Utilitarianism." In ''Morality''. [[Cambridge University Press]].</ref> Like deontology, rule consequentialism holds that [[moral behavior]] involves following certain rules. However, rule consequentialism chooses rules based on the consequences that the selection of those rules has. Rule consequentialism exists in the forms of [[rule utilitarianism]] and [[rule egoism]].

Various theorists are split as to whether the rules are the only determinant of moral behavior or not. For example, [[Robert Nozick]] held that a certain set of minimal rules, which he calls "side-constraints," are necessary to ensure appropriate actions.<ref name="Scheffler"/> There are also differences as to how absolute these moral rules are. Thus, while Nozick's side-constraints are absolute restrictions on behavior, [[Amartya Sen]] proposes a theory that recognizes the importance of certain rules, but these rules are not absolute.<ref name="Scheffler"/> That is, they may be violated if strict adherence to the rule would lead to much more undesirable consequences.

One of the most common objections to rule-consequentialism is that it is incoherent, because it is based on the consequentialist principle that what we should be concerned with is maximizing the good, but then it tells us not to act to maximize the good, but to follow rules (even in cases where we know that breaking the rule could produce better results).

In ''Ideal Code, Real World'', [[Brad Hooker]] avoids this objection by not basing his form of rule-consequentialism on the ideal of maximizing the good. He writes:<ref>[[Brad Hooker|Hooker, Brad]]. 2000. ''Ideal Code, Real World''. [[Oxford University Press]]. p. 101.</ref>

<blockquote>[T]he best argument for rule-consequentialism is not that it derives from an overarching commitment to maximise the good. The best argument for rule-consequentialism is that it does a better job than its rivals of matching and tying together our moral convictions, as well as offering us help with our moral disagreements and uncertainties.</blockquote>

[[Derek Parfit]] described Hooker's book as the "best statement and defence, so far, of one of the most important moral theories."<ref>{{cite book |first=Brad |last=Hooker |title=Ideal Code, Real World |date=30 January 2003 |publisher= Oxford University Press, new edition 2002, back cover |isbn=978-0-19-925657-0 |url=https://www.amazon.co.uk/reader/0199256578/278-8451642-5085302?_encoding=UTF8&ref_=sib_rdr_bc&j=0&page=234#reader-page}}</ref>

===State consequentialism===
{{Main|State consequentialism}}

{{blockquote|It is the business of the benevolent man to seek to promote what is beneficial to the world and to eliminate what is harmful, and to provide a model for the world. What benefits he will carry out; what does not benefit men he will leave alone ([[Chinese language|Chinese]]: 仁之事者, 必务求于天下之利, 除天下之害, 将以为法乎天下. 利人乎, 即为; 不利人乎, 即止).<ref name="Mozi">{{cite book|author1=Di Mo|author2=Xunzi|author3=Di Mo Xunzi Fei Han|author4=Professor Burton Watson|title=Basic Writings of Mo Tzu, Hsün Tzu, and Han Fei Tzu|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TotJdL_zx9YC&pg=PA110|year=1967|publisher=Columbia University Press|isbn=978-0-231-02515-7|page=110}}</ref>|[[Mozi]], ''Mozi'' (5th century BC) (Chapter 8: Against Music Part I)|title=|source=}}
''[[State consequentialism]]'', also known as ''Mohist consequentialism'',<ref name="readings">{{Cite book| title = Readings in classical Chinese philosophy | year = 2005 | last1 =Ivanhoe | first1 = P.J. | last2= Van Norden | first2= Bryan William |publisher = [[Hackett Publishing]] | isbn = 978-0-87220-780-6|page=60|quote="he advocated a form of state consequentialism, which sought to maximize three basic goods: the wealth, order, and population of the state}}</ref> is an [[ethical theory]] that evaluates the moral worth of an action based on how much it contributes to the welfare of a state.<ref name="readings"/> According to the ''[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]'', Mohist consequentialism, dating back to the 5th century BCE, is the "world's earliest form of consequentialism, a remarkably sophisticated version based on a plurality of [[intrinsic good]]s taken as constitutive of human welfare."<ref>Fraser, Chris. [2002] 2015. "[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mohism/ Mohism]." ''[[The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]'', edited by [[Edward N. Zalta|E. N. Zalta]].</ref>

Unlike utilitarianism, which views [[utility]] as the sole moral good, "the basic goods in Mohist consequentialist thinking are...[[Social order|order]], [[material wealth]], and [[Population increase|increase in population]]."<ref name="Cambridge">{{Cite book| title = The Cambridge History of Ancient China | year = 1999 | last1 =Loewe | first1 = Michael | last2= Shaughnessy | first2= Edward L. |publisher = [[Cambridge University Press]] | isbn = 978-0-521-47030-8|page=[https://archive.org/details/cambridgehistory00loew/page/n791 761]| title-link = The Cambridge History of Ancient China }}</ref> The word "order" refers to Mozi's stance against [[war]]fare and [[violence]], which he viewed as pointless and a threat to social stability; "material wealth" of Mohist consequentialism refers to [[Maslow's hierarchy of needs|basic needs]], like shelter and clothing; and "increase in population" relates to the time of [[Mozi]], war and [[famine]] were common, and population growth was seen as a moral necessity for a [[Harmonious Society|harmonious society]].<ref name="Norden">{{Cite book| title = Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy | year = 2011 | last = Van Norden | first = Bryan W. | publisher = [[Hackett Publishing]] | isbn = 978-1-60384-468-0 | page = 52}}</ref> In ''[[The Cambridge History of Ancient China]]'', [[Stanford University|Stanford]] [[sinologist]] [[David S. Nivison|David Shepherd Nivison]] writes that the moral goods of Mohism "are interrelated: more basic wealth, then more [[reproduction]]; more people, then more production and wealth...if people have plenty, they would be good, [[Filial piety|filial]], kind, and so on unproblematically."<ref name="Cambridge"/>

The Mohists believed that morality is based on "promoting the benefit of [[All Under Heaven|all under heaven]] and eliminating harm to all under heaven." In contrast to [[Jeremy Bentham]]'s views, state consequentialism is not utilitarian because it is not [[Hedonism|hedonistic]] or [[Individualism|individualistic]]. The importance of outcomes that are good for the community outweigh the importance of individual pleasure and pain.<ref name="Handbook">{{cite book|author1=Jay L. Garfield|author2=William Edelglass|title=The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=F06FKmKKIXwC&pg=PA62|date=9 June 2011|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-532899-8|page=62|quote=The goods that serve as criteria of morality are collective or public, in contrast, for instance, to individual happiness or well-being}}.</ref> The term ''state consequentialism'' has also been applied to the political philosophy of the [[Confucian philosopher]] [[Xun Kuang|Xunzi]].<ref name="Chatterjee">{{cite book|author=Deen K. Chatterjee|title=Encyclopedia of Global Justice|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2swUg4ZKTgsC&pg=PA1170|date=6 October 2011|publisher=Springer|isbn=978-1-4020-9159-9|page=1170|quote=in this sense, one can interpret Xunzi's political philosophy as a form of state utilitarianism or state consequentialism}}</ref> On the other hand, [[Legalism (Chinese philosophy)|"legalist"]] [[Han Feizi|Han Fei]] "is motivated almost totally from the ruler's point of view."<ref>{{cite journal |first=Chad |last=Hansen |title=Fa (Standards: Laws) and Meaning Changes in Chinese Philosophy |journal=Philosophy East and West |volume=44 |issue=3 |year=1994 |pages=435–488 |jstor=1399736 |doi=10.2307/1399736 |url=http://hub.hku.hk/bitstream/10722/45241/1/3006.pdf |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221010/http://hub.hku.hk/bitstream/10722/45241/1/3006.pdf |archive-date=2022-10-10 |url-status=live |hdl=10722/45241 }}</ref>

===Ethical egoism===
{{Main|Ethical egoism}}

Ethical egoism can be understood as a consequentialist theory according to which the consequences for the individual agent are taken to matter more than any other result. Thus, [[egoism]] will prescribe actions that may be beneficial, detrimental, or neutral to the welfare of others. Some, like [[Henry Sidgwick]], argue that a certain degree of egoism ''promotes'' the general welfare of society for two reasons: because individuals know how to please themselves best, and because if everyone were an austere altruist then general welfare would inevitably decrease.<ref name="Sidgwick">{{Cite book|title=The Method of Ethics |year=1907 |last=Sidgwick |first=Henry |author-link=Henry Sidgwick |publisher=Dover (1981) |location=NY |isbn=978-0-915145-28-7 |url=http://www.la.utexas.edu/methsidg/me/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071209092717/http://www.la.utexas.edu/methsidg/me/ |archive-date=December 9, 2007 }}</ref>

===Ethical altruism===
{{Main|Altruism (ethics)}}
Ethical altruism can be seen as a consequentialist theory which prescribes that an individual take actions that have the best consequences for everyone, not necessarily including themselves (similar to selflessness).<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |title=Ethics |first1=James |last1=Fisher |first2=Bradley |last2=Dowdwen |encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/ethics/ }}</ref> This was advocated by [[Auguste Comte]], who coined the term ''[[altruism]]'', and whose ethics can be summed up in the phrase "Live for others."<ref>{{cite web |last=Moran |first=Gabriel |title=Christian Religion and National Interests |date=2006 |url=https://www.nyu.edu/classes/gmoran/APRRE04.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060706031846/http://www.nyu.edu/classes/gmoran/APRRE04.pdf |archive-date=2006-07-06 |url-status=live }}{{reliable source|date=July 2018}}</ref>

===Two-level consequentialism===
The [[Two-level utilitarianism|two-level approach]] involves engaging in critical reasoning and considering all the possible ramifications of one's actions before making an ethical decision, but reverting to generally reliable moral rules when one is not in a position to stand back and examine the dilemma as a whole. In practice, this equates to adhering to rule consequentialism when one can only reason on an intuitive level, and to act consequentialism when in a position to stand back and reason on a more critical level.<ref name=":1" />

This position can be described as a reconciliation between ''act consequentialism''—in which the morality of an action is determined by that action's effects—and ''rule consequentialism''—in which moral behavior is derived from following rules that lead to positive outcomes.<ref name=":1" />

The two-level approach to consequentialism is most often associated with [[R. M. Hare]] and [[Peter Singer]].<ref name=":1">[[Walter Sinnott-Armstrong|Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter]]. [2003] 2019. "[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/ Consequentialism]." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by [[Edward N. Zalta|E. N. Zalta]]. (Winter 2015 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, [[Stanford University]]. Retrieved 2019-02-01.</ref>

===Motive consequentialism===
Another consequentialist application view is motive consequentialism, which looks at whether the [[State of affairs (philosophy)|state of affairs]] that results from the motive to choose an action is better or at least as good as each alternative state of affairs that would have resulted from alternative actions. This version gives relevance to the motive of an act and links it to its consequences. An act can therefore not be wrong if the decision to act was based on a right motive. A possible inference is that one can not be blamed for mistaken judgments if the motivation was to do good.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Adams |first=R. M. |year=1976 |title=Motive Utilitarianism |journal=Journal of Philosophy |volume=73 |issue=14 |pages=467–81 |doi=10.2307/2025783 |jstor=2025783 }}</ref>

===Negative consequentialism===
{{See also|Negative consequentialism}}
Most consequentialist theories focus on ''promoting'' some sort of good consequences. However, negative utilitarianism lays out a consequentialist theory that focuses solely on minimizing bad consequences.

One major difference between these two approaches is the agent's responsibility. ''Positive'' consequentialism demands that we bring about good states of affairs, whereas ''negative'' consequentialism requires that we avoid bad ones. Stronger versions of negative consequentialism will require active intervention to prevent bad and ameliorate existing harm. In weaker versions, simple forbearance from acts tending to harm others is sufficient. An example of this is the [[Slippery slope|slippery-slope]] argument, which encourages others to avoid a specified act on the grounds that it may ultimately lead to undesirable consequences.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Haigh|first1=Matthew|last2=Wood|first2=Jeffrey S.|last3=Stewart|first3=Andrew J.|date=2016-07-01|title=Slippery slope arguments imply opposition to change|journal=Memory & Cognition|language=en|volume=44|issue=5|pages=819–836|doi=10.3758/s13421-016-0596-9|pmid=26886759|s2cid=25691758|issn=0090-502X|url=http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/26101/1/SSA_Manuscript.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180719090729/http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/26101/1/SSA_Manuscript.pdf |archive-date=2018-07-19 |url-status=live|doi-access=free}}</ref>

Often "negative" consequentialist theories assert that reducing suffering is more important than increasing pleasure. [[Karl Popper]], for example, claimed that "from the moral point of view, pain cannot be outweighed by pleasure."<ref>[[Karl Popper|Popper, Karl]]. 1945. ''[[The Open Society and Its Enemies]]'' 1. [[Routledge]]. pp. 284–85.</ref> (While Popper is not a consequentialist per se, this is taken as a classic statement of negative utilitarianism.) When considering a theory of [[justice]], negative consequentialists may use a statewide or global-reaching principle: the reduction of suffering (for the disadvantaged) is more valuable than increased pleasure (for the affluent or luxurious).

===Acts and omissions===
Since pure consequentialism holds that an action is to be judged solely by its result, most consequentialist theories hold that a deliberate action is no different from a deliberate decision not to act. This contrasts with the "''acts and omissions doctrine''", which is upheld by some medical ethicists and some religions: it asserts there is a significant moral distinction between acts and deliberate non-actions which lead to the same outcome. This contrast is brought out in issues such as [[voluntary euthanasia]].

=== Actualism and possibilism ===
{{About|actualism and possibilism in ethics|actualism and possibilism in metaphysics|Actualism|section=yes}}
The normative status of an action depends on its consequences according to consequentialism. The consequences of the actions of an agent may include other actions by this agent. '''Actualism and possibilism''' disagree on how later possible actions impact the normative status of the current action by the same agent. Actualists assert that it is only relevant what the agent ''would'' actually do later for assessing the value of an alternative. Possibilists, on the other hand, hold that we should also take into account what the agent ''could'' do, even if she would not do it.<ref name="Timmerman">{{cite encyclopedia |last1=Timmerman |first1=Travis |last2=Cohen |first2=Yishai |title=Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/actualism-possibilism-ethics/ |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Cohen |first1=Yishai |last2=Timmerman |first2=Travis |title=Actualism Has Control Issues |journal=Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy |date=2016 |volume=10 |issue=3 |pages=1–18 |doi=10.26556/jesp.v10i3.104 |url=http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c6af/de0d7ba1047b9aa487be99b7eab2eba994d3.pdf|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Jackson">{{cite journal |last1=Timmerman |first1=Travis |last2=Swenson |first2=Philip |title=How to Be an Actualist and Blame People |journal=Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility |date=2019 |volume=6 |pages=216–240 |doi=10.1093/oso/9780198845539.003.0009 |isbn=9780198845539 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/TIMHTB}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Jackson |first1=Frank |last2=Pargetter |first2=Robert |title=Oughts, Options, and Actualism |journal=Philosophical Review |date=1986 |volume=95 |issue=2 |pages=233–255 |doi=10.2307/2185591 |jstor=2185591 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/JACOOA|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

For example, assume that Gifre has the choice between two alternatives, eating a cookie or not eating anything. Having eaten the first cookie, Gifre could stop eating cookies, which is the best alternative. But after having tasted one cookie, Gifre would freely decide to continue eating cookies until the whole bag is finished, which would result in a terrible stomach ache and would be the worst alternative. Not eating any cookies at all, on the other hand, would be the second-best alternative. Now the question is: should Gifre eat the first cookie or not? Actualists are only concerned with the actual consequences. According to them, Gifre should not eat any cookies at all since it is better than the alternative leading to a stomach ache. Possibilists, however, contend that the best possible course of action involves eating the first cookie and this is therefore what Gifre should do.<ref name="Portmore5">{{cite book |last1=Portmore |first1=Douglas W. |title=Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options |date=2019 |publisher=New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/POROFT |chapter=5. Rationalist Maximalism}}</ref>

One counterintuitive consequence of actualism is that agents can avoid moral obligations simply by having an imperfect [[moral character]].<ref name="Timmerman"/><ref name="Jackson"/> For example, a lazy person might justify rejecting a request to help a friend by arguing that, due to her lazy character, she would not have done the work anyway, even if she had accepted the request. By rejecting the offer right away, she managed at least not to waste anyone's time. Actualists might even consider her behavior praiseworthy since she did what, according to actualism, she ought to have done. This seems to be a very easy way to "get off the hook" that is avoided by possibilism. But possibilism has to face the objection that in some cases it sanctions and even recommends what actually leads to the worst outcome.<ref name="Timmerman"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Goldman |first1=Holly S. |title=Dated Rightness and Moral Imperfection |journal=Philosophical Review |date=1976 |volume=85 |issue=4 |pages=449–487 |doi=10.2307/2184275 |jstor=2184275 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/GOLDRA|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Douglas W. Portmore has suggested that these and other problems of actualism and possibilism can be avoided by constraining what counts as a genuine alternative for the agent.<ref name="Portmore3">{{cite book |last1=Portmore |first1=Douglas W. |title=Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options |date=2019 |publisher=New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/POROFT |chapter=3. What's the Relevant Sort of Control?}}</ref> On his view, it is a requirement that the agent has rational control over the event in question. For example, eating only one cookie and stopping afterward only is an option for Gifre if she has the rational capacity to repress her temptation to continue eating. If the temptation is irrepressible then this course of action is not considered to be an option and is therefore not relevant when assessing what the best alternative is. Portmore suggests that, given this adjustment, we should prefer a view very closely associated with ''possibilism'' called ''maximalism''.<ref name="Portmore5"/>