Editing Federal Intelligence Service (section)

== Operations ==

=== 1960s ===
During the first years of oversight by the State Secretary in the federal chancellery of [[Konrad Adenauer]] of the operation in [[Pullach]], [[Munich (district)|Munich District]], [[Bavaria]], the BND continued the ways of its forebear, the Gehlen Organization.

The BND racked up its initial east–west cold war successes by concentrating on [[East Germany]]. The BND's reach encompassed the highest political and military levels of the GDR regime. They knew the carrying capacity of every bridge, the bed count of every hospital, the length of every airfield, the width and level of maintenance of the roads that Soviet armor and infantry divisions would have to traverse in a potential attack on the West. Almost every sphere of eastern life was known to the BND.<ref>Höhne & Zolling, p. 115</ref>

Unsung analysts at Pullach, with their contacts in the East, figuratively functioned as flies on the wall in ministries and military conferences. When the Soviet KGB suspected an East German army intelligence officer, a lieutenant colonel and BND agent, of spying, the Soviets investigated and shadowed him. The BND was positioned and able to inject forged reports implying that the loose spy was actually the KGB investigator, who was then arrested by the Soviets and shipped off to Moscow.<ref>Höhne & Zolling, p. 212</ref> Not knowing how long the caper would stay under wraps, the real spy was told to be ready for recall; he made his move to the West at the appropriate time.

The East German regime, however, fought back.  With still unhindered flight to the west a possibility, infiltration started on a grand scale and a reversal of sorts took hold.  During the early 1960s as many as 90% of the BND's lower-level informants in East Germany worked as [[double agent]]s for the East German security service, later known as [[Stasi]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.netzeitung.de/deutschland/751973.html|title=BND hatte Tausende Spione in der DDR|access-date=16 July 2008|date=24 September 2007|publisher=Netzeitung.de|language=de|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070521213717/http://www.netzeitung.de/deutschland/751973.html|archive-date=21 May 2007}}</ref> Several informants in East Berlin reported in June and July 1961 of street closures, clearing of fields, accumulation of building materials and police and army deployments in specific parts of the eastern sector, as well as other measures that BND determined could lead to a division of the city. However, the agency was reluctant to report communist initiatives and had no knowledge of the scope and timing because of conflicting inputs. The erection of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961 thus came as a surprise, and the BND's performance in the political field was thereafter often wrong and remained spotty and unimpressive.<ref name="Höhne & Zolling, p. 266">Höhne & Zolling, p. 266</ref>

There was a great success for the Federal Intelligence Service during the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]]. In 1962, the BND was the first Western [[Intelligence agency|intelligence service]] to have information about the stationing of [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] [[Medium-range ballistic missile|medium-range missiles]] on the [[Cuba|caribbean island]] and passed it on to the [[United States]].<ref>{{Cite news |title=968-Seiten-Gutachten über den BND: Das Geheimnis um das geschwärzte Land aus Kapitel 6 |language=de-DE |work=Der Tagesspiegel Online |url=https://www.tagesspiegel.de/gesellschaft/bnd-sperrt-sich-gegen-enthuellungen-wie-der-geheimdienst-eine-historische-studie-zensierte-141665.html |access-date=2022-10-12 |issn=1865-2263}}</ref> Between 1959 and 1961, [[Reinhard Gehlen]] called on [[Federal government of the United States|Washington]] several times in vain to "insert the dangerous [[Communism|communist]] bastion, which at the same time represents an excellent starting point for the communist infiltration of [[Latin America]], into the [USA] sphere of power by rapid access." Gehlen's influence on the US government should not be underestimated, because the BND was able to regularly provide the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] with detailed information about Soviet arms deliveries through its very good sources in Cuba. There are indications that the secret service was also informed about military actions against Cuba. Ten days before the [[Bay of Pigs Invasion|Bay of Pigs invasion]], [[Reinhard Gehlen|Gehlen]] reported to [[Cabinet of Germany|Bonn]]: "Within a relatively short period of time, large-scale military operations to defeat [[Fidel Castro]] will begin." In 1962, the BND also found out from its sources, the Cuban exiles living in Miami, that Cuba was also trying to get hold of weapons through German dealers. According to a BND report, Cuba was also able to recruit four former [[Waffen-SS]] officers as instructors for the Cuban armed forces. However, the identity of the men was blacked out in the report.<ref>{{Cite web |title=BND empfahl Militärschlag gegen Kuba |url=https://www.fr.de/politik/empfahl-militaerschlag-gegen-kuba-11290761.html |access-date=2022-10-12 |website=www.fr.de |date=17 January 2019 |language=de}}</ref>

"This negative view of BND was certainly not justified during ... [1967 and] 1968." The BND's military work "had been outstanding",<ref name="Höhne & Zolling, p. 266" /> and in certain sectors of the intelligence field the BND still showed brilliance: in Latin America and in the Middle East it was regarded{{by whom|date=January 2014}} as the best-informed secret service.<ref name="Höhne & Zolling, p. 244">Höhne & Zolling, p. 244</ref>

The BND offered a fair and reliable amount of intelligence on [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] and [[Soviet-bloc]] forces in Eastern Europe, regarding the elaboration of a [[NATO]] warning system against any Soviet operations against NATO territory, in close cooperation with the [[Bundeswehr]] (German Armed Forces).

One high point of BND intelligence work culminated in its early June 1967 forecast – almost to the hour{{Dubious|date=May 2015}} – of the outbreak of the [[Six-Day War]] in the Middle East on 5 June 1967.{{Citation needed|date=May 2015}}<ref>{{Cite book|last=Ro'i, Yaacov, and Boris Morozov.|title=he Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War|publisher=Stanford University Press}}</ref>

According to declassified transcripts of a [[United States National Security Council]] meeting on 2 June 1967, CIA Director [[Richard Helms]] interrupted Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]] with "reliable information" – contrary to Rusk's presentation – that the Israelis would attack on a certain day and time. Rusk shot back: "That is quite out of the question. Our ambassador in Tel Aviv assured me only yesterday that everything was normal." Helms replied: "I am sorry, but I adhere to my opinion. The Israelis will strike and their object will be to end the war in their favor with extreme rapidity." President Lyndon Johnson then asked Helms for the source of his information. Helms said: "Mr. President, I have it from an allied secret service. The report is absolutely reliable."  Helms' information came from the BND.<ref name="Höhne & Zolling, p. 244" />

A further laudable success involved the BND's activity during the [[Prague Spring|Czech crisis]] in 1968; by then, the agency was led by the second president, Gerhard Wessel.  With Pullach cryptography{{clarify|date=May 2015}} fully functioning, the BND predicted an invasion of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia.{{dubious|date=May 2015}} CIA analysts on the other hand did not support the notion of "fraternal assistance" by the satellite states of Moscow; and US ambassador to the Soviet Union, [[Llewellyn Thompson]], quite irritated, called the secret BND report he was given "a German fabrication".<ref name="Höhne & Zolling, p. 266" /> At 23:11 on 20 August 1968, BND radar operators first observed abnormal activity over Czech airspace. An agent on the ground in Prague called a BND out-station in Bavaria: "The Russians are coming." Warsaw Pact forces had moved as forecast.<ref>Höhne & Zolling, p. 267</ref>

However, the slowly sinking efficiency of BND in the last years of Reinhard Gehlen became evident. By 1961, it was clear that the BND employed some men who were Soviet "moles"; they had come from the earlier Gehlen Organization.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Breitman |first1=Richard |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GnkBYN8ipYcC&dq=soviet+moles+in+the+BND&pg=PA405 |title=U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis |last2=Goda |first2=Norman J. W. |last3=Naftali |first3=Timothy |last4=Wolfe |first4=Robert |date=2005-04-04 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-85268-5 |pages=405 |language=en}}</ref> One mole, Heinz Felfe, was convicted of treason in 1963.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Childs |first1=David |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=k-O-DAAAQBAJ&dq=erwin+tiebel+convicted&pg=PA153 |title=The Stasi: The East German Intelligence and Security Service |last2=Popplewell |first2=Richard |date=2016-07-27 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-1-349-15054-0 |pages=153 |language=en}}</ref> Others were not uncovered during Gehlen's term in office.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Johnson |first=Loch K. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=X7i_I_np11IC&dq=BND+moles++Soviet&pg=PA797 |title=The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence |date=2010-03-12 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-970469-9 |pages=797 |language=en}}</ref>

Gehlen's refusal to correct reports with questionable content strained the organization's credibility, and dazzling achievements became an infrequent commodity. A veteran agent remarked at the time that the BND pond then contained some sardines, though a few years earlier the pond had been alive with sharks.<ref>Höhne & Zolling, p. 213</ref>

The fact that the BND could score certain successes despite East German communist Stasi interference, internal malpractice, inefficiencies and infighting, was primarily due to select members of the staff who took it upon themselves to step up and overcome then existing maladies.  Abdication of responsibility by Reinhard Gehlen was the malignancy; cronyism remained pervasive, even nepotism (at one time Gehlen had 16 members of his extended family on the BND payroll).<ref name="Höhne & Zolling, p. 245">Höhne & Zolling, p. 245</ref> Only slowly did the younger generation then advance to substitute new ideas for some of the bad habits caused mainly by Gehlen's semi-retired attitude and frequent holiday absences.<ref name="Höhne & Zolling, p. 245" />

Gehlen was forced out in April 1968 due to "political scandal within the ranks", according to one source.{{who|date=July 2022}}{{citation needed|date=July 2022}} His successor, [[Bundeswehr]] Brigadier General Gerhard Wessel, immediately called for a program of modernization and streamlining.<ref>Höhne & Zolling, p. 255</ref> With political changes in the West German government and a reflection that BND was at a low level of efficiency, the service began to rebuild. Years later, Wessel's obituary in the ''[[Los Angeles Times]]'', reported that he "is credited with modernizing the BND by hiring academic analysts and electronics specialists".<ref name="latimes.com">{{Cite web |last= |date=2002-08-03 |title=Gerhard Wessel, 88; Did Espionage Work for Hitler, West Germany |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-aug-03-me-passings3-story.html |access-date=2022-08-07 |website=Los Angeles Times |language=en-US}}</ref>

Reinhard Gehlen's memoirs, ''The Service, The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen'' (English title), were published in 1977, (World Publishers, New York). A Review of the book published by the CIA makes this comment about Gehlen's achievements and management style:<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20100327044932/https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol16no3/html/v16i3a06p_0001.htm CIA.gov] The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen by Reinhard Gehlen. Book review by Anonymous</ref> <blockquote>"Gehlen's descriptions of most of his so-called successes in the political intelligence field are, in my opinion, either wishful thinking or self-delusion. ... Gehlen was never a good clandestine operator, nor was he a particularly good administrator. And therein lay his failures. The Gehlen Organization/BND always had a good record in the collection of military and economic intelligence on East Germany and the Soviet forces there. But this information, for the most part, came from observation and not from clandestine penetration".</blockquote>

=== 1970s ===
The agency's second president, Gerhard Wessel, retired in 1978. According to his obituary in the ''[[Los Angeles Times]]'' in August 2002, the "former intelligence officer in Adolf Hitler's anti-Soviet spy operations" ... "is credited with modernizing the BND by hiring academic analysts and electronics specialists".<ref name="latimes.com"/> ''[[The New York Times]]''  News Service obituary lauded the BND's many successes under Wessel but noted that there had been "a number of incidents of East Germans infiltrating the West German government, particularly intelligence agencies, on Gen. Wessel's watch".<ref>{{Cite web |date=August 5, 2002 |title=Gerhard Wessel, 88 |url=https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2002-08-05-0208050063-story.html |access-date=2022-08-07 |website=Chicago Tribune}}</ref>

==== Munich Olympic bombings ====
The [[Munich massacre|kidnapping and murder of Israeli athletes]] at the [[1972 Summer Olympics|1972 Olympics in Munich]] was a watershed event for the BND, following early warnings from other countries, because it led the agency to build counter-terrorism capabilities.

==== Acquisition of Crypto AG ====
In 1970 the CIA and the BND bought the Swiss informations and communication security firm [[Crypto AG]], for $5.75 million. Already in 1967 the BND tried, together with the French intelligence service, to buy the company from its founder Robert Hagelin. This deal though fell through due to Hagelin, who was already cooperating with the CIA, refusing. The CIA at the time did not cooperate with the French. In 1969, after negotiations with the US, the BND approached Hagelin anew and bought the company together with the US intelligence service. Crypto AG produced and sold radio, Ethernet, STM, GSM, phone and fax encryption systems worldwide. Its clients included Iran, Libya, military juntas in Latin America, nuclear rivals India and Pakistan, and even the Vatican. The BND and the CIA rigged the company's devices so they could easily decipher the codes that countries used to send encrypted messages.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/world/national-security/cia-crypto-encryption-machines-espionage/|title=The CIA secretly bought a company that sold encryption devices across the world. Then its spies sat back and listened.|newspaper=The Washington Post|accessdate=6 March 2021}}</ref>

=== 1980s ===

==== Libyan bombings in Germany ====
In 1986, the BND deciphered the report of the [[Libya]]n Embassy in East Berlin regarding the "successful" implementation of the [[1986 Berlin discotheque bombing]].<ref name="malinarich2001">{{cite news| url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1653848.stm | publisher=BBC News | first=Nathalie | last=Malinarich | title=Flashback: The Berlin disco bombing | date=13 November 2001}}</ref>

==== Infiltration into Stasi HQ ====
According to an interview with Stasi defector Col. Rainer Wiegand, BND agents were assigned to use the anti-Stasi protests in East Germany in order to covertly obtain files from Building No. 2, which houses the counterespionage directorate.{{sfn|Koehler|2000|p=456}} Wiegand assisted by providing the blueprints of the building and indicated which offices the agents should prioritize.{{sfn|Koehler|2000|p=456}}

====Operation Summer Rain====
[[Operation Summer Rain]] was a highly classified joint mission involving the 
Federal Intelligence Service and [[Kommando Spezialkräfte|special units]] of the [[Bundeswehr|German Armed Forces]] during the [[Soviet-Afghan War]] in the 1980s. The primary objective of the operation was to gather intelligence on the weapons systems utilized by Soviet forces.<ref>{{Cite web |date=11 May 2015 |title=BND-Agenten waren im Afghanistan-Krieg gegen die Sowjets aktiv |url=https://m.focus.de/politik/ausland/afghanistan/operation-sommerregen-bnd-war-im-afghanistan-krieg-gegen-sowjets-aktiv_id_3265579.html |website=FOCUS online}}</ref>

=== 1990s ===

==== Spying on journalists ====
In 2005, a public scandal erupted (dubbed the ''Journalistenskandal'', journalists scandal) over revelations that the BND had placed a number of German [[journalist]]s under surveillance since the-mid 1990s, in an attempt to discover the source of information leaks from the BND regarding the activities of the service in connection with the war in Iraq and the "war against terror".<ref>{{cite news|title=Wer wusste was und wer geht wann?|url=http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/bnd-journalisten-affaere-wer-wusste-was-und-wer-geht-wann-561412.html|access-date=24 December 2013|newspaper=Der Stern|date=18 May 2006|location=Hamburg, Germany|language=de}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Journalisten bespitzeln war wohl Chefsache|url=https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/bnd-skandal-journalisten-bespitzeln-war-wohl-chefsache/2653606.html|access-date=24 December 2013|newspaper=Das Handelsblatt|date=14 May 2006|location=Berlin, Germany|language=de}}</ref> The Bundestag constituted an investigative committee ("Parlamentarischer Untersuchungsausschuss") to investigate the allegations. The committee tasked the former Federal Appellate Court (Bundesgerichtshof) judge Dr. {{Interlanguage link|Gerhard Schäfer|2=de|3=Gerhard Schäfer (Richter)|preserve=1}} as special investigator, who published a report confirming illegal BND operations involving and targeting journalists between 1993 and 2005.<ref name="Schaefer Bericht">{{cite journal|last=Schäfer|first=Gerhard |title=Vom Parlamentarischen Kontrollgremium des Deutschen Bundestages beauftragter Sachverständiger – Gutachten – Für die Veröffentlichung bestimmte Fassung |date=26 May 2006 |language=de |url=http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/archive/2010/0304/bundestag/ausschuesse/gremien/pkg/bnd_bericht.pdf}}</ref> As a consequence, the Chancellery issued an executive order banning BND operational measures against journalists with the aim to protect the service.<ref>{{cite news|title=Kanzleramt verbietet BND Anwerbung von Journalisten Nach Skandal um Bespitzelung|url=http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/kanzleramt-verbietet-bnd-anwerbung-von-journalisten-nach-skandal-um-bespitzelung/711448.html|access-date=24 December 2013|newspaper=Der Tagesspiegel|date=16 May 2006|author=Sabine Beikler|author2=Barbara Junge|location=Berlin, Germany|language=de}}</ref>

The committee published a final report in 2009,<ref>{{cite web |publisher=Deutscher Bundestag |title=Drucksache 16/13400 – Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des 1. Untersuchungsausschusses nach Artikel 44 des Grundgesetzes |date=18 June 2009 |language=de |url=http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/134/1613400.pdf |pages=414–418}}</ref> which mostly confirmed the allegations, identifying the intent to protect the BND from disclosure of classified information and finding a lack of oversight within the senior leadership of the service but did not identify any responsible members from within the government.<ref>{{cite news|last=Schütz|first=Hans Peter|title=Die Wahrheit darf nicht wahr sein|url=http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/bnd-untersuchungsausschuss-die-wahrheit-darf-nicht-wahr-sein-704124.html|access-date=24 December 2013|newspaper=Der Stern|date=19 June 2009|location=Hamburg, Germany|language=de}}</ref>

==== Tiitinen list ====
In 1990, BND gave the [[Finnish Security Intelligence Service]] the so-called [[Tiitinen list]]—which supposedly contains names of Finns who were believed to have links to [[Stasi]]. The list was classified and locked in a safe after the Director of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, Seppo Tiitinen, and the President of Finland, [[Mauno Koivisto]], determined that it was based on vague hints instead of hard evidence.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.helsinkitimes.fi/htimes2/domestic-news/general/11025-tiitinen-says-he-has-no-recollection-of-names-on-stasi-list-.html|title=Tiitinen says he has no recollection of names on Stasi list|date=2010-05-12|website=helsinkitimes.fi|language=en-gb|access-date=2017-10-22}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/supo_determined_to_keep_tiitinen_list_classified/5844276|title=Supo Determined to Keep Tiitinen List Classified|date=2008-07-15|work=Yle Uutiset|access-date=2017-10-22|language=en}}</ref>

==== Unlicensed armament exports ====
In the wake of the [[German reunification]] in 1991, Israel requested access to GDR weapon systems. In March 1991 a parliamentary commission decided to not give the requested weapons to Israel. Six month later, under the supervision of BND-director Volker Foertsch, the service, in conjunction with elements within the [[Federal Ministry of Defence (Germany)|Federal Ministry of Defence]], still without political clearance to do so, arranged several transfers of the requested GDR weapon systems (an [[2K12 Kub|SA-6]] system, a [[ZSU-23-4 Shilka|ZSU-23/4]] and other equipment) to Israel. The transfers were shipped using the ports and airports of Hamburg, [[Wilhelmshaven]], [[Manching]] and [[RAF Ahlhorn|Alhorn]]. In late 1991, a shipment labeled "agricultural machinery" was unexpectedly inspected by the [[Wasserschutzpolizei]] and weapons were discovered. A state’s attorney started an investigation and parliamentary designated BND-overseer [[Willy Wimmer]] concluded, that control over the BND has been lost. An exasperated Chancellor [[Helmut Kohl]] called the service "idiots". A few weeks later BND president [[Konrad Porzner]] and minister of defence [[Gerhard Stoltenberg]] rated the transfers as not to be problematic, since the equipment was only handed over for trials and was supposed to be returned afterwards.<ref>[[Der Spiegel]] "Der Apparat macht was er will", No.45/1991, 1991, pages 30-38</ref>

=== 2000s ===
{{Global surveillance}}

==== Promoting the invasion of Iraq ====
On 5 February 2003, [[Colin Powell]] made the case for a military attack on Iraq in front of the UN Security Council. Powell supported his case with information received from the BND, instead of Mr. [[Hans Blix]] and the [[IAEA]]. The BND had collected intelligence from an informant known as [[Curveball (informant)|Rafid al-Janabi]] alias CURVEBALL, who claimed Iraq would be in possession of [[Weapons of Mass Destruction]], apart from torturing and killing over 1,000 dissidents each year, for over 20 years. Rafid was employed before and after the 2003 incident which ultimately led to the [[2003 invasion of Iraq|invasion of Iraq]]. The payments of 3,000 Euros monthly were made by a cover firm called Thiele und Friedrichs (Munich). 
As a result of the premature cancellation, al-Janabi filed a lawsuit at the Munich labour court and won the case.<ref>{{cite web|title=Kriegslüge: BND bezahlte irakischen Betrüger|url=http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/archiv/2010/curveball101.html|publisher=ARD Panorama|access-date=13 December 2012}}</ref>

Several former senior BND officials publicly stated that the agency had repeatedly warned the CIA not to take Curveball's information as fact. Hanning, the BND president at the time, even formulated his concerns about that in a letter to then CIA Director [[George Tenet]]. The CIA however ignored those warnings and presented the information as facts.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.thelocal.de/20110828/37237/|title=Ex-spy chief says BND 'misused' for Iraq War|date=28 August 2011|accessdate=6 March 2021}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-real-story-of-curveball-how-german-intelligence-helped-justify-the-us-invasion-of-iraq-a-542840.html|title=The Real Story of 'Curveball': How German Intelligence Helped Justify the US Invasion of Iraq|first1=Holger|last1=Stark|first2=Marcel|last2=Rosenbach|first3=John|last3=Goetz|first4=Erich|last4=Follath|newspaper=Der Spiegel|date=22 March 2008|accessdate=6 March 2021}}</ref>

==== Israel vs. Lebanon ====
Following the [[2006 Lebanon War]], the BND mediated secret negotiations between [[Israel]] and [[Hezbollah]], eventually leading up to the [[2008 Israel–Hezbollah prisoner exchange]].<ref>{{cite news|last=Mascolo |first=Georg |url=http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,444128,00.html |title=Mr. Hezbollah: German Mediates Between Israel and the Shiite Militants |work=Der Spiegel|date=23 October 2006 |access-date=25 September 2013}}</ref>

==== Fighting tax evasion ====
{{main|2008 Liechtenstein tax affair}}
In the beginning of 2008, it was revealed that the BND had managed to recruit excellent sources within [[Liechtenstein]] banks and had been conducting espionage operations in the principality since the beginning of the 2000s. The BND mediated the German Finance Ministry's $7.3 million acquisition of a [[Compact disk|CD]] from a former employee of the [[LGT Group]] – a Liechtenstein bank owned by the country's ruling family. While the Finance Ministry defends the deal, saying it would result in several hundred millions of dollars in back tax payments, the sale remains controversial, as a government agency has paid for possibly [[stolen data]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Analysis_Spy_agency_hunts_tax_evaders_999.html |title=Analysis: Spy agency hunts tax evaders |publisher=Spacewar.com |date=19 February 2008 |author=Stefan Nicola |agency=UPI |access-date=25 September 2013}}</ref>

==== Kosovo ====
In November 2008, three German BND agents were arrested in [[Kosovo]] for allegedly throwing a bomb at the [[European Union]] [[International Civilian Office]], which oversees Kosovo's governance.<ref>[http://www.rferl.org/Content/Three_German_Spies_Await_Release_At_Kosovo_Airport/1354240.html  Three German Spies Await Release At Kosovo Airport] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081204093127/http://www.rferl.org/content/Three_German_Spies_Await_Release_At_Kosovo_Airport/1354240.html |date=4 December 2008}}, RFE/RL, 28 November 2008.</ref> Later the "Army of the Republic of Kosovo" had accepted responsibility for the bomb attack. Laboratory tests had shown no evidence of the BND agents' involvement. However, the Germans were released only 10 days after they were arrested. It was suspected that the arrest was a revenge by Kosovo authorities for the BND report about organized crime in Kosovo which accuses Kosovo Prime Minister [[Hashim Thaçi]], as well as the former Prime Minister [[Ramush Haradinaj]] of far-reaching involvement in organized crime.<ref>[https://www.welt.de/english-news/article2806537/German-spy-affair-might-have-been-revenge.html German spy affair might have been revenge], Welt Online, 30 November 2008.</ref>

==== Austria ====
According to reporting in ''[[Der Standard]]'' and ''[[Profil (magazine)|profil]]'', the BND engaged in espionage in Austria between 1999 and 2006, spying on targets including the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]], the [[Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries]], the [[Austria Press Agency]], embassies, and Austrian banks and government ministries.<ref name="reuters">{{cite news |work=[[Reuters]] |first1=Kristi |last1=Knolle |first2=Madeline |last2=Chambers |editor-first=Ros |editor-last=Russell |title=Austria calls on Germany to clarify spying allegations |date=16 June 2018 |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-austria-germany-spying/austria-calls-on-germany-to-clarify-spying-allegations-idUSKBN1JC0RU}}</ref> The government of Austria has called on Germany to clarify the allegations.<ref name="reuters"/>

=== 2010s ===
{{See also|Germany–United States relations}}
In 2014, an employee of BND was arrested for handing over secret documents to the United States.<ref name="spiegel_09July2014">{{cite news|last1=Baumgärtner, Gebauer, Gude, Medick, Medick, Schindler|title=Spiraling Spying: Suspected Double Agent Further Strains German-US Ties|url=http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/arrest-of-bnd-employee-strains-ties-between-germany-and-us-a-979738.html|access-date=10 July 2014|work=[[Spiegel Online]]|publisher=Spiegel Online GmbH|date=9 July 2014|ref=spiegel_09July2014}}</ref> He was suspected of handing over documents about the committee investigating the [[National Security Agency|NSA]] spying in Germany.<ref name="spiegel_09July2014" /> The German government responded to this espionage by expelling the top [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] official in Berlin.<ref name=bbc_11July2014>{{cite news|last1=Philip J. Crowley|title=PJ Crowley: US-German relations have 'Groundhog Day'|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-28257762|publisher=[[BBC]]|date=11 July 2014|author1-link=Philip J. Crowley}}</ref> In December 2016, [[WikiLeaks]] published 2,420 documents from the BND and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). The published materials had been submitted in 2015 as part of a German parliamentary inquiry into the surveillance activities of the BND and its cooperation with the US [[National Security Agency]].<ref name=dw_1Dec2016>{{cite news|last1=Deutsche Welle|title=Wikileaks releases 2,420 documents from German government NSA inquiry|url=http://www.dw.com/en/wikileaks-releases-2420-documents-from-german-government-nsa-inquiry/a-36609515|work=[[Deutsche Welle]]|date=1 December 2016|author1-link=Deutsche Welle}}</ref> The BND has been reported to store 220 million sets of [[metadata]] every day.<ref>Biermann, K. (2015) [http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2015-02/bnd-nsa-mass-surveillance/komplettansicht BND stores 220 million telephone data – every day]. Zeit Online, 2 February 2015.</ref> That is, they record with whom, when, where and for how long someone communicates. This data is supposedly collected across the world, but the exact locations remains unclear to this date. The [[German Parliamentary Committee investigating the NSA spying scandal|Bundestag committee investigating the NSA spying scandal]] has uncovered that the German intelligence agency intercepts communications traveling via both [[satellites]] and [[Internet]] cables. It seems certain that the metadata only come from "foreign dialed traffic", that is, from telephone conversations and text messages that are held and sent via mobile phones and satellites. Of these 220 million data amassed every day, one percent is archived for 10 years "for long-term analysis". Apparently though, this long-term storage doesn't hold any Internet communications, data from social networks, or emails.

In December 2022, a high-ranking employee of the BND was arrested on alleged treason. Carsten L. is said to have disclosed information from his professional activity to the Russian domestic secret service [[Federal Security Service|FSB]]. The [[Public Prosecutor General (Germany)|Public Prosecutor General]] accuses him of treason ("Landesverrat") because it is said to have been state secrets.<ref>{{Cite web |last=tagesschau.de |title=Deutscher wegen mutmaßlicher Spionage für Russland festgenommen |url=https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/russland-spionage-100.html |access-date=2023-08-09 |website=tagesschau.de |language=de}}</ref>