Editing Croatian Spring (section)

===Politicisation of reforms===
Further economic reforms were adopted in 1964 and 1965, transferring considerable powers from the federation to the republics and individual companies. Some of the reform measures exacerbated conflict between the banks, insurers, and foreign trade organisations owned by the Yugoslav government versus those owned by the constituent republics, a conflict that became increasingly political and nationalist.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=212–214}} Competing alliances were established. Ranković gained the support of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, in addition to Serbia. Slovenia was supported by Croatia, based on the belief of [[Vladimir Bakarić]]—the [[President of the League of Communists of Croatia|Secretary of the Central Committee]] of the [[League of Communists of Croatia]] (SKH)—that decentralisation would benefit others in Yugoslavia. Bakarić persuaded [[Krste Crvenkovski]], the head of the [[League of Communists of Macedonia]] (SKM), to support the Slovene–Croatian reformist bloc, which managed to enact substantial legislation curbing federal powers in favour of the republics. The conflict was framed as a contest between Serbia's interests against those of Slovenia and Croatia.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=214–217}}

In Croatia, positions adopted by Ranković's allies in the [[League of Communists of Serbia]] (SKS) and the [[League of Communists of Montenegro]] (SKCG) were interpreted as [[wikt:hegemonistic|hegemonistic]], which in turn increased the appeal of [[Croatian nationalism]].{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=242}} By the mid-1960s, the [[List of diplomatic missions of the United States|United States consul in Zagreb]], [[Helene Batjer]], estimated that about half of SKH members and 80 percent of the population of Croatia held nationalist views.{{sfn|Batović|2010|p=547}}