Editing Daniel Dennett (section)

==Philosophical views==

===Free will vs Determinism===
While he was a confirmed [[Compatibilism|compatibilist]] on [[free will]], in "On Giving Libertarians What They Say They Want"—chapter 15 of his 1978 book ''[[Brainstorms]]''<ref>''Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology'', MIT Press (1981), pp. 286–99.</ref>—Dennett articulated the case for a two-stage model of decision making in contrast to [[Libertarianism (metaphysics)|libertarian]] views.

{{blockquote|The model of decision making I am proposing has the following feature: when we are faced with an important decision, a consideration-generator whose output is to some degree undetermined, produces a series of considerations, some of which may of course be immediately rejected as irrelevant by the agent (consciously or unconsciously). Those considerations that are selected by the agent as having a more than negligible bearing on the decision then figure in a reasoning process, and if the agent is in the main reasonable, those considerations ultimately serve as predictors and explicators of the agent's final decision.<ref>''Brainstorms'', p. 295</ref>}}

While other philosophers have developed two-stage models, including [[William James]], [[Henri Poincaré]], [[Arthur Compton]], and [[Henry Margenau]], Dennett defended this model for the following reasons:

{{blockquote|
# First ... The intelligent selection, rejection, and weighing of the considerations that do occur to the subject is a matter of intelligence making the difference.
# Second, I think it installs indeterminism in the right place for the libertarian, if there is a right place at all.
# Third ... from the point of view of biological engineering, it is just more efficient and in the end more rational that decision making should occur in this way.
# A fourth observation in favor of the model is that it permits moral education to make a difference, without making all of the difference.
# Fifth—and I think this is perhaps the most important thing to be said in favor of this model—it provides some account of our important intuition that we are the authors of our moral decisions.
# Finally, the model I propose points to the multiplicity of decisions that encircle our moral decisions and suggests that in many cases our ultimate decision as to which way to act is less important phenomenologically as a contributor to our sense of free will than the prior decisions affecting our deliberation process itself: the decision, for instance, not to consider any further, to terminate deliberation; or the decision to ignore certain lines of inquiry.
}}

{{blockquote|These prior and subsidiary decisions contribute, I think, to our sense of ourselves as responsible free agents, roughly in the following way: I am faced with an important decision to make, and after a certain amount of deliberation, I say to myself: "That's enough. I've considered this matter enough and now I'm going to act," in the full knowledge that I could have considered further, in the full knowledge that the eventualities may prove that I decided in error, but with the acceptance of responsibility in any case.<ref>''Brainstorms'', pp. 295–97</ref>}}

Leading libertarian philosophers such as [[Robert Kane (philosopher)|Robert Kane]] have rejected Dennett's model, specifically that random chance is directly involved in a decision, on the basis that they believe this eliminates the agent's motives and reasons, [[Moral character|character]] and [[Value (personal and cultural)|values]], and feelings and [[Desire (emotion)|desires]]. They claim that, if chance is the primary cause of decisions, then agents cannot be liable for resultant actions. Kane says:

{{blockquote|[As Dennett admits,] a causal indeterminist view of this deliberative kind does not give us everything libertarians have wanted from free will. For [the agent] does not have complete control over what chance images and other thoughts enter his mind or influence his deliberation. They simply come as they please. [The agent] does have some control ''after'' the chance considerations have occurred.}}
{{blockquote|But then there is no more chance involved. What happens from then on, how he reacts, is ''determined'' by desires and beliefs he already has. So it appears that he does not have control in the ''libertarian'' sense of what happens after the chance considerations occur as well. Libertarians require more than this for full responsibility and free will.<ref>Robert Kane, ''A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will'', Oxford (2005) pp. 64–65</ref>}}

===Mind===
[[File:Daniel dennett Oct2008.JPG|thumb|Dennett in 2008]]
Dennett was a proponent of [[materialism]] in the [[philosophy of mind]]. He argued that mental states, including consciousness, are entirely the result of physical processes in the brain. In his book ''[[Consciousness Explained]]'' (1991), Dennett presented his arguments for a materialist understanding of consciousness, rejecting [[Cartesian dualism]] in favor of a physicalist perspective.<ref name="Dennett1991">{{cite book|last=Dennett|first=Daniel C.|title=Consciousness Explained|publisher=Little, Brown and Co.|year=1991|isbn=978-0316180665|location=Boston}}</ref>

Dennett remarked in several places (such as "Self-portrait", in ''Brainchildren'') that his overall philosophical project remained largely the same from his time at Oxford onwards. He was primarily concerned with providing a philosophy of mind that is grounded in [[empirical]] research. In his original [[Thesis|dissertation]], ''Content and Consciousness'', he broke up the problem of explaining the mind into the need for a theory of content and for a theory of consciousness. His approach to this project also stayed true to this distinction. Just as ''Content and Consciousness'' has a bipartite structure, he similarly divided ''Brainstorms'' into two sections. He would later collect several essays on content in ''The [[Intentional stance|Intentional Stance]]'' and synthesize his views on consciousness into a unified theory in ''Consciousness Explained''. These volumes respectively form the most extensive development of his views.<ref>{{citation|last=Guttenplan|first=Samuel|title=A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind|page=[https://archive.org/details/companiontophilo0000unse/page/642 642]|year=1994|url=https://archive.org/details/companiontophilo0000unse/page/642|location=Oxford|publisher=Blackwell|isbn=0-631-19996-9|author-link=Samuel Guttenplan}}.</ref>

In chapter 5 of ''Consciousness Explained,'' Dennett described his [[multiple drafts model]] of consciousness. He stated that, "all varieties of perception—indeed all varieties of thought or mental activity—are accomplished in the brain by parallel, multitrack processes of interpretation and elaboration of sensory inputs. Information entering the nervous system is under continuous 'editorial revision.'" (p.&nbsp;111). Later he asserts, "These yield, over the course of time, something ''rather like'' a narrative stream or sequence, which can be thought of as subject to continual editing by many processes distributed around the brain, ..." (p.&nbsp;135, emphasis in the original).

In this work, Dennett's interest in the ability of evolution to explain some of the content-producing features of consciousness is already apparent, and this later became an integral part of his program. He stated his view is materialist and scientific, and he presents an argument against [[qualia]]; he argued that the concept of qualia is so confused that it cannot be put to any use or understood in any non-contradictory way, and therefore does not constitute a valid refutation of [[physicalism]].

This view is rejected by neuroscientists [[Gerald Edelman]], [[Antonio Damasio]], [[Vilayanur Ramachandran]], [[Giulio Tononi]], and [[Rodolfo Llinás]], all of whom state that qualia exist and that the desire to eliminate them is based on an erroneous interpretation on the part of some philosophers regarding what constitutes science.<ref>Damasio, A. (1999). ''The feeling of what happens''. Harcourt Brace.</ref><ref>Edelman, G., Gally, J. & Baars, B. (2011). "Biology of consciousness". ''Frontiers In Psychology, 2'', 4, 1–6.</ref><ref>Edelman, G. (1992). ''Bright air, brilliant fire''. BasicBooks.</ref><ref>Edelman, G. (2003). "Naturalizing consciousness: A theoretical framework". ''Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 100'', 9, 5520–24.</ref><ref>Llinás, R. (2003). ''I of the Vortex.'' MIT Press, pp. 202–07.</ref><ref>Oizumi, M., Albantakis, L., & Tononi, G. (2014). From the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: Integrated information theory 3.0. ''PLOS Computational Biology, 10'', e1003588.</ref><ref>Overgaard, M., Mogensen, J. & Kirkeby-Hinrup, A. (Eds.) (2021). ''Beyond neural correlates of consciousness.'' Routledge Taylor & Francis.</ref><ref>Ramachandran, V. & Hirstein, W. (1997). Three laws of qualia. What neurology tells us about the biological functions of consciousness, qualia and the self. ''Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4'' (5–6), pp. 429–58.</ref><ref>Tononi, G., Boly, M., Massimini, M., & Koch, C. (2016). "Integrated information theory: From consciousness to its physical substrate". ''Nature Reviews Neuroscience'', 17, 450–61.</ref>

Dennett's strategy mirrored his teacher Ryle's approach of redefining first-person phenomena in third-person terms, and denying the coherence of the concepts which this approach struggles with.

Dennett self-identified with a few terms:
{{blockquote|[Others] note that my "avoidance of the standard philosophical terminology for discussing such matters" often creates problems for me; philosophers have a hard time figuring out what I am saying and what I am denying. My refusal to play ball with my colleagues is deliberate, of course, since I view the standard philosophical terminology as worse than useless—a major obstacle to progress since it consists of so many errors.<ref>Daniel Dennett, ''The Message is: There is no Medium''</ref>}}

In ''Consciousness Explained'', he affirmed "I am a sort of '[[functionalism (philosophy of mind)|teleofunctionalist]]', of course, perhaps the original teleofunctionalist". He went on to say, "I am ready to come out of the closet as some sort of [[Verificationism|verificationist]]." (pp.&nbsp;460–61).

Dennett was credited<ref>Doherty, M. J. (2009). Theory of Mind: How Children Understand Others’ Thoughts and Feelings. Psychology Press.</ref> with inspiring [[false belief]] tasks used in developmental psychology. He noted that when four-year-olds watch the [[Punch and Judy]] puppet show, they laugh because they know that they know more about what's going on than one of the characters does:<ref>Dennett, D. C. (1978). Beliefs about Beliefs (commentary on Premack, et al.). Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1, pp. 568-70.</ref>

{{Quote|quote=Very young children watching a Punch and Judy show squeal in anticipatory delight as Punch prepares to throw the box over the cliff. Why? Because they know Punch thinks Judy is still in the box. They know better; they saw Judy escape while Punch's back was turned. We take the children's excitement as overwhelmingly good evidence that they understand the situation--they understand that Punch is acting on a mistaken belief (although they are not sophisticated enough to put it that way).}}

===Evolutionary debate===
Much of Dennett's work from the 1990s onwards was concerned with fleshing out his previous ideas by addressing the same topics from an evolutionary standpoint, from what distinguishes human minds from animal minds (''Kinds of Minds''),<ref name=":0" /> to how free will is compatible with a naturalist view of the world (''[[Freedom Evolves]]'').<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Doomen|first=Jasper|date=2005|title=Book Reviews|url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048400500111741|journal=Australasian Journal of Philosophy|language=en|volume=83|issue=2|pages=295–298|doi=10.1080/00048400500111741|issn=0004-8402|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

Dennett saw evolution by natural selection as an [[algorithm]]ic process (though he spelt out that algorithms as simple as [[long division]] often incorporate a significant degree of [[randomness]]).<ref>''Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life'', Simon & Schuster, 1996, pp. 52–60, {{ISBN|0-684-82471-X}}.</ref> This idea is in conflict with the evolutionary philosophy of [[paleontologist]] [[Stephen Jay Gould]], who preferred to stress the "pluralism" of evolution (i.e., its dependence on many crucial factors, of which natural selection is only one).{{cn|date=April 2024}}

Dennett's views on evolution are identified as being strongly [[Adaptationism|adaptationist]], in line with his theory of the [[intentional stance]], and the evolutionary views of [[biologist]] Richard Dawkins. In ''Darwin's Dangerous Idea'', Dennett showed himself even more willing than Dawkins to defend adaptationism in print, devoting an entire chapter to a criticism of the ideas of Gould. This stems from Gould's long-running public debate with [[E.&nbsp;O. Wilson]] and other evolutionary biologists over human [[sociobiology]] and its descendant [[evolutionary psychology]], which Gould and [[Richard Lewontin]] opposed, but which Dennett advocated, together with Dawkins and [[Steven Pinker]].<ref>Although Dennett expressed criticism of human sociobiology, calling it a form of "[[greedy reductionism]]", he was generally sympathetic towards the explanations proposed by [[evolutionary psychology]]. Gould also is not one-sided, and writes: "Sociobiologists have broadened their range of selective stories by invoking concepts of [[inclusive fitness]] and [[kin selection]] to solve (successfully I think) the vexatious problem of altruism—previously the greatest stumbling block to a Darwinian theory of social behavior... Here sociobiology has had and will continue to have success. And here I wish it well. For it represents an extension of basic Darwinism to a realm where it should apply." Gould, 1980. [http://www.ags.uci.edu/~mzyoung/p1.htm "Sociobiology and the Theory of Natural Selection"]. {{webarchive|url=https://archive.today/20070715005236/http://www.ags.uci.edu/~mzyoung/p1.htm|date=July 15, 2007}}. In G.&nbsp;W. Barlow and J. Silverberg, eds., ''Sociobiology: Beyond Nature/Nurture?'' Boulder CO: Westview Press, pp. 257–69.</ref> Gould argued that Dennett overstated his claims and misrepresented Gould's, to reinforce what Gould describes as Dennett's "Darwinian fundamentalism".<ref>[http://cogweb.ucla.edu/Debate/Gould.html Evolution: The Pleasures of Pluralism]. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121226092302/http://cogweb.ucla.edu/Debate/Gould.html|date=December 26, 2012}} – Stephen Jay Gould's review of ''Darwin's Dangerous Idea'', June 26, 1997.</ref>

Dennett's theories have had a significant influence on the work of evolutionary psychologist [[Geoffrey Miller (psychologist)|Geoffrey Miller]].{{cn|date=April 2024}}

===Religion and morality===
Dennett was a vocal [[Atheism|atheist]] and [[secularism|secularist]], a member of the [[Secular Coalition for America]] advisory board,<ref>{{cite web|title=Daniel Dennett|url=https://secular.org/profile/dr-daniel-dennett/|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201205150404/https://secular.org/profile/dr-daniel-dennett/|archive-date=December 5, 2020|access-date=January 4, 2021|work=secular.org}}</ref> and a member of the [[Committee for Skeptical Inquiry]], as well as an outspoken supporter of the [[Brights movement]]. Dennett was referred to as one of the "[[Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse in popular culture|Four Horsemen]] of [[New Atheism]]", along with [[Richard Dawkins]], [[Sam Harris]], and the late [[Christopher Hitchens]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2011/12/richard-dawkins-issue-hitchens|title=Preview: The Four Horsemen of New Atheism reunited|work=newstatesman.com|date=June 8, 2021|access-date=December 23, 2011|archive-date=April 10, 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140410071709/http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2011/12/richard-dawkins-issue-hitchens|url-status=live}}</ref>

[[File:Solidarity message to ex-Muslims - Daniel Dennett.webm|thumb|Dennett sends a solidarity message to [[Council of Ex-Muslims of Britain|ex-Muslims convening in London]] in July 2017.]]
In ''[[Darwin's Dangerous Idea]]'', Dennett wrote that evolution can account for the origin of morality. He rejected the idea that morality being natural to us implies that we should take a skeptical position regarding ethics, noting that what is fallacious in the [[naturalistic fallacy]] is not to support values per se, but rather to ''rush'' from facts to values.{{cn|date=April 2024}}

In his 2006 book, ''[[Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon]]'', Dennett attempted to account for religious belief naturalistically, explaining possible evolutionary reasons for the phenomenon of religious adherence. In this book he declared himself to be "[[Brights movement|a bright]]", and defended the term.{{cn|date=April 2024}}

He did research into clerics who are secretly atheists and how they rationalize their works. He found what he called a "don't ask, don't tell" conspiracy because believers did not want to hear of loss of faith. This made unbelieving preachers feel isolated, but they did not want to lose their jobs and church-supplied lodgings. Generally, they consoled themselves with the belief that they were doing good in their pastoral roles by providing comfort and required ritual.<ref name="Dennett2010">[https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/Preachers_who_are_not_believers.pdf] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190123131759/http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/Preachers_who_are_not_believers.pdf|date=January 23, 2019}}, "Preachers Who Are Not Believers," ''Evolutionary Psychology'', Vol. 8, Issue 1, March 2010, pp. 122–50, {{ISSN|1474-7049}}.</ref> The research, with Linda LaScola, was further extended to include other denominations and non-Christian clerics.<ref>[http://traffic.libsyn.com/ffrf/FTradio_247_011511.mp3 Podcast: interview with Daniel Dennett. Further developments of the research: pastors, priests, and an Imam who are closet atheists]. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200414080440/http://hwcdn.libsyn.com/p/8/6/b/86b9fb94735253f4/FTradio_247_011511.mp3?c_id=2966629&cs_id=2966629&expiration=1586854694&hwt=5f8f65a36e676aca287140cce601aef1|date=April 14, 2020}}.</ref> The research and stories Dennett and LaScola accumulated during this project were published in their 2013 co-authored book, ''Caught in the Pulpit: Leaving Belief Behind''.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://thehumanist.com/magazine/may-june-2014/arts_entertainment/caught-in-the-pulpit-leaving-belief-behind|title=Caught in the Pulpit: Leaving Belief Behind|date=2014-04-22|work=TheHumanist.com|access-date=2017-06-01|language=en-US|archive-date=April 1, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190401015205/https://thehumanist.com/magazine/may-june-2014/arts_entertainment/caught-in-the-pulpit-leaving-belief-behind|url-status=live}}</ref>

===Memetics, postmodernism and deepity===
Dennett wrote about and advocated the notion of [[memetics]] as a philosophically useful tool, his last work on this topic being his "Brains, Computers, and Minds", a three-part presentation through Harvard's MBB 2009 Distinguished Lecture Series.{{cn|date=April 2024}}

Dennett was critical of [[postmodernism]], having said: {{blockquote|Postmodernism, the school of "thought" that proclaimed "There are no truths, only interpretations" has largely played itself out in absurdity, but it has left behind a generation of academics in the humanities disabled by their distrust of the very idea of truth and their disrespect for evidence, settling for "conversations" in which nobody is wrong and nothing can be confirmed, only asserted with whatever style you can muster.<ref>Dennett, Daniel (October 19, 2013). [http://edge.org/conversation/dennett-on-wieseltier-v-pinker-in-the-new-republic "Dennett on Wieseltier V. Pinker in The New Republic: Let's Start With A Respect For Truth."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180805021650/https://www.edge.org/conversation/dennett-on-wieseltier-v-pinker-in-the-new-republic|date=August 5, 2018}}  ''Edge.org''.  Retrieved August 4, 2018.</ref>}}

Dennett adopted and somewhat redefined the term "deepity", originally coined by Miriam Weizenbaum.<ref>Dennett, Daniel. ''Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking''. W. W. Norton & Company, 2013 p. 56.{{ISBN?}}</ref> Dennett used "deepity" for a statement that is apparently profound, but is actually trivial on one level and meaningless on another. Generally, a deepity has two (or more) meanings: one that is true but trivial, and another that sounds profound and would be important if true, but is actually false or meaningless. Examples are "Que será será!", "Beauty is only skin deep!", "The power of intention can transform your life."<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2013/may/25/change-your-life-life-deepities-oliver-burkeman|title=This column will change your life: deepities – 'A deepity isn't just any old pseudo-profound bit of drivel. It's a specific kind of statement that can be read in two different ways...'|newspaper=The Guardian|date=25 May 2013|author=Oliver Burkeman|access-date=6 February 2016|archive-date=November 16, 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181116104544/https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2013/may/25/change-your-life-life-deepities-oliver-burkeman|url-status=live}}</ref> The term [[Wikt:Citations:deepity#English|has been cited]] many times.

=== Artificial intelligence ===
While approving of the increase in efficiency that humans reap by using resources such as expert systems in medicine or GPS in navigation, Dennett saw a danger in machines performing an ever-increasing proportion of basic tasks in perception, memory, and algorithmic computation because people may tend to anthropomorphize such systems and attribute intellectual powers to them that they do not possess.<ref>From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds, Daniel C. Dennett 2017 Penguin p. 402.</ref> He believed the relevant danger from [[artificial intelligence]] (AI) is that people will misunderstand the nature of basically "parasitic" AI systems, rather than employing them constructively to challenge and develop the human user's powers of comprehension.<ref>''From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds'', Daniel C. Dennett 2017 Penguin pp. 402–3.{{ISBN?}}</ref>

In the 1990s, Dennett collaborated with a group of computer scientists at [[MIT]] to attempt to develop a humanoid, conscious robot, named "Cog".<ref name="boag">{{cite web|last1=Boag|first1=Zan|title=The secret of consciousness, with Daniel C. Dennett|url=https://www.newphilosopher.com/articles/the-secret-of-consciousness-with-daniel-c-dennett/|website=New Philosopher|access-date=14 November 2024|date=12 March 2014}}</ref><ref name="natureObit" /> The project did not produce a conscious robot, but Dennett argued that in principle it could have.<ref name="boag"/>

As given in his penultimate book, ''[[From Bacteria to Bach and Back]]'', Dennett's views were contrary to those of [[Nick Bostrom]].<ref>''From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds'', Daniel C. Dennett 2017 Penguin p. 400.{{ISBN?}}</ref> Although acknowledging that it is "possible in principle" to create AI with human-like comprehension and agency, Dennett maintained that the difficulties of any such "[[Artificial general intelligence|strong AI]]" project would be orders of magnitude greater than those raising concerns have realized.<ref>''From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds'', Daniel C. Dennett 2017 Penguin pp. 164–5, 399–400.</ref> Dennett believed, as of the book's publication in 2017, that the prospect of [[superintelligence]] (AI massively exceeding the cognitive performance of humans in all domains) was at least 50 years away, and of far less pressing significance than other problems the world faces.<ref>''From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds'', Daniel C. Dennett 2017 Penguin pp. 399–400.</ref>

=== Realism ===
Dennett was known for his nuanced stance on realism. While he supported [[scientific realism]], advocating that entities and phenomena posited by scientific theories exist independently of our perceptions, he leant towards instrumentalism concerning certain theoretical entities, valuing their explanatory and predictive utility, as showing in his discussion of [[real patterns]].<ref name="Dennett, D. C. 1991">Dennett, D. C. (1991). Real Patterns. The Journal of Philosophy, 88(1), 27-51.</ref> Dennett's pragmatic realism underlines the entanglement of language, consciousness, and reality. He posited that our discourse about reality is mediated by our cognitive and linguistic capacities, marking a departure from [[Naïve realism]].<ref>Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Little, Brown and Co.</ref>

==== Realism and instrumentalism ====
Dennett's philosophical stance on realism was intricately connected to his views on instrumentalism and the theory of real patterns.<ref name="Dennett, D. C. 1991"/> He drew a distinction between illata, which are genuine theoretical entities like electrons, and abstracta, which are "calculation bound entities or logical constructs" such as centers of gravity and the equator, placing beliefs and the like among the latter. One of Dennett's principal arguments was an instrumentalistic construal of intentional attributions, asserting that such attributions are environment-relative.<ref>{{cite journal|title=Realism, Instrumentalism, and the Intentional Stance - Wiley Online Library|url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1207/s15516709cog0904_5#:~:text=Realism%2C%20instrumentalism%2C%20and%20the%20Intentional,such%20attributions%20ore%20environment%20relative|website=Wiley Online Library|doi=10.1207/s15516709cog0904_5|access-date=October 5, 2023|archive-date=November 14, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231114044508/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1207/s15516709cog0904_5#:~:text=Realism%2C%20instrumentalism%2C%20and%20the%20Intentional,such%20attributions%20ore%20environment%20relative|url-status=live}}</ref>

In discussing intentional states, Dennett posited that they should not be thought of as resembling theoretical entities, but rather as logical constructs, avoiding the pitfalls of intentional realism without lapsing into pure instrumentalism or even eliminativism.<ref>{{cite journal|title=Why Dennett Cannot Explain What It Is To Adopt the Intentional Stance|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2956311#:~:text=Dennett%2C%20intentional%20states%20should%20not,is%20the%20notion%20of%27a%20stance|journal=The Philosophical Quarterly|last1=Slors|first1=Marc|date=January 2, 1996|volume=46|issue=182|pages=93–98|doi=10.2307/2956311|jstor=2956311|access-date=October 5, 2023|archive-date=November 18, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231118055313/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2956311#:~:text=Dennett%2C%20intentional%20states%20should%20not,is%20the%20notion%20of%27a%20stance|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref> His instrumentalism and anti-realism were crucial aspects of his view on intentionality, emphasizing the centrality and indispensability of the intentional stance to our conceptual scheme.<ref>{{cite web|title=The Intentional Stance. DANIEL DENNETT. Cambridge: MIT Press - JSTOR|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2026682#:~:text=Dennett%27s%20instrumentalism%20and%20anti,taken|website=JSTOR|access-date=October 5, 2023|archive-date=November 18, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231118055311/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2026682#:~:text=Dennett%27s%20instrumentalism%20and%20anti,taken|url-status=live}}</ref>