Editing Essence (section)

===Ontological status<!--Linked from Etienne Gilson.-->===
In his dialogues [[Plato]] suggests that concrete beings acquire their essence through their relations to "[[Theory of Forms|forms]]"{{mdash}}abstract universals logically or ontologically separate from the objects of sense perception. These forms are often put forth as the models or paradigms of which sensible things are "copies". Sensible bodies are in constant flux and imperfect and hence, by Plato's reckoning, less real than the forms which are eternal, unchanging, and complete. Typical examples of forms given by Plato are largeness, smallness, equality, unity, goodness, beauty, and justice.

According to [[nominalists]] such as [[William of Ockham]], universals are not concrete entities, just names (i.e., labels); there are only individuals.<ref>Roscelin, ''De gener. et spec.'', 524.</ref> Universals are words that can call to several individuals; for example, the word "homo". Therefore, a universal is reduced to a spoken sound (according to [[Roscelin]]),<ref>Roscelin, ''De generibus et speciebus.''</ref> or the (mental) concept to which it corresponds (as Ockham had it)—rather than a substantial, actual "thing" that exists outside of these contexts.

[[John Locke]] distinguished between "real essences" and "nominal essences". Real essences are the thing(s) that makes a thing a thing, whereas nominal essences are our conception of what makes a thing a thing.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/real-essence/ |title=Locke on Real Essence |website=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]|year=2022 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University }}</ref>

According to [[Edmund Husserl]], essence is ''ideal''. However, ''ideal'' means that essence is an intentional object of consciousness. Essence is interpreted as ''sense''.<ref>E. Husserl, ''Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy'', paragraphs 3 and 4.</ref>