Editing Ethical intuitionism (section)

===Henry Sidgwick===

In the 19th century, ethical intuitionism was considered by most British philosophers to be a philosophical rival of [[utilitarianism]], until [[Henry Sidgwick]] showed there to be several logically distinct theories, both normative and epistemological, sharing the same label.{{sfn|Louden|1996|pp=579–582}} For Sidgwick, intuitionism is about intuitive, i.e. non-inferential, knowledge of moral principles, which are self-evident to the knower.{{sfn|Borchert|2006}} The criteria for this type of knowledge include that they are expressed in clear terms, that the different principles are mutually consistent with each other and that there is expert consensus on them. According to Sidgwick, commonsense moral principles fail to pass this test, but there are some more abstract principles that pass it, like that "what is right for me must be right for all persons in precisely similar circumstances" or that "one should be equally concerned with all temporal parts of one’s life".{{sfn|Craig|1996}}{{sfn|Borchert|2006}} The most general principles arrived at this way are all compatible with ''utilitarianism'', which is why Sidgwick sees a harmony between ''intuitionism'' and ''utilitarianism''.{{sfn|Honderich|2005}} There are also less general intuitive principles, like the duty to keep one's promises or to be just, but these principles are not universal and there are cases where different duties stand in conflict with each other. Sidgwick suggests that we resolve such conflicts in a utilitarian fashion by considering the consequences of the conflicting actions.{{sfn|Craig|1996b}}{{sfn|Borchert|2006}} Inspired by Sidgwick, 20th century philosopher [[C.D. Broad]] would coin the term "[[deontological ethics]]" to refer to the normative doctrines associated with intuitionism, leaving the phrase "ethical intuitionism" free to refer to the epistemological doctrines.{{sfn|Louden|1996|p=587}}