Editing First Triumvirate (section)

=== Formation ===
The alliance between [[Pompey]], [[Crassus]], and [[Caesar]] emerged due to their failure to pass various core portions of their programmes in the gridlocked state of Roman politics in the years before 60&nbsp;BC. All three had wanted something but were stymied by their rivals in the senate and assemblies.{{sfn|Russell|2015}}

==== Pompey ====
Pompey, having returned two years earlier from the [[Third Mithridatic War]], wanted ratification of his [[peace settlement]]s in the east. He also sought lands for his veterans to retire on.{{sfnm|Drogula|2019|1pp=109, 112|Russell|2015}} After Pompey's return from the [[Sertorian War]] from [[Hispania]] in 71&nbsp;BC, he had been able to secure a similar bill distributing land to his veterans; he also had sent subordinates back to Rome to stand for the tribunate in attempts to bring the relevant legislation forward (an attempt in 63&nbsp;BC was opposed by then-consul [[Cicero]] in ''De lege agraria'').{{sfnm|Drogula|2019|1p=109|Drogula|2019|2p=109 n. 26}} Further attempts in 62&nbsp;BC had led to his [[Quintus Caecilius Metellus Nepos (consul 57 BC)|allied tribune]] fleeing the city. While he was successful in getting one of his men, [[Marcus Pupius Piso Frugi Calpurnianus]], elected consul for 61&nbsp;BC, an intervening religious scandal had made it impossible for him to push forward the appropriate land resettlement legislation.{{sfn|Drogula|2019|p=109}} Through massive bribes, Pompey also secured the election of more of his men to offices in 60&nbsp;BC ([[Lucius Afranius (consul)|Lucius Afranius]] as consul; Lucius Flavius as one of the [[plebeian tribunes]]), but they too were stymied.{{sfn|Drogula|2019|p=111}} [[Cato the Younger]] and [[Quintus Caecilius Metellus Celer]], motivated in part by their dislike of Pompey's having previously and irregularly displaced their friend [[Lucullus]] from a previous command against [[Mithridates VI Eupator|Mithridates]], Pompey's recent divorce of Celer's half-sister in a failed attempt to form a marriage alliance with Cato,{{sfn|Drogula|2019|p=107}} and also by their fear of Pompey's power, led to an obstructive coalition.{{sfnm|Drogula|2019|1p=111|Russell|2015}} Lucullus returned from his semi-retirement to demand an in-depth review of every aspect of [[Pompey's Eastern Settlement|Pompey's eastern arrangements]]; "this would take a tremendous amount of time and would prevent passage of the bill for the foreseeable future".{{sfn|Drogula|2019|p=113}} Without capable allies in the magistracies – both Piso and Afranius were ineffective – Pompey was forced to look elsewhere for allies.{{sfn|Gruen|1995|p=87}}

==== Crassus ====
Crassus was one of the richest men in Rome, having made his fortune by profiting from the [[Sulla]]n [[proscription]]s.{{sfn|Badian|2012a}} He was a patron for Rome's [[Equites|equestrian]] [[Publican|businessmen]]. With Pompey, he had served as consul in 70&nbsp;BC.{{sfn|Broughton|1952|p=126}} Those [[publicani|public contractor]]s had massively over-bid on tax contracts for the province of [[Asia (Roman province)|Asia]] (parts of modern western [[Turkey]]) because they failed to account for the devastation of the [[Third Mithridatic War]].{{sfn|Drogula|2019|p=114}} His clients demanded a reduction in the taxes they were contractually obliged to deliver to the treasury, a goal also stymied by Cato and Celer in December 61&nbsp;BC.{{sfnm|Drogula|2019|1p=115|Russell|2015}} While senators such as Cicero personally believed "it was ridiculous for [the tax farmers] to seek to have their contracts renegotiated or cancelled simply because they had overestimated their potential profits", the senate had been on the verge of approving the legislation before Celer's intervention.{{sfn|Drogula|2019|p=115}} Crassus, a personal enemy of Pompey, also opposed Pompey's settlements and land bills in 60&nbsp;BC, successfully mobilising his support among the lower-ranked senators to defeat Pompey's proposals.{{sfn|Gruen|1995|p=86–87}} His opposition to Pompey may have been in attempt to win over the senators blocking his own goals, but this was evidently unsuccessful.{{sfn|Drogula|2019|p=114}} Passing renegotiation of these tax contracts was vital for Crassus: "his reputation and influence depended on his ability to act as a champion for the powerful equestrian order".{{sfn|Drogula|2019|p=117}}

==== Caesar ====
Caesar in 60&nbsp;BC was the recently returning governor of [[Hispania Ulterior]].{{sfn|Drogula|2019|p=119}} At this point, he was the least powerful of the three,{{sfn|Russell|2015}} although he had, in an upset, won election as [[pontifex maximus]] in 63&nbsp;BC.{{sfn|Broughton|1952|p=171}} Energetic and a capable supporter of Pompey for the last decade, he was also indebted to Crassus, who was a guarantor of Caesar's debts.{{sfn|Gruen|1995|pp=87–88}} Upon his early return from Spain in June 60&nbsp;BC,{{sfn|Millar|1998|p=123}} he was forced to choose between [[Pomerium|entering the city]] to declare candidacy for the consulship, which would dissolve his [[Imperium|military command]] and make him ineligible for a [[Roman triumph|triumph]], or staying outside of the city in an attempt to work a triumph from the senate.{{sfn|Drogula|2019|pp=119–20}} While the senate had regularly permitted candidacies ''in absentia'', Cato [[filibuster]]ed Caesar's request; Caesar, shockingly, gave up his triumphal eligibility to declare his candidacy.{{sfn|Drogula|2019|p=120}} Caesar was the known favorite for the consulship; to hobble him, Cato and his allies took two actions. They sought to assign the yet-to-be-elected consuls of 59&nbsp;BC to home defence in Italy and sought the election of an uncooperative consular colleague.{{sfn|Drogula|2019|p=121}}<ref>The traditional narrative is the senate assigned the consuls of 59 to forests and country paths (''silvae callesque'') to rob them of a profitable governorship. Others, such as Rhodes and Balsdon, have instead suggested the warrant was to defend Italy from northern invasion and defer assignment to later senatorial initiative. {{harvnb|Rhodes|1978}}.</ref> In both respects, they were successful: the consuls of 59 received commands that put them in a holding pattern and Cato secured election of his son-in-law and a personal enemy of Caesar's, [[Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus]], as Caesar's co-consul.{{sfnm|Rhodes|1978|1p=620, noting assignment to the ''silvae callesque'' was "intended not... as a device to cheat Caesar... but as a token province which would satisfy the requirements of the law [the ''[[lex Sempronia de provinciis consularibus]]''] [and] leave the senate free to delay a serious decision until the [threat] in Gaul had become clearer"|Drogula|2019|2p=121}} Caesar won his election handily, but to turn his provincial assignment into glory and defeat Bibulus' obstruction, he would need allies.{{sfnm|Gruen|1995|1p=89|Drogula|2019|2p=125}}

==== Timing ====
Scholars have debated the specific date at which the alliance was formed.{{sfn|Gruen|1995|p=88}} [[Plutarch]], [[Livy]], and [[Appian]] placed the formation of the alliance before Caesar's election; [[Velleius Paterculus|Velleius]], [[Suetonius]] and [[Cassius Dio]] instead put its formation after his election.{{sfnm|Drogula|2019|1p=125|Gruen|1995|2pp=88 n. 18, 89 n. 20}}

During the elections to the consulship, Caesar certainly received support from both Pompey and Crassus, though "each for his own reasons... Crassus cultivated promising adherents[;] Pompey needed a strong figure in the consulship".{{sfn|Gruen|1995|p=88}} Against the later literary sources, however, a contemporaneous letter to Cicero, where Caesar asked to form a political alliance, also implies Caesar had not yet reconciled Pompey and Crassus by December of 60, months after his election in the summer.{{sfn|Gruen|1995|p=88}} Erich Gruen, in ''Last Generation of the Roman Republic'', believes this letter, combined with the fact that Pompey and Crassus would have alienated each-other with any overt support for Caesar's candidacy, places the alliance's formation decisively after Caesar's consular election.<ref>{{harvnb|Gruen|1995|pp=88–89|ps=. "The conjoining of forces... postdates the inception of Caesar's consulship... only after [Caesar] was safely voted into the consulship would he move to effect reconciliation".}}</ref> Some historians believe Caesar, in his letter to Cicero, may have been coy ("it may also be that Caesar was not yet showing Cicero all of his cards"{{sfn|Drogula|2019|p=126}}) but it did show that Caesar "was not specifically looking at building a triumvirate, but rather was looking to build as strong a coalition as possible".{{sfn|Drogula|2019|p=126}} This evidence – especially disclosure that a pact was sought{{sfn|Drogula|2019|p=126 n. 82}} – places the formation of the alliance some time between July 60 and January 59&nbsp;BC.{{sfn|Drogula|2019|p=127}}{{sfn|Millar|1998|p=124}}

The purpose of the alliance was to secure something that none of the three men could secure alone. If Pompey and Caesar aligned alone, they would not likely be able to overcome opposition to Pompey's proposals in the senate. Pompey and Crassus were personal rivals who could only align through an intermediary. Caesar was that intermediary.{{sfnm|Gruen|1995|1p=89|Drogula|2019|2p=126}} Crassus' motives are less clear. He must have wanted more than simply renegotiation of tax contracts. Crassus' additionally would be one of the administrators for the Pompeian land grants and, in doing so, "the preeminence which Crassus could not quite attain on his own [came] within his grasp".{{sfn|Gruen|1995|pp=89–90}} Caesar needed the alliance as well: he would fully become his own man, "escap[ing] the subordinate stature of Pompey's other ''amici''", defeat the political opposition, and win a profitable command.{{sfn|Gruen|1995|p=89}}