Editing DRE voting machine (section)

==Issues==
Skepticism about the integrity of DRE voting machines led to the creation of [[election forensics]], which can help identify [[election fraud]].<ref>{{cite journal|doi=10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.053007.145205|doi-access=free|title=Voting Technologies|year=2011|last1=Stewart|first1=Charles|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|volume=14|pages=353–378}}</ref> 

===Delays in voting===
DREs can cause more delay than paper ballots at busy times, since every voter needs access to a machine.<ref name="cora">{{Cite news |last1=Corasaniti |first1=Nick |last2=Saul |first2=Stephanie |date=2020-06-11 |title=Georgia Havoc Raises New Doubts on Pricey Voting Machines |language=en-US |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/11/us/politics/georgia-voting-machines.html |access-date=2020-08-11 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=2021-01-09 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210109123403/https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/11/us/politics/georgia-voting-machines.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Queuing theory calculates that waits of an hour result from known variations in when voters arrive, number of voters per machine, and average time a voter spends with a machine.<ref name="edel">{{Cite web |last=Edelstein |first=William A. |date=2008-01-28 |title=Why Computer DRE Voting Machines Cause Long Lines— Why Paper Ballot/Optical Scan Can Prevent Lines |url=http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/messages/downloadsexceeded.html |access-date=2020-08-11 |website=Penn State University |archive-date=2021-01-31 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210131173658/http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/messages/downloadsexceeded.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Edelstein |first=William A. |date=2006-11-14 |title=New Voting Systems for New York - Long Lines and High Cost |work=New Yorkers for Verified Voting |s2cid=59115735 |url=https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/81cf/92ddcada0a8a17b52ff72d5f5145a94141d4.pdf |access-date=2020-08-11 |archive-date=2021-03-12 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210312141304/https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/New-Voting-Systems-for-NY%E2%80%94-Long-Lines-and-High-Cost-Edelstein/81cf92ddcada0a8a17b52ff72d5f5145a94141d4?p2df |url-status=live }}</ref> 

===Errors===
{{See|Vote counting#Errors in direct-recording electronic voting|Electronic voting in the United States#Errors in direct-recording electronic voting}}

Issues have included public web access to the software, before it is loaded into machines for each election, and programming errors which increment different candidates than voters select.<ref name="bren10">{{Cite web |last=Norden |first=Lawrence |date=2010-09-16 |title=Voting system failures: a database solution |url=https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Voting_Machine_Failures_Database-Solution.pdf |access-date=2020-07-07 |website=Brennan Center, NYU |archive-date=2020-11-26 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201126221213/https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Voting_Machine_Failures_Database-Solution.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>

===2009 German court ruling===
In 2009, the [[Federal Constitutional Court of Germany]] found that with voting machines the "determination of the result must be able to be examined by the citizen reliably and without any specialist knowledge of the subject." They further found the DRE-type voting machines, used in parliamentary elections under current German law,<ref>§35 of the Federal Electoral Act (Bundeswahlgesetz – BWG)</ref> permitted voting machines but were unconstitutional without further qualification. The decision does not ban electronic voting but implements a higher standard.<ref>[http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg09-019en.html German Federal Constitutional Court, Press release no. 19/2009 of 3 March 2009] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090404111620/http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg09-019en.html |date=4 April 2009 }}</ref>

===Demonstrated laboratory attacks===
* [[Premier Election Solutions|Diebold Election Systems]] AccuVote-TS (Manipulation of the votes by the [[Princeton University]])<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://citp.princeton.edu/voting/ |title=Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine |access-date=2011-05-19 |archive-date=2008-01-19 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080119013008/http://citp.princeton.edu/voting/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
* [[Nedap]] ES3B (Manipulation of the votes by a citizen group)<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl/images/9/91/Es3b-en.pdf |title=Nedap/Groenendaal ES3B voting computer, a security analysis |access-date=2007-02-13 |archive-date=2010-01-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100107134107/http://wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl/images/9/91/Es3b-en.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>[http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/79106 Dutch citizens group cracks Nedap's voting computer] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070117143032/http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/79106 |date=2007-01-17 }}</ref>
* SDU voting computers (Violating the [[secret ballot|secrecy of the ballot]] using [[Van Eck phreaking]], tested by the Dutch secret service [[AIVD]])<ref>[http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/80302 Use of SDU voting computers banned during Dutch general elections] (Heise.de, 31. October 2006) {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080923142636/http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/80302 |date=September 23, 2008 }}</ref>

Attacks have also been performed on both DRE machines and optical scan voting machines, which count paper ballots. (See California study, "Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuBasic Interpreter"<ref>"[http://nob.cs.ucdavis.edu/bishop/notes/2006-inter/2006-inter.pdf Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuBasic Interpreter] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210224102340/http://nob.cs.ucdavis.edu/bishop/notes/2006-inter/2006-inter.pdf |date=2021-02-24 }}"</ref>).

Whether it is a DRE or an optical scan machine, the opportunity for tampering applies to persons with inside access (including government workers) and to a lesser extent, outside hackers. Therefore, framing election tampering issues as "hacking" may not be an accurate framework for public concerns. Within the context of protecting voting rights, it would not matter whether vote alteration was done by an outsider or an insider. What is of most importance is the ability to perform an audit with a record generated and verified by the voter at the time their vote is cast, all of which is lost with the sole use of these DRE systems.