Editing Encrypting File System (section)

==Security==
{{Unreferenced section|date=August 2012}}

===Vulnerabilities===
Two significant security vulnerabilities existed in Windows 2000 EFS, and have been variously targeted since.

In Windows 2000, the local administrator is the default Data Recovery Agent, capable of decrypting all files encrypted with EFS by any local user.
EFS in Windows 2000 cannot function without a recovery agent, so there is always someone who can decrypt encrypted files of the users.  Any non-domain-joined Windows 2000 computer will be susceptible to unauthorized EFS decryption by anyone who can take over the local Administrator account, which is trivial given many tools available freely on the Internet.<ref name="ntpasswd">[http://pogostick.net/~pnh/ntpasswd/ ntpasswd, available since 1997] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160212202653/http://pogostick.net/~pnh/ntpasswd/ |date=February 12, 2016 }}</ref>

In Windows XP and later, there is no default local Data Recovery Agent and no requirement to have one. Setting [[SYSKEY]] to mode 2 or 3 (syskey typed in during bootup or stored on a floppy disk) will mitigate the risk of unauthorized decryption through the local Administrator account. This is because the local user's password hashes, stored in the [[Security Account Manager|SAM]] file, are encrypted with the Syskey, and the Syskey value is not available to an offline attacker who does not possess the Syskey passphrase/floppy.

====Accessing private key via password reset====
In Windows 2000, the user's RSA private key is not only stored in a ''truly'' encrypted form, but there is also a backup of the user's RSA private key that is more weakly protected. If an attacker gains physical access to the Windows 2000 computer and resets a local user account's password,<ref name="ntpasswd" /> the attacker can log in as that user (or recovery agent) and gain access to the RSA private key which can decrypt all files.  This is because the backup of the user's RSA private key is encrypted with an LSA secret, which is accessible to any attacker who can elevate their login to LocalSystem (again, trivial given numerous tools on the Internet).

In Windows XP and beyond, the user's RSA private key is backed up using an offline public key whose matching private key is stored in one of two places: the password reset disk (if Windows XP is not a member of a domain) or in the Active Directory (if Windows XP is a member of a domain).  This means that an attacker who can authenticate to Windows XP as LocalSystem still does not have access to a decryption key stored on the PC's hard drive.

In Windows 2000, XP or later, the user's RSA private key is encrypted using a hash of the user's NTLM password hash plus the user name – use of a [[Salt (cryptography)|salted]] hash makes it extremely difficult to reverse the process and recover the private key without knowing the user's passphrase. Also, again, setting Syskey to mode 2 or 3 (Syskey typed in during bootup or stored on a floppy disk) will mitigate this attack, since the local user's password hash will be stored encrypted in the SAM file.

===Other issues===
Once a user is logged on successfully, access to his own EFS encrypted data requires no additional authentication, decryption happens transparently. Thus, any compromise of the user's password automatically leads to access to that data. Windows can store versions of user account passphrases with reversible encryption, though this is no longer default behaviour; it can also be configured to store (and will by default on the original version of Windows XP and lower) Lan Manager hashes of the local user account passphrases, which can be attacked and broken easily. It also stores local user account passphrases as [[NTLM]] hashes, which can be fairly easily attacked using "[[rainbow table]]s" if the passwords are weak (Windows Vista and later versions don't allow weak passwords by default). To mitigate the threat of trivial brute-force attacks on local passphrases, older versions of Windows need to be configured (using the Security Settings portion of Group Policy) to never store LM hashes, and of course, to not enable Autologon (which stores plaintext passphrases in the [[Windows registry|registry]]). Further, using local user account passphrases over 14 characters long prevents Windows from storing an LM hash in the SAM – and has the added benefit of making brute-force attacks against the NTLM hash harder.

When encrypting files with EFS – when converting plaintext files to encrypted files – the plaintext files are not wiped, but simply deleted (i.e. data blocks flagged as "not in use" in the filesystem). This means that, unless they for example happen to be stored on an [[SSD]] with [[Trim (computing)|TRIM]] support, they can be easily recovered unless they are overwritten. To fully mitigate known, non-challenging technical attacks against EFS, encryption should be configured at the folder level (so that all temporary files like Word document backups which are created in these directories are also encrypted). When encrypting individual files, they should be copied to an encrypted folder or encrypted "in place", followed by securely wiping the disk volume. The Windows Cipher utility can be used (with the /W option) to wipe free space including that which still contains deleted plaintext files; various third-party utilities may work as well.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc700811.aspx#XSLTsection125121120120|title=The Encrypting File System|website=technet.microsoft.com}}</ref>

Anyone who can gain Administrators access can overwrite, override or change the Data Recovery Agent configuration. This is a very serious issue, since an attacker can for example hack the Administrator account (using third-party tools), set whatever DRA certificate they want as the Data Recovery Agent and wait. This is sometimes referred to as a two-stage attack, which is a significantly different scenario than the risk due to a lost or stolen PC, but which highlights the risk due to malicious insiders.

When the user encrypts files after the first stage of such an attack, the FEKs are automatically encrypted with the designated DRA's public key. The attacker only needs to access the computer once more as Administrator to gain full access to all those subsequently EFS-encrypted files. Even using Syskey mode 2 or 3 does not protect against this attack, because the attacker could back up the encrypted files offline, restore them elsewhere and use the DRA's private key to decrypt the files. If such a malicious insider can gain physical access to the computer, all security features are to be considered irrelevant, because they could also install [[rootkits]], software or even hardware [[keystroke logging|keyloggers]] etc. on the computer – which is potentially much more interesting and effective than overwriting DRA policy.

===Recovery===
Files encrypted with EFS can only be decrypted by using the RSA private key(s) matching the previously used public key(s).  The stored copy of the user's private key is ultimately protected by the user's logon password. Accessing encrypted files from outside Windows with other operating systems ([[Linux]], for example) is not possible—not least of which because there is currently no third party EFS component driver. Further, using special tools to reset the user's login password will render it impossible to decrypt the user's private key and thus useless for gaining access to the user's encrypted files. The significance of this is occasionally lost on users, resulting in data loss if a user forgets his or her password, or fails to back up the encryption key. This led to coining of the term "delayed recycle bin", to describe the seeming inevitability of data loss if an inexperienced user encrypts his or her files.

If EFS is configured to use keys issued by a Public Key Infrastructure and the PKI is configured to enable Key Archival and Recovery, encrypted files can be recovered by recovering the private key first.

===Keys===
* user password (or smart card private key): used to generate a decryption key to decrypt the user's DPAPI Master Key
* DPAPI Master Key: used to decrypt the user's RSA private key(s)
* RSA private key: used to decrypt each file's FEK
* File Encryption Key (FEK): used to decrypt/encrypt each file's data (in the primary NTFS stream)
* SYSKEY: used to encrypt the cached domain verifier and the password hashes stored in the SAM