Editing Donald Davidson (philosopher) (section)

===Anomalous monism===
{{Main|Anomalous monism}}
[[Anomalous monism]] is a philosophical thesis about the [[mind–body problem|mind–body relationship]] first proposed by Davidson in his 1970 paper "Mental Events".<ref>{{Citation |last=Davidson |first=D. |title=Mental Events |date=2001 |work=Essays on Actions and Events |pages=207–228 |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/3354/chapter/144438526 |access-date= |edition= |publisher=Oxford University Press |language=en |doi=10.1093/0199246270.003.0011 |isbn=978-0-19-924627-4|url-access=subscription }}</ref> The theory is twofold and states that [[mental event]]s are identical with physical events, and that the mental is anomalous, i.e. under their mental descriptions, causal relations between these mental events are not describable by strict [[physical law]]s. Hence, Davidson proposes an identity theory of mind without the reductive bridge laws associated with the [[Type physicalism|type-identity theory]].

Since in this theory every mental event is some physical event or other, the idea is that someone's thinking at a certain time, for example, that snow is white, is a certain pattern of neural firing in their brain at that time, an event which can be characterized as both a thinking that snow is white (a type of mental event) and a pattern of neural firing (a type of physical event). There is just one event that can be characterized both in mental terms and in physical terms. If mental events are physical events, they can at least in principle be explained and predicted, like all physical events, on the basis of laws of physical science. However, according to anomalous monism, events cannot be so explained or predicted as described in mental terms (such as "thinking", "desiring", etc.), but only as described in physical terms: this is the distinctive feature of the thesis as a brand of [[physicalism]].

Davidson's argument for anomalous monism relies on the following three principles:

:#'''The principle of causal interaction''': there exist both mental-to-physical as well as physical-to-mental causal interactions.
:#'''The principle of the nomological character of causality''': all events are causally related through strict laws.
:#'''The principle of the anomalism of the mental''': there are no strict psychophysical or psychological laws that can causally relate mental events with physical events or mental events with other mental events.

See the main article for an explanation of his argument as well as objections.