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Enforcement
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==Enforcement mechanisms== {{See also|Standardization}} {{Excerpt|Public policy|Enforcement}} In 2017, of 265 policies for [[Ocean#Protection|ocean protection]] only 13% had specific enforcement mechanisms.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Al-Abdulrazzak |first1=Dalal |last2=Galland |first2=Grantly R. |last3=McClenachan |first3=Loren |last4=Hocevar |first4=John |title=Opportunities for improving global marine conservation through multilateral treaties |journal=Marine Policy |date=1 December 2017 |volume=86 |pages=247β252 |doi=10.1016/j.marpol.2017.09.036 |bibcode=2017MarPo..86..247A |language=en |issn=0308-597X}}</ref> Enforcement mechanisms are major component of [[governance]] structures.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Aliberti |first1=Marco |last2=Krasner |first2=Stephen D. |chapter=Governance in Space |title=Yearbook on Space Policy 2014 |journal=Yearbook on Space Policy 2014: The Governance of Space |date=2016 |pages=143β166 |doi=10.1007/978-3-7091-1899-3_3 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-3-7091-1898-6 |language=en}}</ref> It has been suggested that an effective [[global health|global]] public [[health policy|health]] security convention would require a governing body (or bodies) to enforce the framework with appropriate enforcement mechanisms.<ref name="10.1016/S2468-2667(21)00070-0">{{cite journal |last1=Duff |first1=Johnathan H |last2=Liu |first2=Anicca |last3=Saavedra |first3=Jorge |last4=Batycki |first4=Jacob N |last5=Morancy |first5=Kendra |last6=Stocking |first6=Barbara |last7=Gostin |first7=Lawrence O |last8=Galea |first8=Sandro |last9=Bertozzi |first9=Stefano |last10=Zuniga |first10=Jose M |last11=Alberto-Banatin |first11=Carmencita |last12=Dansua |first12=Akua Sena |last13=del Rio |first13=Carlos |last14=Kulzhanov |first14=Maksut |last15=Lee |first15=Kelley |last16=Scaglia |first16=Gisela |last17=Shahpar |first17=Cyrus |last18=Ullmann |first18=Andrew J |last19=Hoffman |first19=Steven J |last20=Weinstein |first20=Michael |last21=Szapocznik |first21=JosΓ© |title=A global public health convention for the 21st century |journal=The Lancet Public Health |date=1 June 2021 |volume=6 |issue=6 |pages=e428βe433 |doi=10.1016/S2468-2667(21)00070-0 |pmid=33964227 |pmc=8099565 |language=en |issn=2468-2667}}</ref> Similar approaches include the concept of "climate clubs" of [[polity|polities]] for [[climate change mitigation]]. In such, "border adjustments [...] have to be introduced to target those states that do not participate [...] to avoid shifting effects with ecologically and economically detrimental consequences", with such "border adjustments or [[eco-tariff]]s" incentivizing other countries to adjust their standards and domestic production to join the climate club.<ref name="10.3390/su14074365">{{cite journal |last1=Stubenrauch |first1=Jessica |last2=Garske |first2=Beatrice |last3=Ekardt |first3=Felix |last4=Hagemann |first4=Katharina |title=European Forest Governance: Status Quo and Optimising Options with Regard to the Paris Climate Target |journal=Sustainability |date=January 2022 |volume=14 |issue=7 |pages=4365 |doi=10.3390/su14074365 |language=en |issn=2071-1050|doi-access=free }}</ref> The [[Paris Agreement]] may lack enforcement mechanisms.<ref name="10.1007/s10584-021-03082-4">{{cite journal |last1=King |first1=Lewis C. |last2=van den Bergh |first2=Jeroen C. J. M. |title=Potential carbon leakage under the Paris Agreement |journal=Climatic Change |date=17 April 2021 |volume=165 |issue=3 |pages=52 |doi=10.1007/s10584-021-03082-4 |bibcode=2021ClCh..165...52K |s2cid=233279743 |language=en |issn=1573-1480|url=https://ddd.uab.cat/record/239163 |hdl=1871.1/63469f15-e0ce-4899-9b7b-b95b3fe88177 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> On a national level, penalties for non-complying countries could include: * public reprimands * [[economic sanction]]s * denial of benefits, such as those related to travel, trade, and tourism * public disclosures of compliance, which could act either as an incentive or penalty<ref name="10.1016/S2468-2667(21)00070-0"/> * tariffs<ref name="10.3390/su14074365"/> Benefits for countries could include: * tangible resources, such as financial aid or technical assistance * other support * access to data and information, recommendations and guidance, or other services provided by a governing body<ref name="10.1016/S2468-2667(21)00070-0"/> * tariffs
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