Editing Dictator game (section)

==Experiments==
In 1988 a group of researchers at the University of Iowa conducted a controlled experiment to evaluate the homo economicus model of behavior with groups of voluntarily recruited economics, accounting, and business students. These experimental results contradict the homo economicus model, suggesting that players in the dictator role take fairness and potential adverse consequences into account when making decisions about how much utility to give the recipient.<ref name="forsythe">{{cite journal |last1=Forsythe |first1=Robert |last2=Horowitz |first2=Joel L. |last3=Savin |first3=N.E. |last4=Sefton |first4=Martin |title=Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments |journal=Games and Economic Behavior |date=May 1994 |volume=6 |issue=3 |pages=347–369 |doi=10.1006/game.1994.1021}}</ref> A later study in neuroscience further challenged the homo economicus model, suggesting that various cognitive differences among humans affect decision-making processes, and thus ideas of fairness.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Camerer |first1=Colin |last2=Loewenstein |first2=George |last3=Prelec |first3=Drazen |title=Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics |journal=Journal of Economic Literature |date=February 2005 |volume=43 |issue=1 |pages=9–64 |doi=10.1257/0022051053737843|citeseerx=10.1.1.133.8842 |s2cid=155893587 }}</ref>

Experimental results have indicated that adults often allocate money to the recipients, reducing the amount of money the dictator receives.<ref name="bolton" /><ref name="forsythe" /><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Liebe|first1=Ulf|last2=Schwitter|first2=Nicole|last3=Tutic|first3=Andreas|date=2019|title=Objective Status, Subjective Status and Prosociality of Swiss Apprentices|journal=[[Swiss Journal of Sociology]]|volume=45|issue=1|pages=57–81|doi=10.2478/sjs-2019-0004|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>For an overview see {{cite book |last1=Camerer |first1=Colin F. |title=Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction |date=2011 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=9781400840885}}</ref> These results appear robust: for example, Henrich et al. discovered in a wide cross-cultural study that dictators allocate a non-zero share of the endowment to the recipient.<ref name="Henrich">{{cite book |author1-link=Joseph Henrich |author1-last=Henrich |author1-first=Joseph |author2-first=Robert |author2-last=Boyd |author3-first=Samuel |author3-last=Bowles |author4-first=Colin |author4-last=Camerer |author5-first=Ernst |author5-last=Fehr |author6-first=Herbert |author6-last=Gintis |author6-link=Herbert Gintis |date=2004 |title=Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=9780199262045}}</ref> In modified versions of the dictator game, children also tend to allocate some of a resource to a recipient and most five-year-olds share at least half of their goods.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Gummerum|first1=Michaela|last2=Hanoch|first2=Yaniv|last3=Keller|first3=Monika|last4=Parsons|first4=Katie|last5=Hummel|first5=Alegra|date=2010-02-01|title=Preschoolers' allocations in the dictator game: The role of moral emotions|journal=Journal of Economic Psychology|volume=31|issue=1|pages=25–34|doi=10.1016/j.joep.2009.09.002}}</ref>

A number of studies have examined [[Framing effect (psychology)|psychological framing]] of the dictator game with a version called "taking" in which the player "takes" resources from the recipient's predetermined endowment, rather than choosing the amount to "give".<ref name="AlevyJeffries2014">{{cite journal|last1=Alevy|first1=Jonathan E.|last2=Jeffries|first2=Francis L.|last3=Lu|first3=Yonggang|title=Gender- and frame-specific audience effects in dictator games|journal=Economics Letters|volume=122|issue=1|year=2014|pages=50–54|issn=0165-1765|doi=10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.030|url=http://www.econpapers.uaa.alaska.edu/RePEC/ala/wpaper/ALA201302.pdf}}</ref><ref name="ZhangOrtmann2013">{{cite journal|last1=Zhang|first1=Le|last2=Ortmann|first2=Andreas|title=The effects of the take-option in dictator-game experiments: a comment on Engel's (2011) meta-study|journal=Experimental Economics|volume=17|issue=3|year=2013|pages=414–420|issn=1386-4157|doi=10.1007/s10683-013-9375-7|s2cid=144098452}}</ref> Some studies show no effect between male and female players, but one 2017 study reported a difference between male and female players in the taking frame, with females allocating significantly more to the recipient under the "taking" frame compared to the "giving" frame, while males showed exactly the opposite behavior – nullifying the overall effect.<ref name="ChowdhuryJeon2017">{{cite journal|last1=Chowdhury|first1=Subhasish M.|last2=Jeon|first2=Joo Young|last3=Saha|first3=Bibhas|title=Gender Differences in the Giving and Taking Variants of the Dictator Game|journal=Southern Economic Journal|volume=84|issue=2|year=2017|pages=474–483|issn=0038-4038|doi=10.1002/soej.12223|s2cid=146250008 |url=http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/73401/1/DGTG.pdf}}</ref>

In 2016, Bhogal et al. conducted a study to evaluate the effects of perceived attractiveness on decision-making behavior and altruism in the standard dictator game, testing theories that altruism may serve as a courtship display. This study found no relationship between attractiveness and altruism.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Bhogal | first1 = M. S. | last2 = Galbraith | first2 = N. | last3 = Manktelow | first3 = K. | year = 2016 | title = Physical Attractiveness and Altruism in Two Modified Dictator Games | journal = Basic and Applied Social Psychology | volume = 38 | issue = 4| pages = 212–222 | doi = 10.1080/01973533.2016.1199382 | hdl = 2436/620176 | s2cid = 147949673 | hdl-access = free }}</ref>

If these experiments appropriately reflect individuals' preferences outside of the laboratory, these results appear to demonstrate that either:
# Dictators' [[utility function]]s include only money that they receive and dictators fail to maximize it.
# Dictators' utility functions may include non-tangible harms they incur (for example [[self-image]] or anticipated negative views of others in society), or
# Dictators' utility functions may include benefits received by others.

Additional experiments have shown that subjects maintain a high degree of consistency across multiple versions of the dictator game in which the cost of giving varies.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Andreoni|first1=James|last2=Miller|first2=John|date=2002-03-01|title=Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism|journal=Econometrica|language=en|volume=70|issue=2|pages=737–753|doi=10.1111/1468-0262.00302|issn=1468-0262|citeseerx=10.1.1.165.3572}}</ref> This suggests that dictator game behavior is well approximated by a model in which dictators maximize utility functions that include benefits received by others, that is, subjects are increasing their utility when they pass money to the recipients. The latter implies they are maximizing a utility function that incorporates the recipient's welfare and not only their own welfare. This is the core of the "other-regarding" preferences. A number of experiments have shown that donations are substantially larger when the dictators are aware of the recipient's need of the money.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Eckel|first1=Catherine C.|last2=Grossman|first2=Philip J.|year=1996|title=Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games|journal=Games and Economic Behavior|volume=16|issue=2 |pages=181–191|ssrn=1883604|location=Rochester, NY|publisher=Social Science Research Network|doi=10.1006/game.1996.0081 |s2cid=58892684 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Brañas-Garza|first=Pablo|date=2006-07-01|title=Poverty in dictator games: Awakening solidarity|journal=Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization|volume=60|issue=3|pages=306–320|doi=10.1016/j.jebo.2004.10.005|citeseerx=10.1.1.378.4031}}</ref>  Other experiments have shown a relationship between [[Participation (decision making)|political participation]], social integration, and dictator game giving, suggesting that it may be an externally valid indicator of concern for the well-being of others.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Fowler|first1=James H.|last2=Kam|first2=Cindy D.|date=2007-08-01|title=Beyond the Self: Social Identity, Altruism, and Political Participation|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=69|issue=3|pages=813–827|doi=10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00577.x|issn=0022-3816|citeseerx=10.1.1.165.2498|s2cid=12533668}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Fowler|first=James H.|date=2006-08-01|title=Altruism and Turnout|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=68|issue=3|pages=674–683|doi=10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00453.x|s2cid=2978329|issn=0022-3816}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Leider|first1=Stephen|last2=Möbius|first2=Markus M.|last3=Rosenblat|first3=Tanya|last4=Do|first4=Quoc-Anh|date=2009-11-01|title=Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks|journal=The Quarterly Journal of Economics|language=en|volume=124|issue=4|pages=1815–1851|doi=10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1815|s2cid=155012972 |issn=0033-5533|url=https://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/14otokka698nb83lk2n7bhqbo2}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Brañas-Garza|first1=Pablo|last2=Cobo-Reyes|first2=Ramón|last3=Espinosa|first3=María Paz|last4=Jiménez|first4=Natalia|last5=Kovářík|first5=Jaromír|last6=Ponti|first6=Giovanni|date=2010-07-01|title=Altruism and social integration|journal=Games and Economic Behavior|volume=69|issue=2|pages=249–257|doi=10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.014|citeseerx=10.1.1.688.2490}}</ref> Regarding altruism, recent papers have shown that experimental subjects in a lab environment do not behave differently to other participants in an outside setting.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Exadaktylos|first1=Filippos|last2=Espín|first2=Antonio M.|last3=Brañas-Garza|first3=Pablo|date=2013-02-14|title=Experimental subjects are not different|journal=Scientific Reports|language=en|volume=3|pages=1213|doi=10.1038/srep01213|issn=2045-2322|pmc=3572448|pmid=23429162|bibcode=2013NatSR...3.1213E }}</ref> Studies have suggested that behavior in this game is heritable.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Cesarini|first1=David|last2=Dawes|first2=Christopher T.|last3=Johannesson|first3=Magnus|last4=Lichtenstein|first4=Paul|last5=Wallace|first5=Björn|date=2009-01-01|title=Genetic Variation in Preferences for Giving and Risk Taking|jstor=40506244|journal=The Quarterly Journal of Economics|volume=124|issue=2|pages=809–842|doi=10.1162/qjec.2009.124.2.809|citeseerx=10.1.1.638.3714|s2cid=13867477 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Brañas-Garza|first1=Pablo|last2=Kovářík|first2=Jaromír|last3=Neyse|first3=Levent|date=2013-04-10|title=Second-to-Fourth Digit Ratio Has a Non-Monotonic Impact on Altruism|journal=PLOS ONE|volume=8|issue=4|pages=e60419|doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0060419|issn=1932-6203|pmc=3622687|pmid=23593214|bibcode=2013PLoSO...860419B |doi-access=free}}</ref>