Editing Free Exercise Clause (section)

==Compelling interest==
The Supreme Court under [[Warren Court|Earl Warren]] adopted an expansive view of the Free Exercise Clause. In ''[[Sherbert v. Verner]]'' (1963) the Court held that states must have a "compelling interest" to refuse to accommodate religiously motivated conduct. The case involved Adele Sherbert, who was denied unemployment benefits by [[South Carolina]] because she refused to work on Saturdays, something forbidden by her [[Seventh-day Adventist Church|Seventh-day Adventist]] faith. In ''[[Wisconsin v. Yoder]]'' (1972), the Court ruled that a law that "unduly burdens the practice of religion" without a [[compelling interest]], even though it might be "neutral on its face," would be unconstitutional.

''In [[O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz]]'' (1987), the Court held that the prison regulations were not a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of  to deprive an inmate of attending a religious service for "legitimate penological interests."

The "compelling interest" doctrine became much narrower in 1990, when the Supreme Court held in ''[[Employment Division v. Smith]]'' that, as long as a law does not target a particular religious practice, it does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. ''Smith'' set the [[Precedent#United_States_legal_system|precedent]]<ref name="20210617VoxMillhiser">{{cite web | url = https://www.vox.com/2021/6/17/22538645/supreme-court-fulton-philadelphia-lgbtq-catholic-social-services-foster-care-john-roberts-religion | title = An epic Supreme Court showdown over religion and LGBTQ rights ends in a whimper | first = Ian | last = Millhiser | date = June 17, 2021 | accessdate = June 17, 2021 | work = [[Vox (website)|Vox]]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210618192557/https://www.vox.com/2021/6/17/22538645/supreme-court-fulton-philadelphia-lgbtq-catholic-social-services-foster-care-john-roberts-religion|archive-date=June 18, 2021 }}</ref> "that laws affecting certain religious practices do not violate the right to free exercise of religion as long as the laws are neutral, generally applicable, and not motivated by animus to religion."<ref>{{cite web | url = https://www.advocate.com/news/2021/6/17/what-supreme-court-ruling-foster-care-means-lgbtq-parents | title = What the Supreme Court Ruling on Foster Care Means for LGBTQ+ Parents | first = Trudy | last = Ring | date = June 17, 2021 | accessdate = June 17, 2021 | work = [[The Advocate (LGBT magazine)|The Advocate]]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210618164810/https://www.advocate.com/news/2021/6/17/what-supreme-court-ruling-foster-care-means-lgbtq-parents|archive-date=June 18, 2021 }}</ref> In 1993, the Supreme Court revisited the Free Exercise Clause in ''[[Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah]]''. Hialeah had passed an ordinance banning ritual slaughter, a practice central to the [[Santería]] religion, while providing exceptions for some practices such as the [[kashrut|kosher slaughter]] of Judaism. Since the ordinance was not "generally applicable," the Court ruled that it was subject to the compelling interest test, which it failed to meet, and was therefore declared unconstitutional. In 2017, the Court applied this doctrine in ''[[Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer|Trinity Lutheran v. Comer]]'', holding that there must be a compelling state interest for express discrimination based on religious status in government funding schemes. Also in 1993, Congress passed the [[Religious Freedom Restoration Act]] (RFRA), which sought to restore the general applicability of the "compelling interest" standard present prior to ''Employment Division v. Smith''. However, in ''[[City of Boerne v. Flores]]'' (1997) the Court struck down as exceeding Congress's powers those provisions of the Act that forced state and local governments to provide protections exceeding those required by the First Amendment. Thus, state and local government actions that are facially neutral toward religion are judged by the ''Employment Division v. Smith'' standard rather than RFRA. According to the court's ruling in ''[[Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal|Gonzales v. UDV]]'' (2006), RFRA remains applicable to federal statutes, which must therefore still meet the "compelling interest" standard in free exercise cases.