Editing Full Faith and Credit Clause (section)

== Interpretation ==
In 1790, shortly after the Constitution had been ratified, Congress took action under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, enacting that "the records and judicial proceedings, authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every Court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the Courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken."<ref>Act of May 26, 1790 titled, "An Act to Prescribe the Mode in Which the Public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings in Each State, Shall Be Authenticated So As to Take Effect in Every Other State."  The 1790 act was the progenitor of an act that is codified at {{UnitedStatesCode|28|1738}}.  The current act was [https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1738- amended in 1948] to give state statutes the same interstate effect as state judgments.</ref>  In 1813, the Supreme Court interpreted this federal statute, in the leading case of ''Mills v. Duryee'', where the judgment of a New York court was used in a local District of Columbia court.<ref>''Mills v. Duryee'', {{ussc|11|481|1813}}.</ref> Justice [[Joseph Story]] wrote for the Court that it was the federal statute (rather than the constitutional provision) that made records from one state effective in another state:

{{quote|It is argued, that this act provides only for the admission of such records as evidence, but does not declare the effect of such evidence, when admitted. This argument cannot be supported. The act declares, that the record, duly authenticated, shall have such faith and credit as it has in the state court from whence it is taken. If in such court it has the faith and credit of evidence of the highest nature, viz., record evidence, it must have the same faith and credit in every other court.}}

Although the Court was engaged in statutory interpretation in ''Mills'', the Court eventually characterized ''Mills'' as a constitutional decision, in the 1887 case of ''Chicago & Alton v. Wiggins''.<ref>''Chicago & Alton v. Wiggins'', {{ussc|source=f|119|615|1887}}: "Without doubt the constitutional requirement (article 4, 1) ... implies that the public acts of every state shall be given the same effect by the courts of another state that they have by law and usage at home. This is clearly the logical result of the principles announced as early as 1813, in Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481, and steadily adhered to ever since."</ref> During the following decades and centuries, the Supreme Court has recognized a "[[public policy]] exception" to both the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the accompanying federal statute.  In 1939, the Court in ''[[Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n|Pacific Employers Insurance v. Industrial Accident]]'' wrote:
<blockquote>[T]here are some limitations upon the extent to which a state may be required by the full faith and credit clause to enforce even the judgment of another state in contravention of its own statutes or policy. See ''Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co.'', 127 U.S. 265; ''Huntington v. Attrill'', 146 U.S. 657; ''Finney v. Guy'', 189 U.S. 335; see also ''Clarke v. Clarke'', 178 U.S. 186; ''Olmsted v. Olmsted'', 216 U.S. 386; ''Hood v. McGehee'', 237 U.S. 611; cf. ''Gasquet v. Fenner'', 247 U.S. 16.  And in the case of statutes...the full faith and credit clause does not require one state to substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons and events within it, the conflicting statute of another state, even though that statute is of controlling force in the courts of the state of its enactment with respect to the same persons and events.<ref>''Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n'', [http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=306&invol=493 306 U.S. 493], 502 (1939).</ref></blockquote>

The Supreme Court continues to apply its public policy exception differently for state judgments as compared to state laws.  In the 2003 case of ''Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt'', the Court reiterated that, "[o]ur precedent differentiates the credit owed to laws (legislative measures and common law) and to judgments."<ref name="Franchise">''Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt'', [http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=000&invol=02-42 538 U.S. 488], 494 (2003), quoting ''Baker v. General Motors'', 522 U. S. 222, 232 (1998).</ref>

If the legal pronouncements of one state conflict with the public policy of another state, federal courts in the past have been reluctant to force a state to enforce the pronouncements of another state in contravention of its own public policy.  In cases of out-of-state [[judgments]], the Court has stated that there may be exceptions to the enforcement and jurisdiction of out-of-state judgments, but maintains that there is no public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause for judgments.<ref>''Baker v. General Motors'', {{ussc|source=f|522|222|1998}}.</ref>

Federal statutory law (28 USC § 1738) provides that:

{{quote|Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.<ref>{{UnitedStatesCode|28|1738}}</ref>}}