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Critique of Judgment
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==Aesthetic Judgement== The first part of the book discusses the four possible ''[[Aesthetic judgment|aesthetic reflective judgments]]'': the agreeable, the [[beauty|beautiful]], the [[Sublime (philosophy)|sublime]], and the [[Goodness and value theory#Kant: hypothetical and categorical goods|good]]. Kant makes it clear that these are the only four possible reflective judgments, as he relates them to the Table of Judgments from the ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]''. "Reflective judgments" differ from determinative judgments (those of the first two critiques). In reflective judgment we seek to find unknown universals for given particulars; whereas in determinative judgment, we just subsume given particulars under universals that are already known, as Kant puts it: {{quote|text=It is then one thing to say, "the production of certain things of nature or that of collective nature is only possible through a cause which determines itself to action according to design"; and quite another to say, "I can according to the peculiar constitution of my cognitive faculties judge concerning the possibility of these things and their production, in no other fashion than by conceiving for this a cause working according to design, i.e. a Being which is productive in a way analogous to the causality of an intelligence." In the former case I wish to establish something concerning the Object, and am bound to establish the objective reality of an assumed concept; in the latter, Reason only determines the use of my cognitive faculties, conformably to their peculiarities and to the essential conditions of their range and their limits. Thus the former principle is an objective proposition for the determinant Judgment, the latter merely a subjective proposition for the reflective Judgment, i.e. a maxim which Reason prescribes to it.<ref>Kant, Critique of Judgment, section 75.</ref>}} The agreeable is a purely sensory judgment β judgments in the form of "This steak is good," or "This chair is soft." These are purely subjective judgments, based on inclination alone. The good is essentially a judgment that something is [[ethical]] β the judgment that something conforms with moral law, which, in the Kantian sense, is essentially a claim of modality β a coherence with a fixed and absolute notion of reason. It is in many ways the absolute opposite of the agreeable, in that it is a purely objective judgment β things are either moral or they are not, according to Kant. The remaining two judgments β the beautiful and the sublime β differ from both the agreeable and the good. They are what Kant refers to as "subjective universal" judgments. This apparently oxymoronic term means that, in practice, the judgments are subjective, and are not tied to any absolute and determinate concept. However, the judgment that something is beautiful or sublime is made with the belief that other people ought to agree with this judgment β even though it is known that many will not. The force of this "ought" comes from a reference to a ''[[sensus communis]]'' β a community of taste. [[Hannah Arendt]], in her ''Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy'', suggests the possibility that this ''sensus communis'' might be the basis of a political theory that is markedly different from the one that Kant lays out in the ''[[Metaphysics of Morals|Metaphysics of Morals]]''.{{Citation needed|date=April 2025}} The central concept of Kant's analysis of the judgment of beauty is what he called the β³free playβ³ between the cognitive powers of imagination and understanding.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Guyer|first1=Paul|title=Values of Beauty|date=2005|publisher=Cambridge University Press|location=New York}}</ref> We call an object beautiful, because its form fits our cognitive powers and enables such a β³free playβ³ (Β§22) the experience of which is pleasurable to us. The judgment that something is beautiful is a claim that it possesses the "form of finality" β that is, that it appears to have been designed with a purpose, even though it does not have any apparent practical function. We also do not need to have a determinate concept for an object in order to find it beautiful (Β§9). In this regard, Kant further distinguishes between ''free'' and ''adherent'' beauty. Whereas judgments of ''free beauty'' are made without having one determinate concept for the object being judged (e.g. an ornament or well-formed line), a judgment of beauty is ''adherent'' if we do have such a determined concept in mind (e.g. a well-built horse that is recognized as such). The main difference between these two judgments is that purpose or use of the object plays no role in the case of free beauty. In contrast, adherent judgments of beauty are only possible if the object is not ill-suited for its purpose. The judgment that something is sublime is a judgment that it is beyond the limits of comprehension β that it is an object of fear. However, Kant makes clear that the object must not actually be threatening β it merely must be recognized as deserving of fear. Kant's view of the beautiful and the sublime is frequently read as an attempt to resolve one of the problems left following his depiction of moral law in the ''[[Critique of Practical Reason]]'' β namely that it is impossible to prove that we have [[free will]], and thus impossible to prove that we are bound under [[Moral absolutism|moral law]]. The beautiful and the sublime both seem to refer to some external [[noumenon|noumenal]] order β and thus to the possibility of a noumenal self that possesses free will. In this section of the critique Kant also establishes a faculty of mind that is in many ways the inverse of judgment β the faculty of [[genius]]. Whereas judgment allows one to determine whether something is beautiful or sublime, genius allows one to produce what is beautiful or sublime.
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