Editing End-to-end encryption (section)

== Modern usage ==
{{Update section|date=November 2024|reason=begins with "As of 2016" and makes little-to-no mention of Signal, WhatsApp, and more}}

As of 2016,<ref>{{Cite web|title=A history of end-to-end encryption and the death of PGP|url=https://www.cryptologie.net/article/487/a-history-of-end-to-end-encryption-and-the-death-of-pgp/|access-date=2020-10-30|website=www.cryptologie.net}}</ref> typical [[Server (computing)|server]]-based communications systems do not include end-to-end encryption.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Nabeel|first=Mohamed|title=2017 IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing (EDGE) |chapter=The Many Faces of End-to-End Encryption and Their Security Analysis |date=2017-06-23|chapter-url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ieee.edge.2017.47|publisher=IEEE|pages=252–259|doi=10.1109/ieee.edge.2017.47|isbn=978-1-5386-2017-5|s2cid=3419988}}</ref> These systems can only guarantee the protection of communications between [[Client (computing)|client]]s and [[Server (computing)|server]]s,<ref>{{Cite web|date=2016-02-19|title=What is End-to-end encryption (E2EE) ?|url=https://www.gbnews.ch/what-is-end-to-end-encryption-e2ee/|access-date=2020-11-05|website=Geneva Business News {{!}} Actualités: Emploi, RH, économie, entreprises, Genève, Suisse.|language=fr-FR}}</ref> meaning that users have to trust the third parties who are running the servers with the sensitive content. End-to-end encryption is regarded as safer<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Bai|first1=Wei|last2=Pearson|first2=Michael|last3=Kelley|first3=Patrick Gage|last4=Mazurek|first4=Michelle L.|title=2020 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW) |chapter=Improving Non-Experts' Understanding of End-to-End Encryption: An Exploratory Study |date=September 2020|chapter-url=https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9229664|location=Genoa, Italy|publisher=IEEE|pages=210–219|doi=10.1109/EuroSPW51379.2020.00036|isbn=978-1-7281-8597-2|s2cid=220524858}}</ref> because it reduces the number of parties who might be able to interfere or break the encryption.<ref name="ssdeef">{{cite web|title=End-to-End Encryption|url=https://ssd.eff.org/en/glossary/end-end-encryption|website=EFF Surveillance Self-Defense Guide|publisher=Electronic Frontier Foundation|access-date=2 February 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160305112131/https://ssd.eff.org/en/glossary/end-end-encryption|archive-date=5 March 2016}}</ref> In the case of instant messaging, users may use a third-party client or plugin to implement an end-to-end encryption scheme over an otherwise non-E2EE protocol.<ref>{{cite web|title=How to: Use OTR for Windows|url=https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/how-use-otr-windows|website=EEF Surveillance Self-Defence Guide|publisher=Electronic Frontier Foundation|access-date=2 February 2016|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160120015142/https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/how-use-otr-windows|archive-date=20 January 2016}}</ref>

Some non-E2EE systems, such as [[Lavabit]] and [[Hushmail]], have described themselves as offering "end-to-end" encryption when they did not.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Grauer|first1=Yael|title=Mr. Robot Uses ProtonMail, But It Still Isn't Fully Secure|url=https://www.wired.com/2015/10/mr-robot-uses-protonmail-still-isnt-fully-secure/|magazine=WIRED|language=en-US|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170309013643/https://www.wired.com/2015/10/mr-robot-uses-protonmail-still-isnt-fully-secure/ |archive-date=2017-03-09}}</ref> Other systems, such as [[Telegram (software)|Telegram]] and [[Google Allo]], have been criticized for not enabling end-to-end encryption by default. Telegram did not enable end-to-end encryption by default on VoIP calls while users were using desktop software version, but that problem was fixed quickly.<ref name="cpj-2016-05-31">{{cite web|title=Why Telegram's security flaws may put Iran's journalists at risk|url=https://cpj.org/blog/2016/05/why-telegrams-security-flaws-may-put-irans-journal.php|publisher=Committee to Protect Journalists|access-date=23 September 2016|date=31 May 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160819013449/https://cpj.org/blog/2016/05/why-telegrams-security-flaws-may-put-irans-journal.php|archive-date=19 August 2016}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=Hackett|first=Robert|url=http://fortune.com/2016/05/21/google-allo-privacy-2/|title=Here's Why Privacy Savants Are Blasting Google Allo|date=21 May 2016|website=Fortune|publisher=Time Inc.|access-date=23 September 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160910182246/http://fortune.com/2016/05/21/google-allo-privacy-2/|archive-date=10 September 2016}}</ref> However, as of 2020, Telegram still features no end-to-end encryption by default, no end-to-end encryption for group chats, and no end-to-end encryption for its desktop clients. In 2022, [[Facebook Messenger]] came under scrutiny because the messages between a mother and daughter in [[Nebraska]] were used to seek criminal charges in an [[Abortion in the United States|abortion]]-related case against both of them. The daughter told the police that she had a miscarriage and tried to search for the date of her miscarriage in her Messenger app. Police suspected there could be more information within the messages and obtained and served a warrant against Facebook to gain access. The messages allegedly mentioned the mother obtaining [[Medical abortion|abortion pills]] for her daughter and then burning the evidence. Facebook expanded default end-to-end encryption in the Messenger app just days later.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Duffy |first=Sara O'Brien, Clare |date=2022-08-10 |title=Nebraska teen and mother facing charges in abortion-related case that involved obtaining their Facebook messages {{!}} CNN Business |url=https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/10/tech/teen-charged-abortion-facebook-messages/index.html |access-date=2024-07-26 |website=CNN |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Duffy |first=Clare |date=2022-08-11 |title=Meta testing expanded encryption features amid renewed scrutiny of messaging data {{!}} CNN Business |url=https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/11/tech/meta-messenger-encryption-tests/index.html |access-date=2024-07-26 |website=CNN |language=en}}</ref> Writing for ''Wired'', Albert Fox Cahn criticized Messenger's approach to end-to-end encryption, which was not enabled by default, required opt-in for each conversation, and split the message thread into two chats which were easy for the user to confuse.<ref>{{Cite magazine |last=Cahn |first=Albert Fox |title=Facebook's Message Encryption Was Built to Fail |url=https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-message-encryption-abortion/ |access-date=2024-07-27 |magazine=Wired |language=en-US |issn=1059-1028}}</ref>

Some encrypted [[backup]] and [[file sharing]] services provide [[client-side encryption]]. This type of encryption is not referred to as end-to-end encryption because only one end has the ability to decrypt the data. However, the term "end-to-end encryption" is sometimes incorrectly used to describe client-side encryption.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Improving Non-Experts' Understanding of End-to-End Encryption: An Exploratory Study|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342621891|access-date=2020-11-05|website=ResearchGate|language=en}}</ref>