Editing Deterrence theory (section)

=== Cold War ===

==== Concept ====
While the concept of deterrence precedes the Cold War, it was during the Cold War that the concept evolved into a clearly articulated objective in strategic planning and diplomacy, with considerable analysis by scholars.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Betts |first=Richard K. |date=1991 |title=The Concept of Deterrence in the Postwar Era |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636419109347455 |journal=Security Studies |language=en |volume=1 |issue=1 |pages=25–36 |doi=10.1080/09636419109347455 |issn=0963-6412|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Most of the innovative work on deterrence theory occurred from the late 1940s to mid-1960s.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Art |first1=Robert J. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Ez8xCgAAQBAJ |title=The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics |last2=Greenhill |first2=Kelly M. |date=2015 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield Publishers |isbn=978-1-4422-3306-5 |pages=3 |language=en |access-date=2021-08-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240224051621/https://books.google.com/books?id=Ez8xCgAAQBAJ |archive-date=2024-02-24 |url-status=live}}</ref> Historically, scholarship on deterrence has tended to focus on nuclear deterrence.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Shimshoni |first=Jonathan |url=https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.7591/9781501737831/html |title=Israel and Conventional Deterrence |date=1988 |publisher=Cornell University Press |isbn=978-1-5017-3783-1 |pages=1 |language=en |doi=10.7591/9781501737831 |access-date=2021-09-06 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210906141205/https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.7591/9781501737831/html |archive-date=2021-09-06 |url-status=live |s2cid=243305936}}</ref> Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an extension of deterrence scholarship to areas that are not specifically about nuclear weapons.<ref name="Dom Det" />

[[NATO]] was founded in 1949 with deterring aggression as one of its goals.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Rynning |first=Sten |title=NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020 |date=2021 |publisher=T.M.C. Asser Press |isbn=978-94-6265-418-1 |editor-last=Osinga |editor-first=Frans |location=The Hague |pages=29–45 |language=en |chapter=Deterrence Rediscovered: NATO and Russia |doi=10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_3 |pmc=7711749 |editor-last2=Sweijs |editor-first2=Tim}}</ref>

A distinction is sometimes made between nuclear deterrence and "conventional deterrence."<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Wirtz |first=James |date=2018 |title=How Does Nuclear Deterrence Differ from Conventional Deterrence? |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-12_Issue-4/Wirtz.pdf |url-status=live |journal=Strategic Studies Quarterly |language=en |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211025174320/https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-12_Issue-4/Wirtz.pdf |archive-date=2021-10-25 |access-date=2021-09-05}}</ref><ref>{{Citation |last=Mueller |first=Karl |title=The Continuing Relevance of Conventional Deterrence |date=2021 |work=NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020: Deterrence in the 21st Century—Insights from Theory and Practice |pages=47–63 |editor-last=Osinga |editor-first=Frans |series=Nl Arms |publisher=T.M.C. Asser Press |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_4 |isbn=978-94-6265-419-8 |editor2-last=Sweijs |editor2-first=Tim |doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Huntington |first=Samuel P. |date=1983 |title=Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538699 |url-status=live |journal=International Security |volume=8 |issue=3 |pages=32–56 |doi=10.2307/2538699 |issn=0162-2889 |jstor=2538699 |s2cid=154133787 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210905221558/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538699 |archive-date=2021-09-05 |access-date=2021-09-05|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Mearsheimer |first=John J. |date=1982 |title=Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538686 |url-status=live |journal=International Security |volume=7 |issue=1 |pages=3–39 |doi=10.2307/2538686 |issn=0162-2889 |jstor=2538686 |s2cid=154732192 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210905221558/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538686 |archive-date=2021-09-05 |access-date=2021-09-05|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

The two most prominent deterrent strategies are "denial" (denying the attacker the benefits of attack) and "punishment" (inflicting costs on the attacker).<ref name="Act Den" />

[[Lesson of Munich]], where [[appeasement]] failed, contributes to deterrence theory. In the words of scholars [[Fredrik Logevall|Frederik Logevall]] and Kenneth Osgood, "Munich and appeasement have become among the dirtiest words in [[Politics of the United States|American politics]], synonymous with naivete and weakness, and signifying a craven willingness to barter away the nation's vital interests for empty promises." They claimed that the success of [[Foreign policy of the United States|US foreign policy]] often depends upon a president withstanding "the inevitable charges of appeasement that accompany any decision to negotiate with hostile powers.<ref name="Logevall">{{cite journal |last1=Logevall |first1=Fredrik |last2=Osgood |first2=Kenneth |year=2010 |title=THE GHOST OF MUNICH: America's Appeasement Complex |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/27870285 |journal=World Affairs |volume=173 |issue=2 |pages=13–26 |jstor=27870285}}</ref>

==== Examples ====
By November 1945 general [[Curtis LeMay]], who led American [[air raids on Japan]] during World War II, was thinking about how the next war would be fought. He said in a speech that month to the [[Ohio Society of New York]] that since "[[The bomber will always get through|No air attack, once it is launched, can be completely stopped]]", his country needed an air force that could immediately retaliate: "If we are prepared it may never come. It is not immediately conceivable that any nation will dare to attack us if we are prepared".<ref name="rhodes19950611">{{Cite magazine |last=Rhodes |first=Richard |date=1995-06-11 |title=The General and World War III |url=https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1995/06/19/the-general-and-world-war-iii |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191212110359/https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1995/06/19/the-general-and-world-war-iii |archive-date=2019-12-12 |access-date=2023-11-30 |magazine=The New Yorker |language=en-US |issn=0028-792X}}</ref>

In pursuit of nuclear deterrence, the superpowers of the USSR and US engaged in a [[nuclear arms race]]. Warheads themselves evolved from [[Fission weapon|fission weapons]] to [[thermonuclear weapons]], and were extensively miniaturized for both [[Strategic nuclear weapon|strategic]] and [[Tactical nuclear weapon|tactical]] use. [[Nuclear weapons delivery]] was equally important, such as the perceived [[bomber gap]] and [[missile gap]]. Deterrence was a primary factor in the ultimate [[Nuclear proliferation|proliferation of nuclear weapons]] to ten nations in total. Generally this was the form of the threat perceived from a nearby recently nuclear-armed neighbor. In the case of [[Israeli settlement|Israel]] and [[South Africa]] deterrence was against the threat of conventional attack.{{Citeneed|date=May 2025}}

Additionally, chemical weapons were a component of deterrence for both sides, and large stockpiles were maintained until their destruction began following the 1993 [[Chemical Weapons Convention]]. Offensive [[biological weapons]] programs were pursued by both countries in the first two decades of the Cold War, but the United States program was [[Statement on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs|ended by president Richard Nixon in 1969]].{{Citeneed|date=May 2025}}