Editing Europe first (section)

==Opposition==
The "Europe First" strategy was not well received by factions of the US military, driving a wedge between the Navy and the Army. While USN Fleet Admiral [[Ernest King]] was a strong believer in "Europe First", contrary to British perceptions, his natural aggression did not permit him to leave resources idle in the Atlantic that could be utilized in the Pacific, especially when "it was doubtful when—if ever—the British would consent to a cross-Channel operation".<ref name=Morison1957_pp13-14>{{Cite book |first=Samuel Eliot |last=Morison |title=History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. XI: Invasion of France & Germany: 1944–1945 |pages=13–14 |publisher= [[Little, Brown and Company]] |year=1957 |isbn=0-316-58311-1}}</ref> King once complained that the Pacific deserved 30% of Allied resources but was getting only 15%, perhaps partly because the two men did not get along,<ref>{{cite web
 |access-date  = 2007-12-30
 |url         = http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWkingE.htm
 |title       = Ernest King
 |author      = Simkin, John
 |publisher   = Spartacus Educational
 |url-status     = dead
 |archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20071229093558/http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWkingE.htm
 |archive-date = 2007-12-29
}}</ref> the combined influence of King and General [[Douglas MacArthur]] increased the allocation of resources to the Pacific War.<ref name=Gray>{{cite book
|access-date=2007-12-30
|url=http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/BigL/BigL-6.html
|chapter=Chapter 6: Joint Logistics in the Pacific Theater
|author=Gray, Anthony W. Jr.
|title=The Big 'L' — American Logistics in World War II
|editor=Alan Gropman
|year=1997
|publisher=National Defense University Press
|location=Washington, D.C.
}}</ref>

General [[Hastings Ismay]], chief of staff to [[Winston Churchill]], described King as:
<blockquote>tough as nails and carried himself as stiffly as a poker. He was blunt and stand-offish, almost to the point of rudeness. At the start, he was intolerant and suspicious of all things British, especially the [[Royal Navy]]; but he was almost equally intolerant and suspicious of the [[United States Army|American Army]]. War against Japan was the problem to which he had devoted the study of a lifetime, and he resented the idea of American resources being used for any other purpose than to destroy Japanese. He mistrusted Churchill's powers of advocacy, and was apprehensive that he would wheedle President Roosevelt into neglecting the war in the Pacific.{{Cn|date=May 2024}}</blockquote>

At the January 1943 [[Casablanca Conference]], King was accused by Field Marshal Sir [[Alan Brooke, 1st Viscount Alanbrooke|Alan Brooke]], [[Chief of the General Staff (United Kingdom)|Chief of the Imperial General Staff]], of favoring the Pacific war, and the argument became heated. The combative US general [[Joseph Stilwell]] wrote: "Brooke got nasty, and King got good and sore. King almost climbed over the table at Brooke. God, he was mad. I wished he had socked him."<ref name=Pogue1973_p305>{{Cite book |first=Forrest C. |last= Pogue |title=George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory 1943–1945 |pages=305 |publisher=Viking Adult |year=1973 |isbn=0-670-33694-7}}</ref>

The American people favored early action against Japan. In one of the few public opinion polls taken during the war, in February 1943, 53% of Americans said that Japan was the "chief enemy" compared to 34% choosing Germany. A later poll showed that 82% of Americans believed that the Japanese were more "cruel at heart" than Germans.<ref>Gallup, George H. ''The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935–1971.'' New York: Random House, 1972, pp. 370,509</ref> As a consequence of the immediate threat and the need to contain Japan's advance across the Pacific, American resources allocated to the defeat of Japan initially exceeded those allocated to Europe. In the first six months the U.S. was in the war, the U.S. army deployed more than 300,000 soldiers overseas to the Pacific while less than 100,000 were sent to Europe.<ref>Leighton, Richard M. and Coakley, Robert W. ''Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940–1943'', Vol 1, Part 5 of ''The U.S. Army in World War II'' Washington: GPO, 1995, p. 716</ref>  The U.S.'s first major offensive during World War II was in the Pacific: [[Guadalcanal campaign|Guadalcanal]] in August 1942. Concurrently, Australian forces attacked and pushed back the Japanese in the [[Kokoda Track Campaign]] in New Guinea.