Editing Distributive justice (section)

=== Justice as fairness ===
In his book ''[[A Theory of Justice]],'' [[John Rawls]] outlines his famous theory about justice as fairness. The theory consists of three core components:<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|last=Rawls|first=John|title=A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition|publisher=Harvard University Press|year=1999|pages=266–267}}</ref>

# the equality of people in rights and liberties;
# the equality of opportunities for all; and
# an arrangement of economic inequalities focused on benefit maximisation for those who are least advantaged.

==== The just 'basic structure' ====
Building a modern view on [[Social contract|social contract theory]], Rawls bases his work on an idea of justice being rooted in the ''basic structure'', constituting the fundamental rules in society, which shape the social and economic institutions, as well as the governance.<ref name=":1">{{Cite book|last=Rawls|first=John|url=https://archive.org/details/theoryjusticerev00rawl|title=A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition|publisher=Harvard University Press|year=1999|isbn=0-674-00078-1|pages=[https://archive.org/details/theoryjusticerev00rawl/page/n32 10]–15|url-access=limited}}</ref> This basic structure is what shapes the citizens’ life opportunities. According to Rawls, the structure is based on principles about [[basic rights]] and duties that any self-interested, rational individual would accept in order to further his/her own interests in a context of social cooperation.<ref name=":1" />

==== The original position ====
{{Main|Original position}}
Rawls presents the concept of an ''original position'' as a hypothetical idea of how to establish "a fair procedure so that any principles agreed on will be just."<ref name=":2">{{Cite book|last=Rawls|first=John|title=A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition|publisher=Harvard University Press|year=1999|page=118}}</ref> In his envisioning of the original position, it is created from a judgement made through negotiations between a group of people who will decide on what a just distribution of primary goods is (according to Rawls, the primary goods include freedoms, opportunities, and control over resources).<ref name=":3">{{Cite book|last=Rawls|first=John|url=https://archive.org/details/theoryjusticerev00rawl|title=A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition|publisher=Harvard University Press|year=1999|pages=[https://archive.org/details/theoryjusticerev00rawl/page/n76 54]–55|url-access=limited}}</ref> These people are assumed to be guided by self-interest, while also having a basic idea of morality and justice, and thus capable of understanding and evaluating a moral argument.<ref name=":3" /> Rawls then argues that procedural justice in the process of negotiation will be possible via a nullification of temptations for these people to exploit circumstances so as to favor their own position in society.<ref name=":2" />

==== Veil of ignorance ====
{{Main|Veil of ignorance}}
This nullification of [[temptation]]s is realised through a ''veil of ignorance'', which these people will be behind. The veil prevents the people from knowing what particular preferences they will have by concealing their talents, objectives, and, most importantly, where in society they themselves will end up. The veil, on the other hand, does not conceal general information about the society, and the people are assumed to possess societal and economic knowledge beyond the personal level.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Rawls|first=John|url=https://archive.org/details/theoryjusticerev00rawl|title=A Theory of Justice|edition=Rev.|publisher=Harvard University Press|year=1999|pages=[https://archive.org/details/theoryjusticerev00rawl/page/n140 118]–119|url-access=limited}}</ref> Thereby, such veil creates an environment for negotiations where the evaluation of the distribution of goods is based on general considerations, regardless of place in society, rather than biased considerations based on personal gains for specific citizen positions.<ref name=":2" /> By this logic, the negotiations will be sensitive to both those who are worst off, given that a risk of being in that category yourself will incentivize protection of these people, but also the rest of society, as one would not wish to hinder maximal utilisation for these in case you would end up in higher classes.

==== Basic principles of a just distribution ====
In this original position, the main concern will be to secure the goods that are most essential for pursuing the goals of each individual, regardless of what this specific goal might be.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Rawls|first=John|url=https://archive.org/details/theoryjustice00rawl_606|title=A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition|publisher=Harvard University Press|year=1999|pages=[https://archive.org/details/theoryjustice00rawl_606/page/n4 10]–12|url-access=limited}}</ref> With this in mind, Rawls theorizes two basic [[Justice as Fairness|principles of just distribution]].

The first principle, the '''liberty principle''', is the equal access to basic rights and liberties for all. With this, each person should be able to access the most extensive set of liberties that is compatible with similar schemes of access by other citizens. Thereby, it is not only a question of positive individual access but also of negative restrictions so as to respect others’ basic rights and liberties.<ref name=":0" />

The second principle, the '''difference principle''', addresses how the arrangement of social and economic inequalities, and thus the just distribution should look. Firstly, Rawls argues that such distribution should be based on a reasonable expectation of advantage for all, but also to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged in society. Secondly, the offices and positions attached to this arrangement should be open to all.<ref name=":0" />

These principles of justice are then prioritised according to two additional principles:<ref name=":0" />

{{Ordered list|the principles of the priority of liberty, wherein basic liberties only can be restricted if this is done for the sake of protecting liberty either:
{{ordered list|type=lower-alpha|1=by strengthening “the total system of liberties shared by all;” or|2=if a less than equal liberty is acceptable to those who are subject to this same lesser liberty.}}|inequality of opportunity, and the priority of efficiency & welfare, can only be acceptable if:
{{ordered list|type=lower-alpha|1=it enhances “the opportunities of those with lesser opportunities” in society; and/or|2=excessive saving either balances out or lessens the gravity of hardship for those who do not traditionally benefit.}}}}